Did the Bush Administration Look the Other Way on War Crimes in Afghanistan?

That the U.S. may have worked with and supported a war criminal in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 does not surprise me, but that doesn't render this story any less depressing:

After a mass killing of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Taliban prisoners of war by the forces of an American-backed warlord during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Bush administration officials repeatedly discouraged efforts to investigate the episode, according to government officials and human rights organizations.

American officials had been reluctant to pursue an investigation — sought by officials from the F.B.I., the State Department, the Red Cross and human rights groups — because the warlord, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, was on the payroll of the C.I.A. and his militia worked closely with United States Special Forces in 2001, several officials said. They said the United States also worried about undermining the American-supported government of President Hamid Karzai, in which General Dostum had served as a defense official.

Dostum is accused of having overseen the murders of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Taliban prisoner of war deaths. The report mentions FBI documents from 2003 in which detainees back up the allegations of being crammed into overstuffed containers and left to die or being shot. Dostum himself admits that there were around 200 under his watch, but that they were due to "combat wounds and disease." And satellite pictures and human rights groups have uncovered evidence of a massive grave in the area.

All of this combines to paint a grim picture of the actions of a man the U.S. openly supported during the Bush administration. Which of course brings the question around to Bush officials: if the administration was paying and openly supporting a war criminal, and if that war criminal gets convicted, could Bush officials be more likely to face charges? Of course, the landscape of this case could change, but right now, it doesn't seem like Bush or Cheney are directly tied to Dostum. Even if the administration announced its diplomatic support for a war criminal, that (unfortunately) doesn't translate into being charged as a criminal oneself, as the U.S. has proven time and again in the second half of the 20th century.

But things get a bit chippier once we get into the Department of Defense, under Rumsfeld at the time.

In 2002, Physicians for Human Rights asked Defense Department officials to open an investigation and provide security for its forensics team to conduct a more thorough examination of the gravesite. “We met with blanket denials from the Pentagon,” recalls Jennifer Leaning, a board member with the group. “They said nothing happened.”

Pentagon spokesmen have said that the United States Central Command conducted an “informal inquiry,” asking Special Forces personnel members who worked with General Dostum if they knew of a mass killing by his forces. When they said they did not, the inquiry went no further.

“I did get the sense that there was little appetite for this matter within parts of D.O.D.,” said Marshall Billingslea, former acting assistant defense secretary for special operations, referring to the Department of Defense.

I admit openly that I don't know enough of the details of international law to fully know what constitutes a "cover-up" of a known war crime, but this does seem to be pushing the envelope of the definition of a "cover-up." Blanket denials to investigate the matter independently and taking at face value the word of people who worked together with the alleged war criminal in order to close the investigation look suspect, to put it lightly. What role, if any, Donald Rumsfeld may have had in this is unclear for now, but one can't help but think he knew something, given that one of his deputy secretaries, Paul Wolfowitz, was more than aware of the problems:

Another former defense official, who would speak only on condition of anonymity, recalled that the prisoner deaths came up in a conversation with Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense at the time, in early 2003.

“Somebody mentioned Dostum and the story about the containers and the possibility that this was a war crime,” the official said. “And Wolfowitz said we are not going to be going after him for that.”

In an interview, Mr. Wolfowitz said he did not recall the conversation. However, Pentagon documents obtained by Physicians for Human Rights through a Freedom of Information Act request confirm that the issue was debated by Mr. Wolfowitz and other officials

Again, it's no surprise that Wolfowitz's stench would be attached to this particular case - he was actively involved in some of the darkest parts of the Bush administration's foreign policy. The documents confirmed by the FIA request indicate Wolfowitz knew exactly what had happened and what the allegations were, and was simply not interested in going after Dostum for the crimes. Given that position, plus the "blanket denials" the Pentagon issued, Wolfowitz comes out looking particularly bad. It seems to early to say if he looks "war criminal" bad, but if nothing else, he is attached to yet another despicable act of support for an open criminal, all in the name of furthering the Bush administration's misguided, inept, and downright destructive foreign policies.

Of course, if this case gains greater traction, the wingnut talking points are easy to predict: "It was a state of war! After 9/11! The Taliban was teh evil!" Many may agree with this, but it doesn't take away from a central tenet codified in such quaint documents like the Geneva conventions: "war criminals" of any stripe are tried and sentenced for their crimes in courts. They are not summarily executed, and they are certainly not thrown into overcrowded containers to slowly die (if they aren't shot) and then be dumped in a mass grave. What Dostum's men did, with or without his orders (and it would seem from the report that he was more than aware of those actions), constitutes a violation of the Geneva conventions and a war crime.

It's too soon to know where this will end up - probably at most with Dostum facing some level of ostracization, but not enough to be completely deprived of any power. I'd like to be proven wrong, but this doesn't seem like the kind of thing that will snowball a la the Pinochet case. And as for those in the administration who tied themselves, directly or indirectly, to this kind of war criminal, it will mark just one more file in the case that should be filed against the Bush Administration's own criminals, but never will be.

