Today in Specious Arguments: Lula's Absence at the G20 Destroyed Brazil's Economic Power!

Although editorials like this are all too common and don't surprise, their absurdity never ceases to amaze me. I always marvel at how far some will stretch in order to attack Lula, even when all other evidence suggests their arguments are wrong. Are there good reasons to criticize Lula? Absolutely. It's completely fair to say that his environmental record is at best "not good." Although I wouldn't fully agree, you could also suggest that he did not go far enough with his social programs, and that he compromised too many of his ideals to become president.

But to go after Lula because he skipped June's G-20 to deal with domestic disaster is facile and ridiculous. First, there is the fact that there is very little concrete evidence to suggest that Lula's absence has doomed Brazil. The author provides a lot of conjecture, but no actual evidence of damage. Could Lula's absence possibly be a problem down the line? Theoretically, I suppose so; but the idea that missing deals that could have taken place at one meeting across two days in June will reduce Brazil's economy and political presence globally is not only ridiculous; it's insulting to the expert diplomats Brazil has throughout the world to suggest that their efforts are undone just because a president missed a meeting due to issues at home. And there is absolutely no reason, politically, economically, or historically, to believe that the window that was open for opportunity for economic deals on June 26-27 will magically be closed on October 22-23, when the G20 meets again. Arguing that Lula's absence has caused irreparable damage to Brazil's standing in the global economy and politics is not just specious; it's patently absurd.

And on those issues at home...it's not like Lula dodged the meeting to vacation, or get some fake honorary title or something. There were horrible floods in Brazil; dozens were killed, and thousands more displaced. And this was almost simultaneous with the G-20 meeting. It's not like Lula waited to respond until it was too late. What is more, I just don't buy the "he skipped the G-20 for a few more votes at home argument," for several reasons. First, being president isn't the same as being head of the national bank; Lula has other duties besides economic deal-making. Taking care of his constituents is arguably at the top of the list of presidential duties. Surveying the damage and trying to help alleviate Brazilians' suffering through executive decision-making is probably more important than economic deals that can come later. I imagine most presidents or prime ministers would agree that domestic disasters take precedence over international meetings; you are elected by and serve your country's civilians, not the leaders and deal-makers of other countries.

Finally, this idea that Lula skipped the meetings for "a few more votes at home" is absurd. A) He's not running for re-election. Sure, you could suggest he did it to garner support for the PT's candidate, Dilma Rousseff; certainly, he's been very present in drumming up support for her. But the flooding happened in Brazil's Northeast, an area where Lula got 66% of the vote in 2006 (nearly propelling him to a first-round victory), an area where the PT has traditionally done very well. It's not like this was some opportunity to try to shore up support where Lula and the PT had traditionally lacked it, and to suggest as much is to effectively ignore both regional politics and the social conditions in the Northeast.

In short, this is one of the worst types of editorializing, relying not only on doom-and-gloom predictions based on hypotheses with no grounding in historical realities and gross simplifications of complex negotiations, but also turning to conjecture that ignores social realities and political practicality (who is the president supposed to serve?) in order to launch yet another smear campaign.

On Brazil's Presidential Campaign

I've been terribly remiss at dealing with this topic, in no small part because, while Brazil prepares to head to the polls again, I continue to try to finish a dissertation. However, with the campaign having really picked up steam once Brazil exited the World Cup, now seems as good a time as any to dive into the debates and discussions on the impending election.

Shortly after Dilma Rousseff's nomination, the PSDB, the main political party of the right, once again launched Jose Serra as its presidential candidate, later selecting relatively young Indio da Costa, of the far-right Democratas (Democrats) party as its vice-presidential candidate. Serra had been the candidate against Lula in 2002, when the PT and Lula finally won the election on their fourth try (having lost in 1989, 1994, 1998). Although Serra was seen in retrospect as relatively progressive for the PSDB (especially after the PSDB nominated extreme conservative Geraldo Alckmin in 2006), the 2002 loss apparently has still left him embittered, while the PSDB has continued to futilely and baselessly rail and rant against Lula, taking any chance they can to smear him. Indeed, in an effort to denigrate the PT, da Costa even baselessly claimed that the PT is connected to the FARC and narco-traficantes, in a moment that resembled Sarah Palin suggesting Obama "palled around with terrorists." It is clear that the PSDB and Serra do not want the PT's presence in Brasilia to continue, and while their efforts to do anything to prevent that from happening are fairly disgusting, it's also understandable, for two reasons: first, Lula has seemed to invoke an almost irrational hatred among many in the PSDB and its supporters (especially Rio's middle class); this is often based on classism as well as political jealousy and (to a lesser extent) ideology. Secondly, the PT was and is Lula's party, and the PSDB is Fernando Henrique Cardoso's party. Many have questioned whether the PT could survive beyond a Lula presidency, or whether it would disappear the way the National Reconstruction Party disappeared when Fernando Collor had to resign amidst allegations of extreme corruption. If Dilma wins, it will do much for the PT's ability to remain a strong and vibrant party beyond Lula. With Rousseff having taken the lead in polls after a statistical tie for much of the campaign, these tactics are likely to continue.

What would a Rousseff presidency look like vs. a Serra presidency, though? Many intelligent and respected scholars say there won't be much difference [sorry for the rough translation - Google's Portuguese-English translator isn't the best], and that a PT and PSDB presidency at this point would really vary only in shade, rather than in real policy. They point to what they perceive to be Lula's "continuist" policies following Fernando Henrique in terms of views on the market. This M.O. of Lula as "continuist" has been the main narrative since about 2004, and it clearly hasn't shifted as historians, political scientists, and others consider this year's elections.

However, I think this has always been a bit of a misnomer. If your idea of "continuist" is "a not-sudden and extreme ideological shift," a la from socialism to neoliberalism or from a dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy, then yes, Lula has been continuist, and either Dilma or Serra would be similar. However, this strikes me as a rather facile and useless way to view the two main presidential parties in Brazil right now. There were subtle but important differences between Lula and Cardoso. For example:

-The PSDB under FHC pushed privatization to extremes, trying to privatize everything (and succeeding with just about everything except Brazil's public university system and Petrobras; on both, the Brazilian people drew the line, and FHC had to step back a bit). While some say this did improve services, it also raised prices (when a French company bought out Brazil's public phone system, for example, phone prices in Brazil immediately went up 30%, even as they dropped 30% in France); what is more, as Lula demonstrated, investing in state-run companies and improving efficiency are not mutually exclusive terms, and when both are executed, can make an even stronger company than privatization could, all while offering greater benefits to your own citizens.

