Discussing Latin America (II): Where is Nicaragua Headed? Part Two

Several days ago, Mr. Trend pointed out a couple contrasting interpretations about Nicaragua's economic future from Foreign Policy and World Focus. I won't rehash what was already said in the previous post, but I do want to make a few observations. 

First, the Foreign Policy article really has nothing useful to say about Nicaragua's future. The comparison with Iceland, as pointed out in the comments in the previous post, is absurd. Iceland is an industrialized nation with major connections to the global economy. The financial collapse in Iceland could not even possibly take place in Nicaragua largely because of the nature of Nicaraguan economy. Nicaragua is already incredibly poor, right up there with Haiti as one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere. The connection between the health of financial institutions and the well being of most Nicaraguans is fairly tenuous; any collapse of financial institutions in Nicaragua would have an impact on the daily lives of people, but since they are so close to subsistence levels as of now, it is hard for me to imagine how a collapse would in any way be comparable to what happened in Iceland. 

Moreover, the reasons why Nicaragua's economy might be on the verge of collapse as stated by Foreign Policy make little sense. They first suggest a drop in remittances from the U.S. will affect the Nicaraguan economy. While the role of remittances from the US to Nicaragua does matter to a certain extent, it is much smaller than in other countries such as Mexico and El Salvador. There just aren't that many Nicaraguans living in the U.S. compared to other Latin American populations. Nicaragua also depends a lot on remittances from Costa Rica, so the extent to which the U.S. financial crisis affects the Costa Rican economy will matter just as much for the health of Nicaragua's. Maybe Mr. Trend has some insight on how Costa Rica is doing economically? I really have no idea. 

Foreign Policy also points out the fall in coffee prices as a sign of pending financial ruin in Nicaragua. Please. First off, Nicaragua exports other agricultural goods, as well as textiles and apparel. The economy is not completely dependent on coffee prices. Second, the fluctuations in coffee prices is basically a constant throughout Central American history. While they have an impact, governments and economies do not rise and fall with the price of coffee.

The World Focus piece seems a little over optimistic and sugar coats a lot, but I do tend to agree Nicaragua has the potential to grow economically. However, the key word here is 'potential.' What the article does not mention (because it primarily focuses on just Managua) is that there is a major lack of basic infrastructure in Nicaragua. This lack of infrastructure, such as paved roads, sewage, water, electricity, and development of  communications networks, is a major stumbling block for encouraging capitalist investment in the country. Tourist infrastructure is still fairly basic, and nonexistent in many parts of the country. As a result, tourism is likely to remain limited to those who enjoy a more rustic experience. 

The other major stumbling block is the political situation, and I don't mean just Ortega. Political and legal institutions are generally not respected, and have been in a constant state of flux since 1990. From an foreign investment standpoint, the fluidity of the rule of law may not be particularly attractive since the political situation is unpredictable. 

I want to make clear that my particular criticisms of the Nicaraguan economy and the state, are not a result of anything unique to Daniel Ortega, or the Sandinistas more generally. These are historical problems that I would argue go back to the beginning of the 20th century, and maybe before. Generally, I think recent governments, including Ortega's, have been making attempts to promote economic growth, but the problems they face are so huge that its hard to be optimistic about anything that happens in the short term.

Discussing Latin America (II): Which Way Is Nicaragua Headed?

Last week, the Latin Americanist put up two conflicting articles on Nicaragua. On the one hand, Foreign Policy suggested that Nicaragua was one of five countries that could be "the next Iceland" (i.e., go bankrupt), saying remittances from the to Nicaragua, which play a major role in the Nicaraguan economy, will probably drop, perhaps drastically. This drop would accompany a drop in coffee exports, one of Nicaragua's major sources of income in the international market, as prices drop off in the face of a global depression (this is nothing new - Brazil was similarly hit in the 1930s, and Costa Rica and others were ravaged in the 1970s and early 1980s. Incidentally, in the case of Costa Rica, the collapse in the coffee economy actually played a major role in the development of eco-tourism as an alternate source of national income, a hugely successful policy that is still keeping that country stable even today). Finally, Foreign Policy argues that Ortega's increasingly authoritarian rule is isolating foreign partners, leading to reduced international aid for and investment in Nicaragua under Ortega.

On the other hand, World Focus foresees Nicaragua on the verge of great economic success. In the video, it reports that anti-Americanism has declined, leading to a growth in tourism. It also suggests that Ortega has taken a pro-business stance that has helped the economy to grow, and that while there is political opposition, the economy is ready to boom because of the increased business opportunities for foreign investment and a rise in tourism.

