On Brazil's Presidential Campaign

I've been terribly remiss at dealing with this topic, in no small part because, while Brazil prepares to head to the polls again, I continue to try to finish a dissertation. However, with the campaign having really picked up steam once Brazil exited the World Cup, now seems as good a time as any to dive into the debates and discussions on the impending election.

Shortly after Dilma Rousseff's nomination, the PSDB, the main political party of the right, once again launched Jose Serra as its presidential candidate, later selecting relatively young Indio da Costa, of the far-right Democratas (Democrats) party as its vice-presidential candidate. Serra had been the candidate against Lula in 2002, when the PT and Lula finally won the election on their fourth try (having lost in 1989, 1994, 1998). Although Serra was seen in retrospect as relatively progressive for the PSDB (especially after the PSDB nominated extreme conservative Geraldo Alckmin in 2006), the 2002 loss apparently has still left him embittered, while the PSDB has continued to futilely and baselessly rail and rant against Lula, taking any chance they can to smear him. Indeed, in an effort to denigrate the PT, da Costa even baselessly claimed that the PT is connected to the FARC and narco-traficantes, in a moment that resembled Sarah Palin suggesting Obama "palled around with terrorists." It is clear that the PSDB and Serra do not want the PT's presence in Brasilia to continue, and while their efforts to do anything to prevent that from happening are fairly disgusting, it's also understandable, for two reasons: first, Lula has seemed to invoke an almost irrational hatred among many in the PSDB and its supporters (especially Rio's middle class); this is often based on classism as well as political jealousy and (to a lesser extent) ideology. Secondly, the PT was and is Lula's party, and the PSDB is Fernando Henrique Cardoso's party. Many have questioned whether the PT could survive beyond a Lula presidency, or whether it would disappear the way the National Reconstruction Party disappeared when Fernando Collor had to resign amidst allegations of extreme corruption. If Dilma wins, it will do much for the PT's ability to remain a strong and vibrant party beyond Lula. With Rousseff having taken the lead in polls after a statistical tie for much of the campaign, these tactics are likely to continue.

What would a Rousseff presidency look like vs. a Serra presidency, though? Many intelligent and respected scholars say there won't be much difference [sorry for the rough translation - Google's Portuguese-English translator isn't the best], and that a PT and PSDB presidency at this point would really vary only in shade, rather than in real policy. They point to what they perceive to be Lula's "continuist" policies following Fernando Henrique in terms of views on the market. This M.O. of Lula as "continuist" has been the main narrative since about 2004, and it clearly hasn't shifted as historians, political scientists, and others consider this year's elections.

However, I think this has always been a bit of a misnomer. If your idea of "continuist" is "a not-sudden and extreme ideological shift," a la from socialism to neoliberalism or from a dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy, then yes, Lula has been continuist, and either Dilma or Serra would be similar. However, this strikes me as a rather facile and useless way to view the two main presidential parties in Brazil right now. There were subtle but important differences between Lula and Cardoso. For example:

-The PSDB under FHC pushed privatization to extremes, trying to privatize everything (and succeeding with just about everything except Brazil's public university system and Petrobras; on both, the Brazilian people drew the line, and FHC had to step back a bit). While some say this did improve services, it also raised prices (when a French company bought out Brazil's public phone system, for example, phone prices in Brazil immediately went up 30%, even as they dropped 30% in France); what is more, as Lula demonstrated, investing in state-run companies and improving efficiency are not mutually exclusive terms, and when both are executed, can make an even stronger company than privatization could, all while offering greater benefits to your own citizens.

-In addition to adhering strongly to neoliberalism, FHC kept his economic relations connected almost strictly to the European Union and the United States, meaning Brazil's economy was by and large dependent on the fluxes of the American and European markets (no small irony, given that, in the 1970s, FHC was a leading theorist in dependency theory). While Lula did not shed the mercantilist policies of his predecessor, he did extend them to all of the world. Trade with Africa; deals with Arab countries in the Middle East; agreements with China; partnerships with India; collaborations with the United States - all were fair game, and Lula fostered these agreements in all parts of the world. This was beneficial both economically and politically; on the economic front, it diversified Brazil's trade, making it less susceptible to one country's or region's economic decline and strengthening its own economy (indeed, it was one of the last countries to enter the 2008 global recession, entering into recession in June 2009 and emerging from it just one quarter later.) Politically, Brazil was able to strengthen its role as a global player, working with everybody but dependent on nobody. Thus, Brazil enjoyed a level of both political and economic autonomy it had never witnessed before. The old joke used to be "Brazil - the country of tomorrow, forever." Yet Lula seems to have guided it very close to being the country of tomorrow today.