The Mid-Range Consequences of Bush's Foreign Policy Taking Shape in South Asia

Even before his departure, there was plenty of talk from both Bush's supporters and his opponents about what his "legacy" would be. Since Obama's inaugural, we've already seen some of the immediate short-term consequences of Bush's administration - most notably, the economic collapse and the emergence of the issue of torture, but also other matters like Obama having to try to repair the U.S.'s reputation in Latin America after 8 years of arrogance and ignorance.

It seems we can add to that Bush's foreign policy's effects on the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the possibility of the Taliban gaining access to nuclear materials in the case of the latter. By rushing the U.S. to war in Iraq in late 2002 and 2003 under the banner of 9/11 without actually focusing on the country that actually was home to bin Laden is undoubtedly one of Bush's most egregious foreign policy blunders. The issue of whether the war in Afghanistan was "just" or not is not necessarily relative here; the fact is, by prosecuting a half-hearted effort from the White House while putting all the efforts on Iraq and then having to spend the past 6 years trying to clean up the mess, the Bush administration undoubtedly left the door open for the events that we're seeing now in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What is more, the bullying and indefnsible aggression of Bush not just in Iraq, but in talks about Iran, Hamas, and other groups has most likely made us even more enemies in Southern Asia, perhaps aiding the Taliban's efforts and giving it even more support than it would have gained had we actually had an intelligent leader employing actual diplomatic intelligence and reason.

Things are certainly too unclear to attempt to accurately predict what will happen in Afghanistan, and especially Pakistan. But while people's freak out because over 1000 people out of over six billion are sick worldwide, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is becoming more precarious. With over 6 years passed now since the war in Iraq began, it's undeniable that the Iraq War deterred the employment of resources to Afghanistan, while our constant support of Pervez Musharraf even in the face of eroding support endeared us to very few in Pakistan. Thus, while things are still in movement right now, we're already beginning to see the potential long-term damage of the Bush administration's foreign policy.

Turning Afghanistan Into Colombia

I highly recommend Peter Bergan and Sameer Lalwani's article, "The War on Poppies" about the failure of U.S. opium eradication efforts in Afghanistan.

It's clear that we have learned no lessons from 40 years of failure in Colombia. We could have made a real difference in Afghanistan after we overthrew the Taliban. We chose not to so we could go after Saddam Hussein. In the following years, Afghanistan has remained unstable, the condition of women has barely improved outside Kabul, and the Taliban remain a powerful force in the countryside.

If you are an Afghan farmer, what are you supposed to do other than grow opium? Are they supposed to care that the heroin market in the West is insatiable? Why should they? Particularly when the United States does not develop a realistic alternative for them. Plus, drug eradication efforts have never proved successful. Has the U.S. stopped marijuana farms in southern Oregon and northern California from decades of aerial surveillance? Have even made the slightest indentation in crystal meth? What has our coca eradication policies done to Colombia and the other Andean nations? And now the war on poppies is bringing increased violence to the Afghan countryside and binding closer ties between the Taliban and local farmers.

Bergen and Lalwani write,

"What's more, our policy is not effective. Though the U.S. spends about the same amount on counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan annually as all Afghan poppy farmers combined take home in a year, our policies have not prevented record-setting poppy crops from springing up with every succeeding year, nor have they prevented Afghanistan from becoming a quasi-narcostate where corruption is rampant. Last week's U.N. report said Afghanistan continues to be the center of the world's heroin trade, accounting for 93% of global opium production. It noted a 17% spike in poppy cultivation in the last year, on the heels of a record 59% rise the year before.

The U.S. government, in short, is deeply committed to an unsuccessful drug policy that helps its enemies. The Taliban derives not only substantial financial benefits from the opium trade, according to U.S. military officials in Afghanistan, but wins political benefits from its supportive stance on poppy growing, masterfully exploiting situations in which U.S.-sponsored eradication forces are pitted against poor farmers."

Good job America!

What could we do differently? How could the United States actually cut into opium production in an effective manner. To start with Bergan and Lalwani suggest

The State Department strategy misses the forest for the trees. The priority of the United States and NATO should be first to thwart the Taliban insurgency while bettering the lives of typical Afghans through significant economic and reconstruction efforts to win hearts and minds. Doing nothing on the poppy front would do more to achieve this goal than the counterproductive eradication path the U.S. currently pursues. The U.S. should adopt a "first do no harm" policy that temporarily suspends eradication while implementing a promising portfolio of new initiatives to build up alternatives for farmers.

To begin with, the U.S. needs to invest in building up the legitimate Afghan economy. Though poppy fetches much higher prices than most other crops, subsidies, price supports and seeds for alternative crops should be offered to offset that price gap. Because other crops often face pitfalls such as the absence of distributors, domestic demand or consistent prices abroad, the international community should help Kabul set up an agency, modeled on the Canadian Wheat Board, that would purchase crops from farmers at consistent prices, and market and distribute them internationally. The U.S. and other NATO countries should open their markets and extend trade preferences to Afghan agricultural products and handicrafts.

They suggest several other possible solutions as well. Read the whole thing.