Clearly, these are two diametrically opposed stances. I asked Yann about this, and he will have more to say later, but I wanted to comment on a few things (though I will defer to his expertise on Nicaragua, which is much greater than mine). I suspect it falls somewhere between the two. I really don't see any evidence that Nicaragua's government is about to go bankrupt, for a couple of reasons. First, from what I can see, there's just no evidence that it's on a major economic precipice. Secondly, it goes without saying that Iceland's particular conditions and contexts are different from Nicaragua's. I can't see any current or historical reasons or evidence to believe that, if Nicaragua were to really flounder economically, organizations like the IMF or the World Bank wouldn't be ready to swoop in with more loans that Ortega very well may take. After all, the U.S. has had economic interests in Nicaragua for well over one hundred and fifty years. Yes, the U.S. has withdrawn aid due to Ortega's actions, but we've never had a problem looking the other way in the past when it was to our financial or political interests.

That said, I don't think Nicaragua's really ready to boom, either. Ortega can make all of the pro-business pitches he wants, but the fact that the U.S. and the European Union are witholding aid are important. Businesses may be investing in Nicaragua, and that could set off some of the aid withdrawal, but not all. What is more, the World Press article seems to put a lot of faith on the importance of tourism and ex-pats, which would be fine if we weren't in the midst of a global recession with no sign of exiting anytime soon. But we are, and one of the first things that goes when recessions hit globally is tourism. Certainly, some people who would have like to go to Asia or Africa or some expensive vacation may opt for Nicaragua instead, but I don't think that would be a very significant number of people. And the evidence for an inexpensive lifestyle seems deceptive, as the report only cites an American ex-pat who comments, "I can afford it. I can live the good life on a postal pension." That's fine, but that says more about borderline colonialist and exploitative mentalities than it does about the general cost of living for Nicaraguans themselves, many of whom remain in poverty despite government programs designed to finally help Nicaragua's poor.

In short, it will be interesting to see where Nicaragua goes, but it's as interesting to see how two respected journalistic sources could come to opposite conclusions on this issue. Again, I think it's somewhere in the middle - Nicaragua is neither about to experience a full-blown collapse, nor is it about to enter a new golden age. Political repression under Ortega is a real problem. And while he may be making strides to help the poor, his human rights record is far from good, and claims that he wants "equality for all" are hard to swallow when one considershis stance towards women's rights). If push came to shove, I'd probably have to say Nicaragua is facing an uphill climb, simply because there are few countries in the global economy right now that aren't facing an uphill climb, but I could be wrong. I look forward to Yann's comments on this.

Discussing Latin America - A (Very Belated) Response on Political Parties

Awhile back, Yann and I discussed the nature of political parties whose identities were rooted in a particular historical figure. I originally pondered the roles of figures like Augusto Sandino, Farabundo Martí, and Juan Peron might have had in current party politics in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina, respectively. Yann had some really great thoughts, particularly in regards to efforts to re-interpret past national figures into current worldviews of national and global politics in Latin America. These figures can remain controversial, as with Sandino ("Whether or not Sandino was an anti-imperialist hero, or a criminal lunatic is still very much a debate in Nicaragua"), but Yann argued strongly that my exclusion of Bolivar was perhaps misplaced, as Chavez has attempted to re-interpret Bolivar as one of the original "anti-imperialists." While I think (and I believe Yann agreed) that Bolivar differed from a Marti or Sandino in that Bolivar is still a part of the nationally-accepted myth of Venezuela when compared to Sandino or Marti, I agree that, in light of Chavez's efforts to re-interpret Bolivar, we can lump him in with the other two.

However, I want to actually address the issue of Peronism. Yann suggested that Peronism was the outlier from these groups/parties, as he founded the party that became central to national political contestation, rather than serving as a model for future parties, a la the Sandinistas' uyse of Sandino and the FMLN's use of Marti. Yann went on to suggest that we could therefore consider Peron closer to Chavez or Castro in that their parties were "formed around charismatic individuals."