-Thirdly, there has been Lula's emphasis on state programs. A sort of flip-side to neoliberalism, Lula proposed a greater state presence and higher government spending on programs like Zero Hunger and the Bolsa Familia, which provided money to poor families for food or for their children to attend school longer. These programs have by all accounts been massively successful, and thanks in no small part to them, more people are joining Brazil's middle class than had ever taken place before. These policies ran directly counter to FHC's emphasis on "trickle-down" economics, something that Serra also emphasizes. While there are still enormous gaps between the wealthiest and the poorest in Brazil, the middle seems to be growing, and has done so through increased state spending (something the U.S. could learn from), and not from privatization and hopes for a trickle-down effect.

This is why describing Lula as "continuist" is not wholly accurate. Sure, he didn't radically alter the political or economic system, but there are major and important differences between Lula/PT and FHC/PSDB, and these differences I think in large part explain why Brazil has become such a major player in the global community in the 2000s, and not in the 1990s. And these differences continue between Rousseff on the one hand and Serra on the other. The election of either will not be the same thing (in much the same way that Bush and Gore were not the same thing in 2000); the election will determine whether Brazil continues down the path that garnered so much success in the first decade of the 2000s, or if it returns to the path of the 1990s that continued to perpetuate social and economic inequalities and sent the country spiralling into debt in the 1990s and inflation and recession after 1998 (when the exchange rate of the real to the dollar doubled overnight, immediately after FHC's re-election).

We are already getting good examples of these differences in Rousseff's pledges to continue those social programs, even while Serra denigrates of Mercosur and Brazil's relationship with Paraguay (fostered under Lula), while expressing his desire to return to policies focusing on neoliberalism and partnerships with the EU and the US. That type of policy is pure PSDB, and I think explains in no small part why Brazil did not take off under FHC but did under Lula. Lula did indeed continue to focus on market policies, but he did so with everybody, rather than just the EU and US; in doing so, he was able to expand Brazil's market even while retaining autonomy, rather than becoming dependent on one or two major economies. That success explains in no small part some of that hatred for Lula among the PSDB and its supporters - he succeeded where they failed, and did so by pointing out the weaknesses in their own policies. That these university-educated politicians were schooled by a laborer who never went to college particularly stung.

For these reasons, to suggest that Brazil will be the same whether Rousseff or Serra wins overlooks some very important distinctions. Yes, an overall mercantilist worldview will continue, but the differences between Serra and Rousseff are not just the differences between believing in privatization vs. a strong state with social programs for the poorer sectors, or partnerships with the U.S. vs. partnerships with the whole world. They are the differences between Brazil in the 1990s and Brazil in the 2000s; ask any Brazilian, and those differences are enormous and almost uniformly better in the 2000s. And that is why this year's election is so important and worth watching.

Brazil's 2010 Presidential Campaigns Officially Kicking Off with Dilma Rousseff's Nomination

Brazil's presidential election season has officially kicked off, as the Workers' Party (PT) officially nominated Dilma Rousseff for president yesterday. Of course, this is in no way any surprise - the candidates for all of the parties have been unofficially known for months. Still, with the original launch, Brazil is finally gearing up for its presidential campaigns now, with elections coming at the beginning of October.

There are several observations to be made already. First, it's of little surprise that the media, both in Brazil and internationally, is making a strong effort to undermine the Rousseff campaign; indeed, the negative portrayals in the press began as early as early as last April, when O Folha de Sao Paulo wrecklessly and baselessly linked Rousseff to political kidnappings in the late-1960s, when the military dictatorship was entering its most repressive phase.

Although Rousseff's campaign only officially began yesterday, the international media has already been gearing up its anti-Rousseff campaign, though, and much of it has hinged and will hinge on Rousseff, who was one of Lula's top aides, being portrayed as a "puppet" to Lula. This narrative actually began last year in the New York Times, when Alexei Barrionuevo offered absolutely baseless speculation (that his own article contradicted) that Lula would run for a third term, and that Rousseff was just window-dressing. Mercopress has also gotten into the act, suggesting that all of Lula's "prestige" rests on Rousseff. This is absurd for a couple of reasons; first, whether you love or hate Lula's administration, his policies have spoken for themselves in either direction; it's not like their effects will suddenly become retroactively great or terrible if Rousseff were to win. Additionally, by linking Lula's "legacy" to Rousseff, the press is clearly implying yet again that Rousseff is nothing more than Lula redux, and thus, a puppet.