-In addition to adhering strongly to neoliberalism, FHC kept his economic relations connected almost strictly to the European Union and the United States, meaning Brazil's economy was by and large dependent on the fluxes of the American and European markets (no small irony, given that, in the 1970s, FHC was a leading theorist in dependency theory). While Lula did not shed the mercantilist policies of his predecessor, he did extend them to all of the world. Trade with Africa; deals with Arab countries in the Middle East; agreements with China; partnerships with India; collaborations with the United States - all were fair game, and Lula fostered these agreements in all parts of the world. This was beneficial both economically and politically; on the economic front, it diversified Brazil's trade, making it less susceptible to one country's or region's economic decline and strengthening its own economy (indeed, it was one of the last countries to enter the 2008 global recession, entering into recession in June 2009 and emerging from it just one quarter later.) Politically, Brazil was able to strengthen its role as a global player, working with everybody but dependent on nobody. Thus, Brazil enjoyed a level of both political and economic autonomy it had never witnessed before. The old joke used to be "Brazil - the country of tomorrow, forever." Yet Lula seems to have guided it very close to being the country of tomorrow today.

-Thirdly, there has been Lula's emphasis on state programs. A sort of flip-side to neoliberalism, Lula proposed a greater state presence and higher government spending on programs like Zero Hunger and the Bolsa Familia, which provided money to poor families for food or for their children to attend school longer. These programs have by all accounts been massively successful, and thanks in no small part to them, more people are joining Brazil's middle class than had ever taken place before. These policies ran directly counter to FHC's emphasis on "trickle-down" economics, something that Serra also emphasizes. While there are still enormous gaps between the wealthiest and the poorest in Brazil, the middle seems to be growing, and has done so through increased state spending (something the U.S. could learn from), and not from privatization and hopes for a trickle-down effect.

This is why describing Lula as "continuist" is not wholly accurate. Sure, he didn't radically alter the political or economic system, but there are major and important differences between Lula/PT and FHC/PSDB, and these differences I think in large part explain why Brazil has become such a major player in the global community in the 2000s, and not in the 1990s. And these differences continue between Rousseff on the one hand and Serra on the other. The election of either will not be the same thing (in much the same way that Bush and Gore were not the same thing in 2000); the election will determine whether Brazil continues down the path that garnered so much success in the first decade of the 2000s, or if it returns to the path of the 1990s that continued to perpetuate social and economic inequalities and sent the country spiralling into debt in the 1990s and inflation and recession after 1998 (when the exchange rate of the real to the dollar doubled overnight, immediately after FHC's re-election).

We are already getting good examples of these differences in Rousseff's pledges to continue those social programs, even while Serra denigrates of Mercosur and Brazil's relationship with Paraguay (fostered under Lula), while expressing his desire to return to policies focusing on neoliberalism and partnerships with the EU and the US. That type of policy is pure PSDB, and I think explains in no small part why Brazil did not take off under FHC but did under Lula. Lula did indeed continue to focus on market policies, but he did so with everybody, rather than just the EU and US; in doing so, he was able to expand Brazil's market even while retaining autonomy, rather than becoming dependent on one or two major economies. That success explains in no small part some of that hatred for Lula among the PSDB and its supporters - he succeeded where they failed, and did so by pointing out the weaknesses in their own policies. That these university-educated politicians were schooled by a laborer who never went to college particularly stung.

For these reasons, to suggest that Brazil will be the same whether Rousseff or Serra wins overlooks some very important distinctions. Yes, an overall mercantilist worldview will continue, but the differences between Serra and Rousseff are not just the differences between believing in privatization vs. a strong state with social programs for the poorer sectors, or partnerships with the U.S. vs. partnerships with the whole world. They are the differences between Brazil in the 1990s and Brazil in the 2000s; ask any Brazilian, and those differences are enormous and almost uniformly better in the 2000s. And that is why this year's election is so important and worth watching.

Around Latin America

I had hoped to write in depth about some of these stories in individual posts, but an unexpected trip out of town will keep me from blogging for several days. I still hope to come back to a couple of these, but until then, the stories themselves are well worth checking out.

-Death squads in Colombia have apparently begun targeting Afro-Colombian activists. The racial tensions in Colombia are often under-acknowledged, but stories like this serve as a strong reminder that complex race-relations among Afro-descendants and others in the Americas are not the monopoly of Brazil and the United States alone.

-Also in Colombia, another 14 soldiers have been set free from jail in the Soacha murders case. Like the previous 17 soldiers, the men were set free on a technicality, thus setting back efforts against paramilitary actions and human rights violations in Colombia even further.

-Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom has been cleared in the assassination of an opposition lawyer. The investigation arose when Rodrigo Rosenberg was murdered last May, with a videotape surfacing with Rosenberg claiming that if he were killed, it was because Colom had ordered it. The incident led to protests both against and in favor of Colom, and even the FBI had gotten involved with the investigation. The investigation ruled Rosenberg's death a suicide in which he tried to take down Colom's government with him, which sounds somewhat unlikely, but isn't so strange within the way the report narrates the events. They may be wrong still, but it appears Colom has emerged from this strange challenge to his office.

-Some in Brazil and the U.S. wonder if a new film on Lula's early years as a metal-worker and union leader will influence the elections this year. [I'll certainly have more on this later.]

-It turns out, Roberto Micheletti isn't the only perpetual participant in Honduran politics, as the Honduran Congress handed out 50 other lifetime government positions. And as for Micheletti himself, not only is he remaining in politics, but he plans to continue to be a very vocal participant.

-Finally, in Argentina, prison riots are bringing the issue of prisoners' rights to the fore in Argentina, which, like many other countries in the Americas (including the U.S.), suffers from an appalling penal system that demonstrates little concern for the conditions of prisons and rights of prisoners.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Caetano Veloso - Angry, Bitter, Jealous Old Men

A couple of Brazil's more famous political and cultural leaders have decided to make complete asses out of themselves in the past few weeks. The ugliest, worst, most infuriating, and most hypocritical incident comes from Fernando Henrique Cardoso himself, writing about Lula. The not-too-subtle title of his editorial? "The Time Has Come to End Lula's Monarchy in Brazil." This is rich on so many levels, not least of which because Lula has only served two terms. Why was it possible for him to serve two terms? Because of a constitutional amendment passed in 1998....giving Fernando Henrique Cardoso permission to run for re-election (an amendment that was surrounded by controversy and not-unsubstancial accusations that Cardoso engaged in corrupt practices and promises in order to get Congress to pass his request for an amendment that would allow him to run for re-election).

From there, Cardoso's rhetoric just gets more hilarious. He accuses the Lula administration of offering little more than "odd government decisions, apparently meaningless presidential phrases and so much propaganda," which sounds really witty and completely out of touch with reality. Aside from getting the World Cup and the 2016 Olympics (which aren't exactly empty statements of "propaganda"), Brazil's economy has bloomed under Lula in ways that Cardoso only dreamed of as he used the blank check he received for the plan that stopped hyperinflation in 1994 in Brazil in order to ravage the country with his neoliberal policies and hollowed-out monetary policies that saw the real drop in value by half to the dollar immediately after his re-election.

As I said, the development and growth Brazil is now experiencing dwarfs even Cardoso's hopes, and to add insult to injury, Lula was able to achieve this growth by basically taking the opposite approach to the national economy that Cardoso did. Lula halted the privatizations that Cardoso pushed; he increased federal investment in state companies like Petrobras, with great results; where Cardoso tried to attract foreign businesses and offer tax relief to the upper class, Lula invested in programs like Fome Zero and the Bolsa Familia to help the country see real improvements in standards of living and consumption rates; and instead of relying on investment from European and American multinationals, as Cardoso did, Lula instead sought to diversify Brazil's global economic relations, bringing in deals with Africa, China, and India, even while continuing to establish deals with the U.S. and Europe when it was practical and beneficial to Brazil.