I agree in that sense, but I think we shouldn't necessarily overstate that differentiation, either. In terms of party creation, I completely agree. However, I think there are important similarities between Peronism and the Sandinistas as they currently exist. Peron has been dead for nearly 40 years now, and his two administrations (1946-1955 and for 9 months, from 1973 to his death in 1974) had radically different legacies. Peron certainly was never a left-wing leader, but historically he was probably one of the most "populist" leaders of Latin America. In spite of his efforts at top-down control, the workers' movement developed strongly under Peron, and in many ways used and developed further Peron's fight for causes that often are (probably rightfully) considered "left," including labor rights, more equal wealth distribution, greater control and profit from laborers' efforts, etc. With Peron out of the country for 18 years, this leftward shift among many in the Peronist party happened without having Peron be able to directly counter them or divulge his true beliefs on these issues. At the same time, more conservative sectors that were drawn to his top-down (and even borderline authoritarian) control of the movement and social change, as well as his more fascistic sympathies, seemed justified in their beliefs of what Peronism was when he returned in 1973, far more right-wing in his campaign, brief administration, and attitudes than many portions of his own party. In short, Peron was able to represent, in his words, deeds, and ideas, many different things to different groups, and none of those groups was completely "wrong" or "right." (And this isn't even to consider those who hated and stood against Peron from start to finish).

All this is to say that I think Peronism and Peron doesn't represent a complete break from the divisive role Sandino and Marti had in their own countries. Yes, Peron formed his namesake party, and Sandino and Marti did not. However, the image of Peron was a divisive one almost from the start, not just among his party and other parties in Argentina, but within the party itself, and his absence for 18 years only exacerbated these divisions. You still see this today - the Peronists are still deeply divided and torn over the role they should take, a division made even deeper by the military's "Dirty War" of 1976-1983 and the presidency of Carlos Menem, a Peronist who drove Argentina to economic collapse with his extreme neoliberalism while opening old wounds by pardoning convicted war criminals from the dictatorship.

As one final note here, I agree with Yann that Chavez has the potential to be similar to Peron down the line. I would also add Lula to this mix. The PT is completely Lula - he was one of its founders, he has been its main leader and spokesperson since its formation in the early 1980s as Brazil's dictatorship opened, and he has been its only presidential candidate in Brazil's 5 post-dictatorship elections (the failed elections of 1989, 1994, 1998, as well as the victory of 2002 and re-election in 2006). Come 2010, Lula's term is up, and the PT is facing the first post-Lula election of its existence. As Yann cautioned, it is too soon to say for sure if Lula (or Chavez, or Castro) will end up having the same effect as Peron on their parties. The PT in 2010 will be aided in no small part that Lula is still alive, and can make clear which direction he thinks the party should go. Still, he faces a difficult challenge, as divisions among middle-class intellectuals and ideologues vs. workers and politicians seeking more practical demands have emerged. Indeed, Lula's own administration has jaded many of his more intellectually leftist supporters, who felt he abandoned the true "revolutionary" cause when he actually had to navigate real political channels (in this regard, I have little sympathy for such ideologues, I openly admit). I'm certainly not saying the PT will end up going down the same road as Peron's Partido Justicialista, and I would be amazed to see Lula end up doing a massive rightward shift, both for ideological and historically contextual reasons. Still, I think that, as with Chavez and Castro, it will be very interesting to see how the PT functions in a post-Lula road, and Peronism will more likely than not serve as a fascinating and important point of comparison and contrast.

Discussing Latin America, Part 2 - The role of iconic figures in political party conflict

Mr. Trend raises an important question in  Part 1 of this post related to understanding political parties in a number of Latin American countries.

Among the political parties mentioned in the previous post, I think there are some important distinctions that need to be made in how the symbolic figure becomes adopted. Among the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador, both parties were attempting to recover a national history that was somewhat lost or hidden through the iconic use of Nicaragua's Augusto César Sandino and El Salvador's Farabundo Martí. What sets these two parties apart from others is that the importance of these two individuals as national figures is still hotly contested in both countries (at least I think this is the case in El Salvador). Whether or not Sandino was an anti-imperialist hero, or a criminal lunatic is still very much a debate in Nicaragua. 

Both the Sandinistas and the FMLN were in some sense attempting to reinterpret the historical narrative in their respective countries, which is much different than say the use of José Martí in Cuba or Bolívar in Venezuela. My sense of the use of José Martí and Bolívar is that these two figures were, and remain so, national icons used to give nationalist legitimacy to a movement. There was not a conflict over the importance of these two figures to each country's national history as exists in Nicaragua and El Salvador. 