Then, there are more subtle approaches. For example, even though this news agency has a photo of Rousseff on file (in this story), there is no picture of Rousseff just one day later in the story about her nomination. By literally "de-facing" her, they're effectively dis-associating her from the smiling, seemingly-likeable politician she appears to be, and while there is much more to politicians than their looks, if the appearance was completely useless, then politicians and campaign managers wouldn't need to or want to rely on the value of images in their own commercials and ads.

Meanwhile, stories about the possibility of Rousseff being Brazil's first woman president, while available, are not as common. After all, these stories do cast her in a positive light in the international arena, even though Lula is probably correct when he points out that being a woman in Brazil may mean she faces particular political challenges and prejudices that Serra will not. Certainly, Rousseff is not Brazil's first woman candidate, but this does mark the first time that one of the major parties (PSDB, PT, PMDB) has run a woman as its candidate. And speaking of the PMDB, it has thrown its support behind Rousseff, once again not running its own candidate for a variety of reasons (including the fact that, as Brazil's biggest and oldest political party, it also has a rather large "tent" that makes internal agreements difficult sometimes).

Likewise, the major opposition party to the PT, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's PSDB, began trying to undermine Rousseff's chances as early as May last year, too, attempting (again, without much evidence) to connect her to corruption charges that never materialized. Not surprisingly, the PSDB is also trying to paint Rousseff as a "puppet," a story that some media outlets are pleased to repeat simply by giving Cardoso an audience, in an effort to undermine her popularity. I'm not quite sure how this is supposed to work; the PSDB ran a fairly uncharismatic Jose Serra in 2002, an extremely unlikeable Geraldo Alckmin in 2006, and now is back to Serra this year, so obviously, they're trying to paint the PT candidate in a worse light to make up for possible shortcomings. But Lula has consistently been one of the most popular presidents ever in Brazil over his two administrations, so I'm not really sure why linking somebody to a president that has had upwards of 70% approval ratings seems like a good strategy. Certainly, anti-Lula rhetoric appeals to upper-middle class and elite prejudices in places like Rio, but you don't win elections just because the Zona Sul thinks you're right; the 2002 and the 2006 elections proved that, and I don't understand why the PSDB is trying that strategy again (unless it speaks to the complete absence of any new ideas or policies of their own that would appeal to people).

The opposition is also trying to undermine her on more basic policy issues. In her speech, Rousseff pointed to the successes in Brazilian development under the PT; in response, the PSDB suggested that the improvements did not happen because of Lula, but for "other reasons" (nevermind the fact that the PSDB has no problem taking all the credit for the economic boom of the late-1990s, before Cardoso's neo-liberal policies nearly brought the Brazilian economy crashing down again).

This is to say nothing of Rousseff's qualities or abilities. In Brazil, presidential candidates don't really start detailing their programs, agendas, and policies until they've been officially nominated, giving Brazil a 7-month electoral season. Certainly, the PSDB's (still-unofficial) candidate, Jose Serra, has been opining on Brazilian society and government in general, as has Rousseff, but there's a difference between general observations and specific plans. While Rousseff's platform became officially public last night, the PSDB hasn't yet launched its platform (aside from the "Lula is evil/Rousseff's a puppet!" approach). Thus, at this point, it's still not certain what the major differences between the two major candidates (not to mention tertiary candidates like Brazilian Socialist Party candidate Ciro Gomes, the PSOL's Heloisa Helena, and the Green Party's Marina Silva).

One thing is for certain - it will be a very interesting campaign to watch, and not just because Brazil is one of the world's biggest economies and increasingly important actors within the global economy and politics. Among other things, the PT and PSDB are battling for their futures - each party has successfully elected its founder (Fernando Henrique Cardoso for the PSDB, and Lula for the PT), but has not managed to elect somebody beyond its figurehead (although this does mark the first time that the PT is trying to elect somebody who isn't Lula). Because Brazilian parties are so new, they are often tied up to the personage of their founders, and it is not clear that they will be able to move beyond that image without suffering some major losses. (And as for the newness of the parties, the PMDB, Brazil's oldest party, has its roots in a dictatorship-era decree that limited Brazil to two parties, with the MDB being one, back in 1966; even for the first 10 years, political repression basically meant the MDB was useless, leading many to say that the MDB was the party of "yes" and the pro-dictatorship ARENA was the party of "yes sir!"). Additionally, the polls have gotten interesting - while there is still a long way to go, much was made of how far behind Rousseff had been; yet of late, she has jumped up at least 8% or more in various polls since last September. While Serra still has the lead, it's clear that it's far from being consolidated. That's why they hold the elections, after all. Still, there will be plenty more to come from the Brazilian campaign trail as the year goes on.