In short, Lula did everything Cardoso spurned, and under Lula's policies, and not Cardoso's, Brazil has finally seen the growth that many have expected for Brazil for decades. As a result, Cardoso's rant comes off as little more than the humorous, impotent rumblings of an angry bitter man whose policies have been rightly spurned, and, what's worse, proven to be ineffective in the face of a political rival's much greater successes.

If Cardoso has reached the point of a hollow shell of an angry old man, then Caetano Veloso has gone beyond the point of self-parody. Veloso is highly respected musically globally, even while he puts out pretty middling stuff. However, while Veloso may have once been pretty politically engaged in opposing Brazil's dictatorship, he jumped the ship of political progressivism years ago. Back in the 1990s, he declared that Brazil no longer had racism (something with which his former collaborator and friend Gilberto Gil strongly disagreed with, and in any debate on whether a country is racist or not, I'm going to tend to side with the guy who would experience racism).

With a tendency for ridiculous statements in the past, you'd think Veloso would know when to keep his mouth shut. But he doesn't. In proclaiming his support in Brazil's 2010 elections for Green Party candidate Marina Silva, Veloso declared that Lula is "illiterate," a president "who doesn’t know what to talk about and when he does he’s coarse." That's fine - if Veloso wants to hold to that belief, that's his right. But that notion of Lula as an incompetent speaker was pretty much passe by 2002, as years of political experience had helped Lula sharpen his rhetorical abilities. Is he an Abraham Lincoln or Cicero when he opens his mouth everytime? Of course not, but neither is Obama, nor was Cardoso, nor are most people (including Veloso, in spite of how highly he holds his own lyrical ability). In his comments, Veloso doesn't come off as angry as Cardoso. Still, positions and statements like these are risible at this point; Lula's proven time and again he's far from "illiterate," and even if you don't think his every word is poetry, one might hope you'd realize that presidents are supposed, first and foremost, to help lead and improve their countries, and in that arena, Lula has been a major success. Sure, there are shortcomings even in his administration (hello, environmental policy), but to hear Veloso and Cardoso tell it, you'd think Brazil was ruined by the cult of personality of an illiterate laborer. It would be offensive if it weren't so disconnected with the actual current situation in Brazil.

Instead, Veloso and Cardoso just show their true colors: as bitter old men out of touch with Brazilian politics and development.

An Addendum to Honduras: Brazil's Role

In my original post below, I wanted to include Brazil's role, but had neither a decent way of stating that role nor a good place to put it. Fortunately, Randy perfectly and concisely summarizes the importance Brazil has played in the Honduran crisis, in his "winners and losers in Honduras" post. Among the winners:

Lula. Brazil's president's vigorous leadership on the issue was a model for the region: unwavering, but not bombastic; providing support behind the scenes (e.g., the Brazilian embassy for Zelaya's refuge), while maintaining diplomatic pressure was a sign of true diplomatic skill, a trait common in Brazil, arguably Latin America's most skilled diplomats.

I couldn't put it better myself.

Some (Lengthy) Thoughts on Brazil Winning the 2016 Olympics

Words don't express how much this means to Brazil. As Erik noted, there's a particular sense of pride about Brazil, and I think it's safe to say that this is based in no small part on the fact that Brazilians feel their country is often overlooked in the name of the "developed" world. In many regards, they're right - people in the U.S. are stunned when I explain to them that Brazil would be larger than the U.S. if the U.S. didn't have Alaska (which is almost three times bigger than Texas, the second largest state). Brazil is also somewhere between the eighth and tenth largest economy in the world (depending on how you measure it), and is projected to be the fifth largest by 2016. And it's pretty depressing the number of times that, when I've explained I'm going to Brazil, I've been met with the responses "How's your Spanish?" or "Oh, where - Buenos Aires?" Brazil's a massive, rapidly developing country that's taking a major place on the national level, and yet its grandness and growing importance is often overlooked. So this really means a lot to Brazilians on multiple levels.

How much? Well, this should give you a sense of the expectation and anticipation that was building yesterday. It is so huge, I have yet to see or hear any of the vaunted O Globo commentators (some of Brazil's most jaded and cynical citizens) say anything bad. As one reader put it, "For the 190 million Brazilians, this is more than a prize." And O Globo has offered nothing but praise for Lula on this, which, to my memory, is an unprecedented event since his election in 2002.

And speaking of Lula.....crazies on the right are already celebrating that the elimination of Chicago was some great loss for Obama. Even if you accept this premise (which I don't - disappointment, perhaps, but not some major repudiation of the Obama administration), it's nothing compared to the loss it would have been to Lula, which would have been more substantial and personal. While Obama recently decided to go to Copenhagen to lobby for his home city, Lula has been involved in Brazil's efforts to get the Olympics for years. He was quickly involved in the process, keeping up to date on the proceedings and meeting with officials, when he was elected, and when Brazil lost the bid to host the 2012 Olympics four years ago, Lula ratcheted up his involvement. Some may have think Obama has a little egg on his face now, but Lula would have been covered with a chicken-farm's worth of yolks had Brazil not won.

But it was about much more than personal pride, to Lula and to Brazilians. A lot of countries are still positivists at their core, thinking that their "nation's" history is a tale of constant progress. However, positivism has been particularly heavy-handed in Brazilian history since the 1800s. French positivism played a major role in the hand-wringing over Brazil's ethnic identities in the late-1800s and early-1900s, as they feared they were "inferior." Indeed, while bringing settlers from Switzerland, Germany, and other parts of Northern Europe had its economic reasons (the gradual decline in slavery leading up to abolition in 1888 meant that a new labor force was needed), Brazilian economic, political, and intellectual elites could have tried to target any group; they targeted Northern Europeans not just because they seemed like good workers, but because their "work ethic" and whiteness could help Brazil "improve itself" via Comtean eugenics. Since Brazil's post-colonial history, the country's politics and nation's identity has always been closely concerned with the notion that Brazil "progress" enough to join the "developed" world, a place many Brazilians have for generations felt Brazil deserved due to its size, beauty, productivity, uniqueness, etc.

This may seem like I'm overstating things on the positivist/"progress" front, but there are historical examples of this from 1821 onwards. Ever see Brazil's flag? Those two words translate as "Order and Progress," and it's been there since the establishment of the Republic in 1889. Up until the 1930s, Brazilian intellectuals, academics, and elites struggled with the fact that they weren't as "white" as other developed nations, so when Gilberto Freyre suggested that the mixture of indigenous, Afro-descendant, and Portuguese actually made Brazil better and stronger by combining the best elements of all three groups (and we are dealing with anthropology and sociology as they functioned in the 1930s, to be fair), Brazil suddenly embraced its ethnic background as a benefit for the first time, as if saying, "finally, we have a way to be proud of ourselves and we've overcome a major racial obstacle to progress!" It may sound silly, and I am simplifying some rather complex processes for the sake of space, but it is one of the main reasons Brazilians today still deny that there is racism in Brazil.