Mr. Trend suggests that Bolívar does not belong in this category, but I think it is an interesting case that does belong here. There has been an attempt by Hugo Chávez to reinterpret Bolívar as an anti-imperialist hero, and sort of whitewash his more unsavory characteristics. What is going on there is somewhat similar to how the Sandinistas chose to present Sandino during the Nicaraguan Revolution. Sandino's thought was collected in ways by Sandinista leaders to present a very narrow portrait of the man that would serve the Revolution's interests. Chávez is doing something similar by issuing collections of Bolívar's thought that highlight his thought in ways that serve the Bolivarian Revolution, but ignore some of the more anti-democratic and aristocratic tendencies of Bolívar. However, this use of Bolívar is not quite comparable to Nicaragua and El Salvador, because both sides in Venezuela accept Bolívar as a national icon. Anti-chavistas oppose Chávez' use of Bolívar for political ends, but not his place in Venezuelan history. 

As for Perón, I'm not sure I would lump his Justicialist Party (PJ) in with the other cases, since it was Perón himself who formed the party. There is a fairly decent sized literature in political science on political parties formed around charismatic individuals (which maybe I will delve into in future posts?) that sets these types of parties apart from others on a number of organizational and ideological dimensions. I am somewhat familiar with the effect his leadership had on the future of the party, but I'm not familiar with the current status of Peron as a myth or national icon in Argentina. Does it cross party lines, or is he more seen as a symbol to supporters of the PJ rather than to all Argentines?

Thinking about parties formed around charismatic individuals, my sense is that we would be better off comparing Perón to Chávez, and possibly to Fidel Castro in Cuba and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and his foundation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico. This comparison would be somewhat difficult because we haven't been able to observe a post-Chávez party or a post-Castro party, but the consequences for these political parties is likely to be distinct due to their foundational characteristics in ways unlike the FMLN or the Sandinistas.

In short, what I am suggesting from all of this in response to Mr. Trend's question is some form of conceptual typology to look at the consequences particular individuals have on political parties. I think we could look at these parties along three lines:

1) The use of contested national symbols (i.e. Farabundo Martí and Sandino)

2)The use of accepted national symbols (i.e. José Martí and Bolívar)

3)Parties formed around charismatic individuals (i.e. Perón, Chávez, Castro)

This typology allows for one party to fit in multiple categories, but I think it makes more sense to look at these parties in this way, rather than in a sort of holistic comparison of political parties across countries. 

Discussing Latin America - Political Parties in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Argentina

I was already thinking about Yann's post about Nicaragua's municipal elections from last week, and it, combined with a story at the New York Times about the divisions among current and former Sandinistas who are fighting over the role of the party, raised an interesting set of questions for me. Basically, those two posts/articles got me thinking about political movements/parties based on the "icon-ization" of a particular figure/hero/leader. I've been trying to figure out exactly what role(s) such a figure might have on political parties and party identities, how the timelines of mythification and division over the hero's supposed "vision" (which is often contested among the individual's followers) play out, etc.

In thinking about this, I was able to come up with three countries off the top of my head to whom this political scenario applied currently or in the past: Nicaragua with the Sandinistas; Argentina with Peronism; and El Salvador, with the Frente Farabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional (FMLN).

In addition to these three countries with current political parties based on a single figure, there was also the case of Cuba with Jose Marti, but I think that, while Marti was particularly important to daily politics in pre-1959 Cuba, the ways in which Fidel has shaped Cuba over the past 50 years have resulted in Cuba being an outlier from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Argentina - there just isn't a struggle over Marti's thought in political life in Cuba today. It seemed possible that Venezuela could apply to this, as well, but I wasn't really sure it did merit a comparison to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina (though further discussion may convince me it does). I didn't think it was in the same category because Chavez's "Bolivarian project" doesn't seem on the surface to include much debate over what Bolivar "wanted" for Venezuela. Although Sandino, Marti, and Peron were/are all symbols, too, the use of Bolivar seems almost purely symbolic, rather than evoking an ideological debate over the meanings of his views.

Anyhow, in all of these efforts at comparisons and contrasts, while I know a decent bit about Argentina and Nicaragua, I know virtually nothing about the case of El Salvador and Farabundo Marti. I e-mailed Yann, asking him several questions for discussion, and we've decided to move the discussion to the blog. He and I will be addressing each other here on this particular question, but we invite others to please join in in the comments. We don't really have any expectations as to how long this will last - as long as the conversation is worth having, I guess. However, Yann and I hope that this is also the beginning of a series of dialogues over Latin America between Yann, myself, and others here at the blog, and that this series of "Latin American discussions" can perhaps even become a semi-permanent feature of the blog.