Is the PT Looking towards Obama's Model of Campaigning?

If the Brazilian presidential elections were held today, Serra of the right-center PSDB (Partido Social Democratico Brasileiro) would win, as he is well in front of runner-up Dilma Rousseff, of the PT, and in a run-off, would decimate her if the elections were held today.

However, the elections aren't held today, and, unlike in the U.S., the campaign won't really get going until 2010 begins. (I know, I know - campaigning only in the year of the election seems novel and strange in the United States, but there you have it), and a lot of factors could enter into the equation. Rousseff hasn't really geared up in campaigning yet, and Serra's numbers are in large part because he's a known name who's generally respected (he lost to Lula in 2002, before the PSDB swung even further right in the 2006 elections and being severely repudiated for that swing). Plus, there are always dark horse candidates, specifically former Minister for the Environment Marina Silva, who left her post last year. She is running next year for Brazil's Green Party (Partido Verde), and who is already causing a bit of a buzz with the possibility of being Brazil's first black president and woman president, which, in the wake of the wonder and marvel in Brazil at the U.S.'s election of Obama, may make voters a bit more emotional and wistful for their own "change they can believe in."

While Obama could hover over the elections vaguely as issues of politics, rhetoric, and racial identities play out in next year's elections, it turns out he's already having a more immediate impact on Brazil's 2010 elections. It seems the PT has contacted the firm responsible for Obama's internet campaign in a hopes of having them help the PT in getting the word out on the PT and on Dilma.

Leaders from the Workers Party met with Ben Self from the Blue State Digital agency, the brains and architect behind the successful digital publicity strategy displayed by president Obama during his 2008 campaign.

According to O’ Estado de Sao Paulo, Lula da Silva’s party is intent in mounting a propaganda strategy through Internet to promote the most certain presidential postulation of Dilma Rousseff, currently cabinet chief, and who Lula da Silva has virtually hand picked as his successor. [...]

Obama’s “on line” strategy has been closely followed by Lula da Silva and his advisors who last week inaugurated the president’s own blog with incredible success.

This is really interesting, and only in part because the PT is looking to Obama and the U.S. for lessons on how to employ newer technologies in elections. From a Brazilianist's standpoint, it's an interesting answer to the question that has dominated the PT since the 1980s, and especially since 2002: what will a post-Lula presidency PT look like? One of the biggest challenges facing the PT has been that Lula has been its leader since it was formed out of the metal-workers' movement against the dictatorship in Brazil in the late-1970s. Lula has been the PT's face, its leader, its ideologue, and its communicator; at the same time, he has made clear that he would be finished with politics after his presidency, and there has been real concern within the party and among its supporters about what would happen to it - could it survive without Lula at the helm?

This effort to use the internet as a means of promoting not just its candidate, but its platforms and its ideas, seems to me to be a serious attempt to ground the PT as a party unto itself, rather than as "Lula's party." Who knows how this will play out - like the presidential elections of 2010, there's just too much time still to come and too many unknown factors to make any concrete guesses. Still, it's a fascinating move on the part of the PT, both for what it could mean for next year's election, and for what it could mean for Brazilian politics more generally.

Political Partisanship and the Congressional Inquiry into Petrobras

Last week, Brazil's Senate launched a Congressional inquiry into charges of corruption in Petrobras, the state-owned energy company. Based on the reporting in Brazil and now the Times, though, I suspect there isn't much to these charges, and that it's pure partisan politics and political theater at its worst. To wit:

The vote was sealed by senators who oppose President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Workers Party, setting up an inquiry that is likely to drag on for months.
The investigation [...] could also be damaging to Dilma Rousseff, Mr. da Silva’s chief of staff and his handpicked candidate to succeed him in next year’s presidential elections, since she is also the chairwoman of the Petrobras board of directors. Ms. Rousseff’s ability to make a competitive run for president has already been questioned by some politicians and analysts because she is undergoing treatment for lymphoma, even though doctors say her chances of a full recovery are very high.