And as for development projects - Brasilia in 1960; Juscelino Kubitschek's pledge to help Brazil develop "50 years in 5" upon his election in 1955; the (failed) Trans-Amazonian highway, the pet project of the Medici administration during Brazil's dictatorship; all of these, and many many more, were projects adopted in no small part to prove Brazil was finally "developed." You see the language everywhere in the documents from their respective times; some of these policies were practical, while others were really adopted just to show the world what Brazil could do (Brasilia and the Transamazonia, especially).

In the last few years, however, all of Brazil's claims to "progress" seem to have been finally coming to more accurately reflect reality, rather than what Brazilian elites (and many Brazilians themselves) wanted to believe. After the economic troubles brought on by neo-liberal policies in the 1990s, Brazil has seen a remarkable level of economic growth that may be unprecedented in its history. Purchasing power is reaching social classes that had previously been shut out. While the American, European, and Asian markets have been struggling for over a year with the financial collapse of 2008, Brazil entered into an official recession this June, and exited it one quarter later. Nor is it restricted to economics; Brazil has become a major player in international politics in a way it never has been before, serving as a leader not only in South America, but joining China and India as one of the major emerging global powers alongside (possibly declining) powers like the U.S. and western Europe. Much of this has been due in no small part to Lula's government, yes, but these processes have been in play for hundreds of years, with accompanying hopes and disappointment regarding the status of Brazil in the world. Yet it finally seems like, more than ever before, Brazil is perched on (if not already entering) a phase as a global power that many elites and non-elites alike have dreamed about for nearly two hundred years.

Are there critics? I imagine so - there's no way 190 million people all feel exactly the same. But the depth this pride reaches is really foreign to jaded Americans who had to deal with Vietnam, Nixon, Bush, etc. As one final example, some of my most politically-cynical Brazilian friends couldn't contain their joy. When I logged on to facebook, one was proudly declaring (in French) that Brazil would be ready to her friends in France, fully proud of her country; another simply wrote, "Who said national pride is a thing of the past?" And these are some of the most jaded, cynical people I know in Brazil.

All of this is a very long way of saying, this means a lot more to Brazilians than it would have meant to those in Chicago, or Tokyo, or even Madrid, and it means a lot more than one can easily say. Between the World Cup and the Olympics, I think it's safe to say Brazilians are finally getting the international stage that they've wanted for generations in order to prove themselves to the world once and for all.

And prove itself, Brazil will. I've already started hearing codgery statements from some Americans that this was the wrong choice. The arguments are as tired as they are uninspired, as uninformed as they are offensive. Brazil is too "Latin," too "corrupt," underprepared, too "dangerous." All of these arguments could be easily brushed aside if people weren't so bigoted. Yes, Brazil struggled with getting the Pan-American games ready on time in 2007 - I was there. They promised things they (or anybody else) never could have achieved (like a third subway line in a few years) just to get the games. The federal government had to step in 4 months before the games and put construction on a 24-7 schedule to be ready. But you know what? The games were ready, and they went off perfectly. And Brazil learned from them. Just this past week I was reading an article (that I now can't find to link to) in a Brazilian journal in which an official admitted Brazil over-pledged itself in the Pan-American Games bid, and this time, instead of making a couple of grand claims, they had focused on making many achievable claims, ones they could fulfill.

How ready will Brazil be? Well, I would argue they're better prepared than any country that's hosted the Olympics in recent history. While many places have had to build new stadiums and facilities out of nothing, Brazil already has more than half of the facilities it needs for the Olympics, thanks to the Pan-American games and the World Cup coming to Brazil in 2014. But it's about more than just facilities. Rio has done an amazing job in expanding its travel options, relying on express bus lines as much as subways, and expanding those lines in the last few years (and again, I was there and saw the dramatic changes). Environmentally, too, it's already much better off than Beijing, and will be in 2016. If nothing else, there won't be that pollution. And you don't think the World Cup will be a good trial run for running things in Brazil? Please. Even if things don't go perfectly in 2014, Brazil's has two full years to focus on improvements. Did Beijing get that same chance? Or Sydney? Or Atlanta? No.

Which of course, leads to "safety." The violence in Brazil is real, but it's also overblown to the level of borderline-racist/classist paranoia. Yes, the favela violence is appalling. But do you think the police are going to be going into the Olympic village with guns blazing? And do tourists get mugged? Sure. Is it because they drew too much attention to themselves and went to places they never should have gone? Absolutely. I have known Brazilian and non-Brazilian mugging victims in Brazil, and in every single case, without exception, they said, "it was my fault - what I did was stupid." Whether it was pulling out a really obviously expensive camera in a poor neighborhood, or walking down the street with lots of cash in their hands, it was dumb, and they knew it. And it's not like Chicago, or Tokyo, or Madrid wouldn't have similar issues. And as one final point, last time I checked, Brazil didn't have any anti-abortion terrorists running around threatening the games. So Americans really don't have a lot of room to complain about "violence" or "danger" to me. As for corruption? Again, it's not like that hasn't happened outside of Latin America.

At the end of the day (and a very long post), I see this as nothing but good for Brazil and for the world. There's the pride issue, certainly. And while I wouldn't overstate the economic boon this will be, it certainly will help. In response to questions about Olympic stadiums, well....Maracana will be the big stadium, and I guarantee it isn't going anywhere after the Olympics. And as for other facilities, like pools, tracks, etc. - they're already there from the Pan-American games. They'll be updated, but they won't be destroyed afterwards. Just as in 2007, once the Olympics end, they will revert to public places where there are programs for children, physically disabled people, and others from all social groups who can swim, play basketball, track, and other events. This will help everyday Brazilians in the long-run, simply because it has already begun to help them in the wake of the 2006 Pan-American games (when not even the World Cup was a guarantee, to say nothing of the Olympics).

As one final addendum, I want to say that I'm actually proud of the IOC. It really is inexcusable that it has taken so long to have an Olympic games in South America; likewise, the fact that it's only been in a Latin American country once (in 1968), and in the southern hemisphere twice (both times in Australia) shows how Eurocentric the system is. While I found it unlikely, the possibility of Madrid following London infuriated me yesterday, especially since, if it were to win, it would have been due in no small part to the appeal of Spaniard and former Olympic chair Juan Antonio Samarach said it should be in Madrid because he is 89 and "I am near the end of my time." At the risk of seeming like a jerk, this infuriated me - "Oh, I'm sorry, you were chair for 21 years, until 2001? And you'd like to see the Olympics in Spain? Oh, where were you in 1992? And you're 89? So, how likely will you be around to 96?" While I don't begrudge Samarach his feelings and pride, Spain has had its chance, and will again.

Right now, it's Brazil's time.

Facial Hair of the Weekend

In honor of Rio de Janeiro getting the 2016 Olympics, capping a remarkable two-term presidency for the man, I give you Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva, president of Brazil (and, to my knowledge, the only head of a non-Islamic state with a beard).

