Human Rights in Brazil

I'm a little late in getting to this story on the quest for human rights in Brazil, but it's extremely important. Human Rights groups here in Brazil, trying to find a way around the 1979 amnesty that pardoned leftist groups and military torturers equally, have seized upon a new method. A family has filed a civil case against Col. Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra. The civil case means Ustra cannot go to jail, but what it also means is that his name can officially be marked now as an individual in charge of torture and illegal kidnappings and imprisonments during the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985).

This is hugely important for two reason. Firstly, it does find a way to circumvent that 1979 amnesty, adn while it will not lead to any jail time for anybody, it will permanently record, for once and for all, the widespread practice of torture in Brazil during the dictatorship, and it will name names. Secondly, it has put the issue of torture and human rights back in the public arena again. People here have generally let the question of torture fall into the background of Brazilian history with the passing of time, and the sheer horror of the practice of torture in Brazil (outlined in the article, but including beatings, electroshock on the genitals, and dunking heads in water to the point of near-drowning) has been greatly dulled in the public eye with the passing of time. My fincée heard a girl say just two weeks ago that the military didn't even use that much torture, and even when it did, it must have been because the tortured did something illegal and awful, though what exactly might merit torture she didn't say. By bringing forward such cases and outlining the particular acts, people will hopefully be reminded that torture in any form, including that practiced during the dictatorship, is beyond awful.

Once again, the story (and Larry Rohter) reveal a general misunderstanding and/or misrepresentation of the workings of the Brazilian government (something Rohter has failed to grasp before). Lula comes off as a president who isn't interested in trying to undo the 1979 amnesty and prosecuting torturers. There are two factors that have really impeded this. One is, as José Miguel Vivanco says, is the lack of widespread demand on the part of the Brazilian constituency to address the issue. Many people supported the dictatorship while it was in power, and many who didn't necessarily like it have had their opinions softened with the passing of time. The fact that "only" several hundred people were killed (in comparison to 3000 in Chile from 1973-1990 and perhaps as many as 30,000 in Argentina from 1976-1983) has meant that fewer lives were directly affected by the regime in the area of human rights (though the numbers of tortured were rather high in Brazil, but again, not as high in terms of per capita as in Chile and Argentina).

Secondly, the article clearly has no understanding of the role the military still plays in politics in Brazil. As I've mentioned before, it didn't just go away and say, "OK, civil government, do whatever you want - we'll just hang out in the barracks." The military has continued to influence (to put it lightly) events in the government, ranging from military pay hikes to pressure not to charge military police in the killing of the poor in favelas, always with the vague cloud of needing to "intervene" again hanging over civil politicians. Thus, it isn't necessarily that Lula lacks "political will", as the article (and Vivanco) say - it's that the military would openly threaten and bully Lula were he to try to use his office to seek actual prosecutions of those members of the military who were involved in torture. In this regard, Brazil actually isn't that dissimilar from Chile in the mid-1990s, when Pinochet was still there. The main difference is, the military is still present in Brazilian politics, despite being 22 years removed from the executive branch now. The article even unintentionally (and unacknowledgingly) indicates this, given Ustra's sabre-rattling among his colleagues, trying to frighten them by claiming that soon, such groups and civil suits will be coming after them as well. If this is the rhetorical effect of a civil suit, a state-led prosecution would be far worse for the administration.

Could Lula do more? Absolutely, particularly given the rise of this civil-suit approach to naming torturers. He could come out in favor of this civil suit while not fully alienating the military leadership itself. And is dealing with torturers at the top of Lula's agenda? Probably not, and it wouldn't hurt to put it near the top. But at the same time, Vivanco is correct when he points out that "politicians are rational actors." It's just that I don't think Lula's rationality doesn't come from flakiness or disinterest - it's embedded in a democratic system itself that never fully saw the civilian-led executive branch of the government regaining control over the military (see this for a scholarly argument on the role of the military in politics since 1990).

UPDATE: Randy has more.