There are two reasons I am fairly confident that this is just partisan politics and theater at its worst. First, this is pretty much how politics works in Brazil (and is often one of the main critiques of the presidential parliamentary system in Brazil from political scientists both in Brazil and the U.S.). I've commented before on the PSDBs and Democratas (ex-PFL)'s sheer hatred of Lula and opposition to any of his policies, even when he seeks to continue policies former PSDB president Fernando Henrique Cardoso put in place with overwhelming support from his party. What is more, the Congressional Inquiry is going to bog down Lula's administration as it relates to Petrobras for quite awhile at a time when the president is trying to increase the revenue the state brings in from oil production. Under Lula's plan, this money would be used "to set up funds for social programs like health and education." And that's the second reason I doubt the legitimacy of this inquiry. The PSDB and Democratas have been against Lula's social programs (such as Bolsa Familia) since he took office in 2002, in no small part because it simultaneously tries to somewhat level a social playing field that they don't want levelled, and it builds further support among the poor for the PT and related parties, cutting into the PSDB's and Democrata's support.

In short, I have little doubt as of right now that this inquiry is not based on any substantive corruption charges in Petrobras, but rather is an effort on the part of the politically conservative opposition to prematurely influence the 2010 presidential elections and to stall the furthering of social programs these politicians hate for ideological and political reasons. This is not to say that the behavior of every employee at Petrobras has been saintly, or that every decision has been made without taking into account personal interests; indeed, Petrobras has "already fired two people and punished three others for their involvement in irregularities" in contract bidding. However, it will take a lot more evidence than has been provided thus far to prove that there is some major problem at Petrobras, and that this isn't what it seems to be now: the worst kind of partisanship politics in Brazil.

The New York Times Once Again Dazzles Us with Its "Hard-Hitting" Analysis on Brazil

The New York Times had an article up this past weekend about the Brazilian presidential elections looming next year, and specifically, the PT's (Lula's party) candidate, Dilma Roussef. I've already commented on the horrible journalism covering Dilma in Brazil, and I've flogged both journalist Alexei Barrionuevo's and the New York Times' coverage of Brazil for years, but with the latest report, we get the best of both worlds - ridiculous claims and borderline-fear-mongering on the possibility of Dilma's exit and Lula seeking a third term, combined with Barrionuevo's shoddy "reporting" and "analysis." I wanted to break it down bit by bit, but I've been busy writing. Fortunately, I'm able to outsource to Randy on this one (and read his whole post - it's brief but thorough).

In short, Barrionuevo actually offers multiple direct indicators Lula will not and does not want to seek a third term, but then turns around and basically says, "but what if...?" It's the worst kind of pandering, (middle-class) fear-mongering and conterfactual idiocy that I would expect of O Globo and those who irrationally hate Lula in Brazil, and not of the New York Times. But I guess if there's anything to be learned over the past several years, it's that the Times cannot, will not, and/or does not employ decent jounalists in its Brazilian post.

Dealing with Brazil's Dictatorship and Its Legacies: Good News and Terrible "Journalism"

In spite of having ended nearly 25 years ago, Brazil's dictatorship is still very much present in current politics and society, and two events this week have hammered this point home.

First, in the "despicable journalism" category (non O Globo category), there is a story about Dilma Rousseff, Lula's Chief of Staff and the PT's candidate for president in 2010, published this week in Folha de Sao Paulo. The headline reads: "Dilma's group planned the kidnapping of Delfim in 1969." Basically, the story alleges that Dilma's group of radicals who fought against the dictatorship planned to kidnap the Treasury Minister, Delfim Netto, back in 1969. While it's true that Dilma was a member of opposition groups in the 1960s and 1970s, radical opposition to the dictatorship hasn't exactly prevented others from arriving to the presidency. What is more, though she admits (and has long admitted) to her involvement in radical student groups, there is absolutely no evidence linking her to any plans to kidnap Netto (who never was kidnapped), and she has adamantly denied the latest story.

What is so despicable about this is that it is nothing short of an early effort on Folha's part to use its influential role as one of Brazil's top newspapers to prevent the PT (or the left) from winning the elections in 2010. The article presents Dilma as somebody who was involved in bank robberies (or "appropriations," as young "revolutionaries" at the time called them) and planned murders, in addition to the kidnapping. The article apparently tries to use her police records (from archives) to make its case, and ends up giving her the stigma of a "terrorist." I haven't seen the actual evidence the article uses (it was available only in the dead-trees version of the paper), but I do know from having worked with literally thousands of police reports for my own dissertation, they are far from an "objective" report on people's activities. Trapped in a Cold War mindset in which "subversive" and "communist" threats were to be found everywhere (and which, indeed, the security apparatus under the dictatorship had to continue to find to justify and legitimate its own repressive and invasive measures and existence), the police during the dictatorship often embellished students' and others' positions and activities, making mountains out of what were by any account molehills, and making connections between "radicals" that quite simply did not exist. Although I may be wrong, I suspect that these "vague connections" that were never there are what appear in the police reports cited in the article.