Did Brazil Play a Minor or a Major Role in the Return of Manuel Zelaya?

More news agencies are reporting on Manuel Zelaya's return to Honduras, and there will be many interesting developments over the next few days and perhaps weeks, accompanied by a decent amount of speculation as to what might happen next.

However, one aspect in all of this may go relatively ignored, with little comment on, but it's something I raised in these comments. Specifically, what, if any, role did Brazil play in this?

As we all know, Zelaya is staying at the Brazilian embassy in Honduras, a brilliant move considering that embassy grounds are soverign soil of the country they represent. Thus, while the Honduran military did not mind breaking the law to exile Zelaya back in June, to try to arrest him at the embassy (as Micheletti blustered) would effectively be an act of war, and while Brazil hasn't been involved in an open foreign war since World War II, I know who I'd pick in a Brazilian-Honduran war.

That said, it's clear that Brazil has some role in this whole incident, obviously. There are three alternatives I can come up with (though there may be others I haven't thought of):

1) Brazil had no idea Zelaya was coming back, and when he showed up at the embassy doors, they just decided to let him in. This strikes me as plausible - Brazil, like the rest of the world, has held that the June coup was illegal and that Zelaya, and not Micheletti, is the proper president of Honduras. Zelaya may have gone there just hoping, and if it didn't work out, he could hope to get to another friendly embassy before he was arrested. This does raise the question that, if many embassies would accept him, why go to Brazil first? It may be because Brazil is a big power (bigger than, say, Costa Rica or Italy or most other countries), and he knew it was friendly to his cause. It may also be because, again, the Brazilian embassy allegedly sits next to Micheletti's private home. This would make it the obvious first choice of Zelaya if he wanted to thumb his nose at Micheletti.

2) Zelaya actually tried to go to other embassies for protection before Brazil's, but was turned down. This is possible, too, and could help explain why early reports said that Zelaya was in Honduras, but with no knowledge of where he was staying. There's not much that distinguishes this from the first possibility; still, I'm inclined to believe the first possibility over this one, primarily because Brazil seemed like such a sure bet in terms of friendliness, Honduras' inability to bully Brazil, and Brazil's high standing in the diplomatic community.

3) Brazil knew well in advance, through direct or indirect contact, that Micheletti was coming, and was prepared to accept him should he arrive safely in Tegucigalpa. Whether or not Brazil was active, they would make sure he was taken care of upon his arrival in the embassy. Perhaps they actively wanted to help undermine the Micheletti government, though this strikes me as the most implausible likelihood. Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim (who is in New York, preparing for the UN's meeting on climate change) denied any previous knowledge, and right now, I don't see any reason not to believe him. More importantly, if the Brazilian government was actively trying to undermine a regime, it would mark a major departure from Brazilian foreign relations over the last 7 years. If there's anything one can say about Lula's approach, it has been that he has been the consummate diplomat during his two terms; even politicians in neighboring countries look up to the way in which he conducts foreign relations. To suddenly throw all caution to the wind in any event seems extreme; to do so with the Honduran case in particular pushes the envelope of believability.

4) Brazil knew shortly before or after Zelaya's official departure (from where is still unknown) that he was coming to Honduras, and quickly prepared for his arrival. Again, I just don't see why they would do this; the foreign relations minister insists it's not the case, and again, it would mark a major departure from all that Brazil has stood for in international relations over the last 7 years under Lula.

Ultimately, of these four scenarios, the first one seems most likely to me, though I wouldn't be remotely surprised to learn that it was the second. If it's either three or four, I will be more than surprised, and were it to be either of those scenarios, it would raise all kinds of interesting (and perhaps troubling) questions about the direction Brazilian foreign relations were heading. Still, while not the most commented-upon aspect of Zelaya's return, it does offer some fascinating questions about that return as well as possible insights on the role of Brazil in Latin America, in the defense of democratic processes, and in international relations more generally.

Is the PT Looking towards Obama's Model of Campaigning?

If the Brazilian presidential elections were held today, Serra of the right-center PSDB (Partido Social Democratico Brasileiro) would win, as he is well in front of runner-up Dilma Rousseff, of the PT, and in a run-off, would decimate her if the elections were held today.

However, the elections aren't held today, and, unlike in the U.S., the campaign won't really get going until 2010 begins. (I know, I know - campaigning only in the year of the election seems novel and strange in the United States, but there you have it), and a lot of factors could enter into the equation. Rousseff hasn't really geared up in campaigning yet, and Serra's numbers are in large part because he's a known name who's generally respected (he lost to Lula in 2002, before the PSDB swung even further right in the 2006 elections and being severely repudiated for that swing). Plus, there are always dark horse candidates, specifically former Minister for the Environment Marina Silva, who left her post last year. She is running next year for Brazil's Green Party (Partido Verde), and who is already causing a bit of a buzz with the possibility of being Brazil's first black president and woman president, which, in the wake of the wonder and marvel in Brazil at the U.S.'s election of Obama, may make voters a bit more emotional and wistful for their own "change they can believe in."

While Obama could hover over the elections vaguely as issues of politics, rhetoric, and racial identities play out in next year's elections, it turns out he's already having a more immediate impact on Brazil's 2010 elections. It seems the PT has contacted the firm responsible for Obama's internet campaign in a hopes of having them help the PT in getting the word out on the PT and on Dilma.

Leaders from the Workers Party met with Ben Self from the Blue State Digital agency, the brains and architect behind the successful digital publicity strategy displayed by president Obama during his 2008 campaign.

According to O’ Estado de Sao Paulo, Lula da Silva’s party is intent in mounting a propaganda strategy through Internet to promote the most certain presidential postulation of Dilma Rousseff, currently cabinet chief, and who Lula da Silva has virtually hand picked as his successor. [...]

Obama’s “on line” strategy has been closely followed by Lula da Silva and his advisors who last week inaugurated the president’s own blog with incredible success.

This is really interesting, and only in part because the PT is looking to Obama and the U.S. for lessons on how to employ newer technologies in elections. From a Brazilianist's standpoint, it's an interesting answer to the question that has dominated the PT since the 1980s, and especially since 2002: what will a post-Lula presidency PT look like? One of the biggest challenges facing the PT has been that Lula has been its leader since it was formed out of the metal-workers' movement against the dictatorship in Brazil in the late-1970s. Lula has been the PT's face, its leader, its ideologue, and its communicator; at the same time, he has made clear that he would be finished with politics after his presidency, and there has been real concern within the party and among its supporters about what would happen to it - could it survive without Lula at the helm?

This effort to use the internet as a means of promoting not just its candidate, but its platforms and its ideas, seems to me to be a serious attempt to ground the PT as a party unto itself, rather than as "Lula's party." Who knows how this will play out - like the presidential elections of 2010, there's just too much time still to come and too many unknown factors to make any concrete guesses. Still, it's a fascinating move on the part of the PT, both for what it could mean for next year's election, and for what it could mean for Brazilian politics more generally.

The New York Times Once Again Dazzles Us with Its "Hard-Hitting" Analysis on Brazil

The New York Times had an article up this past weekend about the Brazilian presidential elections looming next year, and specifically, the PT's (Lula's party) candidate, Dilma Roussef. I've already commented on the horrible journalism covering Dilma in Brazil, and I've flogged both journalist Alexei Barrionuevo's and the New York Times' coverage of Brazil for years, but with the latest report, we get the best of both worlds - ridiculous claims and borderline-fear-mongering on the possibility of Dilma's exit and Lula seeking a third term, combined with Barrionuevo's shoddy "reporting" and "analysis." I wanted to break it down bit by bit, but I've been busy writing. Fortunately, I'm able to outsource to Randy on this one (and read his whole post - it's brief but thorough).

In short, Barrionuevo actually offers multiple direct indicators Lula will not and does not want to seek a third term, but then turns around and basically says, "but what if...?" It's the worst kind of pandering, (middle-class) fear-mongering and conterfactual idiocy that I would expect of O Globo and those who irrationally hate Lula in Brazil, and not of the New York Times. But I guess if there's anything to be learned over the past several years, it's that the Times cannot, will not, and/or does not employ decent jounalists in its Brazilian post.

The Goals and Missions of the U.S. Heading into the Summit of the Americas

The Fifth Summit of the Americas begins today in Trinidad and Tobago, and heading into it, Obama had an editorial that several newspapers ran yesterday (though not that bastion of liberal bias, the New York Times, which instead opted today for an ok-if-general analysis of how Obama's popularity may mark a radical shift compared to Bush's last meeting in 2005 in what can only be called a nadir in his diplomacy with Latin America). In his editorial, Obama outlines the general issues he feels are facing the countries in the hemisphere: U.S.-Cuba relations (which almost all Latin American leaders, left or right, want to see improve, feeling it would be the most concrete evidence that U.S. policy in the region as a whole was shifting); security issues; energy; and, of course, the economy. While it's just talk in an editorial, I do like Obama's comment that "we don't need a debate about whether to blame right-wing paramilitaries or left-wing insurgents - we need practical cooperation to expand our common security." Of course, who is defining "common security" and how they're defining it will be a major issue (especially from Colombia's and Mexico's representatives), but the simple fact that he's acknowledging that there is violence from paramilitaries is much better than anything his predecessor did, particularly in dealing with Colombia; and mentioning "left-wing insurgents" helps alleviate sectors from the right, too.

Despite its seemingly casual inclusion in the editorial, I think energy, and not the economy, may very well end up being the key issue for Obama at the Americas. After 8 years of Bush, we have a new outlook on the importance of energy efficiency and the environment. I suspect that Obama will want to act quickly on this, and given how much Latin America has criticized the U.S.'s environmental policy under Bush, this could be the most fertile area in which they could come to agreements about limiting emissions, using alternate fuels and renewable energy sources, and outline specific plans for the present and future.

Obama's call for collective action is interesting, as well - it seems rather mundane, but as Boz points out, Chavez may throw a wrench into the works. While I don't fully agree with every detail of Boz's analysis of Chavez, I think he's right in his suggestion that this weekend has the potential to say a lot about Chavez's power in the region. As I argued awhile back, Lula and Brazil are definitely the ascendant power in South America, and Obama is the most popular U.S. president in Latin America in some time (I don't have stats dating back, but I wouldn't be surprised if the numbers were the highest since at least Kennedy). Watching how this dynamic between the U.S., Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries plays out this weekend will be interesting to watch, as will the rest of the Summit, and I'll have more as the event takes place and wraps up.

Lula and Obama Meet

Lula and Obama met this weekend in what was Obama's first meeting with a Latin American leader, demonstrating how Brazil has really emerged as a global power , which also indicates that the U.S. is going to have to (and seems willing to) deal with Brazil and Latin America in general on much more balanced (if not perfectly equal) footing than in the past. Publicly, the discussions were, as Boz says, no surprise - Doha, energy, the global economy. I am curious if/how the Venezuela talks played out privately - I suspect if there is anything, we'll only know more later. Overall, the meeting seemed to have went well, and just the overall demeanor and relationship between the two men already is just another reminder of what a radical change and galactic-sized improvement we are witnessing between Bush's administration and Obama's when it comes to foreign policy and representing the United States globally. It's really too early to say much about the consequences of the meeting, but it's definitely a good step, and will be interesting to watch Obama's, Lula's, and the rest of Latin America's actions leading up to the Summit of the Americas in April.

Discussing Latin America - A (Very Belated) Response on Political Parties

Awhile back, Yann and I discussed the nature of political parties whose identities were rooted in a particular historical figure. I originally pondered the roles of figures like Augusto Sandino, Farabundo Martí, and Juan Peron might have had in current party politics in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina, respectively. Yann had some really great thoughts, particularly in regards to efforts to re-interpret past national figures into current worldviews of national and global politics in Latin America. These figures can remain controversial, as with Sandino ("Whether or not Sandino was an anti-imperialist hero, or a criminal lunatic is still very much a debate in Nicaragua"), but Yann argued strongly that my exclusion of Bolivar was perhaps misplaced, as Chavez has attempted to re-interpret Bolivar as one of the original "anti-imperialists." While I think (and I believe Yann agreed) that Bolivar differed from a Marti or Sandino in that Bolivar is still a part of the nationally-accepted myth of Venezuela when compared to Sandino or Marti, I agree that, in light of Chavez's efforts to re-interpret Bolivar, we can lump him in with the other two.

However, I want to actually address the issue of Peronism. Yann suggested that Peronism was the outlier from these groups/parties, as he founded the party that became central to national political contestation, rather than serving as a model for future parties, a la the Sandinistas' uyse of Sandino and the FMLN's use of Marti. Yann went on to suggest that we could therefore consider Peron closer to Chavez or Castro in that their parties were "formed around charismatic individuals."

I agree in that sense, but I think we shouldn't necessarily overstate that differentiation, either. In terms of party creation, I completely agree. However, I think there are important similarities between Peronism and the Sandinistas as they currently exist. Peron has been dead for nearly 40 years now, and his two administrations (1946-1955 and for 9 months, from 1973 to his death in 1974) had radically different legacies. Peron certainly was never a left-wing leader, but historically he was probably one of the most "populist" leaders of Latin America. In spite of his efforts at top-down control, the workers' movement developed strongly under Peron, and in many ways used and developed further Peron's fight for causes that often are (probably rightfully) considered "left," including labor rights, more equal wealth distribution, greater control and profit from laborers' efforts, etc. With Peron out of the country for 18 years, this leftward shift among many in the Peronist party happened without having Peron be able to directly counter them or divulge his true beliefs on these issues. At the same time, more conservative sectors that were drawn to his top-down (and even borderline authoritarian) control of the movement and social change, as well as his more fascistic sympathies, seemed justified in their beliefs of what Peronism was when he returned in 1973, far more right-wing in his campaign, brief administration, and attitudes than many portions of his own party. In short, Peron was able to represent, in his words, deeds, and ideas, many different things to different groups, and none of those groups was completely "wrong" or "right." (And this isn't even to consider those who hated and stood against Peron from start to finish).