These aren't the only appalling aspects of the article. As critics of Folha have already pointed out, it hardly seems "objective" that Dilma is a "terrorist" in the article, but the family whose car company built and sold the vans that the military used to kidnap civilians and take them to torture centers have never been labeled such. What is more, despite any evidence directly connecting Dilma to plans (again, never executed) to kidnap the Minister of Finance, Folha opted to run a headline that explicitly said she was involved with such plans, thereby immediately jaundicing readers who simply had to glance at the headline to be impressed with the image of the PT candidate as a "terrorist." Even more blatantly evil, Folha apparently received the tip on the police files from none other than the public relations team of Jose Serra of the PSDB, one of Dilma's main rivals in the 2010 elections. That Folha is publishing this, not out of any "fair and balanced" "investigative" interest, but at the suggestion of her main political rival, is as base and disgusting a "journalism" as one could possibly conceive.

Finally, there is the fact that Folha has begun semiotically reducing the power of the dictatorship. The word dictatorship in Portuguese is ditadura, and, by itself, dura means "hard" (as in "hard-liners"). However, Folha has begun using a play on words to diminish the actions of the dictatorship, calling it the ditabranda, replacing "dura" with "branda" (bland); in other words, it was a "bland" dictatorship that didn't do much. Nevermind the thousands of people who were tortured, the tens of thousands who were exiled, the hundreds who were murdered - at the same time that Folha is painting the PT's presidential candidate as a "terrorist" and kidnapper, it's painting the dictatorship as something that wasn't so bad. It's just appalling and scary all around.

In the face of this, there actually was good news about the pursuit for justice against human rights violators during the dictatorship. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared last week that Brazil's 1979 general amnesty and the statues of limitations on human rights violations do not apply to crimes against humanity that the dictatorship committed. Unlike in neighboring countries (Argentina and Chile), Brazil never really saw any major punishment against those who committed torture or disappearances during the dictatorship. The 1979 amnesty law that the final president of the dictatorship, Joao Figueiredo, decreed, not only forgave "political prisoners" and exiles that had resisted the dictatorship; it also gave blanket amnesty to the armed forces and leaders. While some doctors who helped monitor torture sessions were disbarred, nobody else has ever really seen punishment for the actions the dictatorship, armed forces, and security apparati committed. The Commission's ruling is in response to the case brought forth by more than 70 families whose loved ones were involved in a guerrilla movement against the military government in the Brazilian northeast. From 1971-1974, the military systematically disappeared the rebels, and to this date, their fates and the location of their remains are unknown, hidden by still-classified government documents and hidden by plant growth and always-shifting landscapes in the Brazilian "hinterlands."

Unfortunately, the Commission's ruling doesn't automatically have any standing in Brazil, and if the government chooses to disregard the ruling, it can. However, this is still a major ruling, for a couple of reasons. First, it's the time an international decision has been made regarding the deeds and actions of Brazil's military dictatorship of 1964-1985. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is just one more example of growing insistence on re-examining and punishing those involved in crimes against humanity in Brazil during the dictatorship. Already, the government has given reparations to victims of the dictatorship, and while the Brazilian government has never given a full account of the dictatorship's activities (unlike what Truth Commissions accomplished in Chile, Argentina, or elsewhere), the government in 2007 acknowledged the Brazilian state's direct role in 356 deaths and disappearances. And as of now, there are several cases pending before the Supreme Court that challenge the legitimacy of the Amnesty law and that are seeking the declassification of documents that were given "permanent secrecy."

Certainly, many of the leaders and highest military brass will avoid any punishment, as many of them have died (including all five presidents during the dictatorship, including the first two, Humberto Castelo Branco and Artur Costa e Silva, both of whom were dead before 1970), and the cases may move so slowly or be challenged to the point that prosecutions for a majority of the torturers and murderers may never happen. Nonetheless, the general trend towards re-examining and questioning the Amnesty law and its applicability to specific cases is good news, and offers hope, even when the Brazilian media continues to wage a war against the "dangerous leftists" of 40 years ago and tries to diminish the overall horrors of the dictatorship.