All this is to say that I think Peronism and Peron doesn't represent a complete break from the divisive role Sandino and Marti had in their own countries. Yes, Peron formed his namesake party, and Sandino and Marti did not. However, the image of Peron was a divisive one almost from the start, not just among his party and other parties in Argentina, but within the party itself, and his absence for 18 years only exacerbated these divisions. You still see this today - the Peronists are still deeply divided and torn over the role they should take, a division made even deeper by the military's "Dirty War" of 1976-1983 and the presidency of Carlos Menem, a Peronist who drove Argentina to economic collapse with his extreme neoliberalism while opening old wounds by pardoning convicted war criminals from the dictatorship.

As one final note here, I agree with Yann that Chavez has the potential to be similar to Peron down the line. I would also add Lula to this mix. The PT is completely Lula - he was one of its founders, he has been its main leader and spokesperson since its formation in the early 1980s as Brazil's dictatorship opened, and he has been its only presidential candidate in Brazil's 5 post-dictatorship elections (the failed elections of 1989, 1994, 1998, as well as the victory of 2002 and re-election in 2006). Come 2010, Lula's term is up, and the PT is facing the first post-Lula election of its existence. As Yann cautioned, it is too soon to say for sure if Lula (or Chavez, or Castro) will end up having the same effect as Peron on their parties. The PT in 2010 will be aided in no small part that Lula is still alive, and can make clear which direction he thinks the party should go. Still, he faces a difficult challenge, as divisions among middle-class intellectuals and ideologues vs. workers and politicians seeking more practical demands have emerged. Indeed, Lula's own administration has jaded many of his more intellectually leftist supporters, who felt he abandoned the true "revolutionary" cause when he actually had to navigate real political channels (in this regard, I have little sympathy for such ideologues, I openly admit). I'm certainly not saying the PT will end up going down the same road as Peron's Partido Justicialista, and I would be amazed to see Lula end up doing a massive rightward shift, both for ideological and historically contextual reasons. Still, I think that, as with Chavez and Castro, it will be very interesting to see how the PT functions in a post-Lula road, and Peronism will more likely than not serve as a fascinating and important point of comparison and contrast.

Bolivia and Brazil Joining Forces in Combatting Drug Trade

This is a few weeks old (I apologize for the light blogging - I currently have two grant proposals, a conference paper, a dissertation chapter, and a part-time job on my plate, and things have actually calmed a bit from the first 4 weeks of the year), but I wanted to point out that Bolivia and Brazil have joined forces in combatting the cocaine trade along their border in the wake of the expulsion of the DEA. It's a fascinating agreement that serves both wonderfully - Brazil is making an effort to implement some national drug policy efforts rather than letting police blaze their way into favelas, and Bolivia is making a strong effort to make clear that while coca leaf production is non-offensive and important to its economy, it has little tolerance for the cocaine trade. Additionally, Bolivia gets more infrastructural agreement as part of the deal, and Brazil strengthens its role as a regional leader in lending and development projects for its neighbors. Boz reminds us also that combatting the drug trade behooves more nations than the U.S., and that fighting it doesn't always have to involve the U.S.

But there is another major aspect worth mentioning here, too. Although the U.S. under Bush constantly chastized Morales for Bolivia's coca production (leading to occasionally humorous interactions between the two countries), Morales has always made it clear that the coca leaf itself is not a drug, and that he's against the proliferation of cocaine production. The distinction is important and relatively easy to understand, but one that the United States has never bothered to grasp. This request to Brazil just further evidence both of that fact, and of fact that U.S. really has gone about in the "war on drugs" in the Andes in the totally wrong way.

Barack Obama - the Lula of the U.S.?

The Christian Science Monitor has an article up that raises an interesting comparison/question - will Obama be to the U.S. what Lula has been to Brazil? It's a tough question to answer, primarily because Lula has 6 years of presidential administration behind him, while Obama has, well, none. As a result, the article focuses more on what Lula has accomplished. Still, given that, like Obama, Lula inherited a government whose economy was in trouble (though not like the global economy today) and who had come from his country's political left (yes, Obama isn't "left," but in terms of our party system, it's as close as we've had in a long time).

At first, I wanted to reflexively disagree with the article's suggestion that Obama is the U.S.'s Lula, but the more you look at things, the more similar they are: both were raised by single mothers out of relatively difficult positions; both were "outsiders" to the traditional party systems who managed to overcome the entrenched political aristocracy to become leaders of their respective countries; both advocate social change, but with a methodical, steady approach, rather than an "all the chips on the table" method; and both are big proponents of diplomatic relations to resolve their own country's and other countries' issues. What is more, both Lula and Obama mark a major social shift in an office that had traditionally been held by white elites; Lula, as a worker who rose up through the metal factories to become a union leader before entering politics; and Obama, an African-America. Finally, like Lula, I suspect that Obama will have to lead from the center-left, creating real social change but still disappointing his more progressive and radical supporters (though certainly, after eight years of Bush, many of Obama's supporters, while perhaps disappointed in the future, will also have a fairly good grasp of the alternatives). Despite my initial reflex, reflecting further on the issue, there seemed to be more in common between the two men than I at first wanted to admit.

I think the major differences between what the election of Lula meant to Brazil and what Obama's election means is not the differences (or similarities) between the two men, but rather the differences in the context of the two. Brazil's electing of Lula was a major watershed, because it did prove you did not have to be part of the elite to attain higher office. Lula is a man who never had a college education, and who had to work in his youth instead of going to school, just to help support his family. He lost a finger working in the factories, and gradually rose up through the labor structure to become a major union leader, gaining fame in fighting both for greater workers' rights and fighting at the head of a new coalition of opposition towards Brazil's military dictatorship in the late 1970s (Lula was even briefly arrested and tortured). Yes, by the time Lula was elected in 2002, the PT had been active as a political party for over 20 years, and Lula had won in his fourth attempt to become president (having run unsuccessfully in 1989, 1994, and 1998), so he was far from a political "outsider." Nonetheless, he marked the first time Brazil elected somebody who was not from the economic and political elite, and thus marked a major breakthrough in the classism of Brazilian elections. Indeed, it was his very background as a laborer and union leader that has caused so much animosity, hatred, and slander from many sectors of the middle class (many of my in-laws included).

Likewise, as many people have observed, Obama's election was a breakthrough, in that the U.S. elected an African-American. The historical import of this cannot be overstated, and there have been plenty of anecdotes, images, and historical reminders of just how huge it is that Obama won, ranging from the fact that only 54 years ago, Brown v. Board was decided; the Civil Rights Act is only 44 years old; Martin Luther King, Jr. was killed 40 years ago; and if those reminders didn't say enough, the tears flowing down Jesse Jackson's face last Tuesday night said more than enough. In many ways, what Lula did for class barriers in Brazil, Obama did for racial barriers in the U.S.

But, as I said, I think the social and historical context of the two countries makes Obama's victory and Lula's presidency more different symbolically. Simply put, I think Obama's victory is more symbolically important than Lula's, and the reason is simple: I think racism in the U.S. is structurally stronger and more severe than classism in Brazil or the U.S. The reasons for this are multiple: in the U.S., class and race are closely (though not always) tied together, so that often statements of class really are statements on race. What is more, our notions of "middle class" are so vague and open-ended that virtually anybody can and does claim they are "middle class," from the family of four making only $50,000 collectively per year to the lawyer who pulls in $300,000+ and considers herself/himself "upper middle class." Because of the ways race has historically operated in this country, we simply base many of our judgements based on one's racial qualities, and I think it's fair to say that, in the most general terms, racism trumps classism in how we view our fellow citizens. And I realize that's a huge, charged statement. I want to make absolutely clear that there is, without question, classism in the U.S. too. The very fact that virtually everybody identifies as "middle class" shows the stigma towards being "poor," and we often make fun of "white trash" and "rednecks" and "shitkickers," with class being a central part of those criticisms. Nonetheless, the number of times that we lynched a poor person, prevented a poor person from voting, or hired a poor person based simply on class and not on race, is relatively small compared to the number of times those things were done based on race.

In Brazil, it's not so clear-cut, and I would suggest that racism and classism are far more muddled in Brazil than they are even in the U.S. Ever since Gilberto Freyre's work in the 1930s, Brazil has culturally refused to acknowledge its racism, claiming that because Brazilians were historically "forced" to mix between Portuguese, indigenous peoples, and African slaves because of the colonial context in Brazil, there can be no racism. The logic goes that, because of all of those generations of mixing, there are too many skin tones to be able to simply categorize somebody as one race or another, and since there's a whole lot more "brown" in Brazil, there can't be racism like there is in the U.S., where there is the "black/white" dichotomy based on the one-drop theory. What is more, Brazilians have often reinforced their argument of being incapable of being racist by pointing directly to the U.S. They have suggested (in a foolish argument that found support both in Brazil and the U.S.) that slavery was somehow "worse" in America, and the fact that America legally codified racism via Jim Crow laws (in addition to very public lynchings) just further reifies the arguments made in Brazil that American racism is worse than Brazilian racism.

What this thinking has done has allowed Brazilians by and large to deny the existence of racism while further encoding it in other categories, such as "culture" and class. In many of the elections, Lula constantly faced criticisms based on his education, class, and birthplace (the Northeast of Brazil, generally viewed as "inferior" by the Southern Metropole in Brazil, in no small part because of the concentration of Afro-descendants in the Northeast). Each of these criticisms carried heavy overtones of barely-hidden racism. Yet the racial content of these critiques wasn't really broached, or even confronted. Thus, even while Brazil, like Europe, has applauded the U.S. in its ability to (temporarily) overcome its racism enough to elect an African-American (and to be clear, I am in no way saying that now the U.S. is less racist than the rest of the world simply because Obama won this time around), but like Europe, Brazil has failed to reconcile itself to its ability to have an Obama-like figure in its own society. And that's exactly where the symbolic difference between Lula and Obama appears: Brazil may one day have somebody who shatters barriers like Obama did, but Lula, for all of the barriers he himself shattered, is not that person.

To sum up what is admittedly a rather long post, there are a lot of similarities between Lula and Obama. However, I think this similarities do not overcome the major symbolic difference each man represents to his own respective culture and society. The major difference between Lula's 2002 victory and Obama's 2008 victory is the social monoliths which they have challenged. Lula's victory did indeed break through the elitism that had dominated Brazil's political class since the colonial period, and the "elephant" of classism in Brazil's room was very real. But racism was and remains the larger proverbial elephant in Brazil; chipping away at classism did not erode the deeper-seated ways that racism operates in Brazil. Thus, in terms of what the event of Obama's election represents to the U.S. vs. what Lula's represented to Brazil, the comparison simply does not hold up - Obama's symbolic importance has done things for American society that Lula's has not done and never could do in Brazil. For that to happen, Brazil will need its own "Barack Obama."

Tensions between Brazil and Paraguay

The New York Times has a story up about "mounting tensions" between Brazil and Paraguay. This week, Brazil is conducting military training along their border with Paraguay. Paraguay is rather nervous over this, and Fernando Lugo this week made some strong statements about what would happen if Brazil violated even "one inch" of Paraguay's territorial sovereignty.

I must say, the tensions mentioned in this story seem to fall far more on the Paraguay side of the equation than the Brazil side. I think the implicit connections that the story tries to make between the training practices and the Paraguayan landless' efforts to seize land owned by Brazilians in Paraguay is tenuous at best. Yes, there is the possibility that naturalized Brazilians' ownership is at risk in Paraguay, and it is in the Brazilian government's interests to make sure its citizens are not harmed, be it in Paraguay or elsewhere. Still, I'm not really convinced that the Paraguayan landless movement and the military training have led to heightened nervousness in Brazil. That may be the case, but the article really offers nothing in the way of evidence to back that up.

As for Paraguay, I have little doubt that their tensions are very real and a bit more pervasive. None can fault Paraguay for being a bit worried about the fact that, just as there is a growing movement to remove foreign (mostly Brazilian) farmers from there lands in Paraguay, Brazil is training its military along Paraguay's border. Although it was nearly 140 years ago, the War of the Triple Alliance, in which Brazil (with nominal and brief aid from Argentina and Uruguay) invaded Paraguay. The 6-year war (1864-1870) ended up with nearly half of Paraguay's population dead, and more than 80% of its men over the age of 20 casualties of war or disease. It's not hard to understand why, even if so much time has passed, Paraguay might still be a bit on edge over this.

Still, I really don't think much is going to come of this, at least for now. Brazil does often train troops in that region, and it (along with the Amazonian basin) is a major site of illegal smuggling of drugs, weapons, and especially products like electronics and housewares, whose smuggling helps circumvent Brazilian taxes and tariffs. What is more, if there's any single word that could describe Lula's foreign policy, it's "diplomatic." Even when popular opinion in Brazil calls for sabre-rattling and takes a more aggressive stance towards its neighbors, Lula has practiced a calm, peaceful foreign policy. In short, "cooperation" has been the word for the last 6 years under Lula, and there is absolutely no good reason to see the military training as a sudden shift in that policy over what amounts to a domestic issue facing Paraguay.

That said, this does raise the specter of uglier regional politics in the post-Lula era. There can be no doubt that, since the beginning of the decade, Brazil has come to assume a new role as regional leader in South America, gaining a very real presence as the major power of the region, rather than a nominal presence (which is what Brazil's role as a regional leader often was throughout the 20th century). While Lula's administration has been one of reasoned diplomacy and cooperation, there's nothing to guarantee that future leaders will be as calm and patient in dealing with their neighbors, particularly when said leaders perceive Brazil's own interests to be at risk. In light of Lula's foreign policy over the past several years, I really don't see much aggression in and of itself in Brazil's recent definition of foreign aggression as "whoever threatens or commits “hostile prejudicial acts against Brazilian sovereignty, territorial integrity or the Brazilian people”. However, it is open-ended enough to leave room for future leaders to interpret it in a far more aggressive fashion than Lula probably would. And while it may seem strange to suggest that Brazil would provoke a war with another country over a perceived threat, geopolitics is strange, and it's not like countries haven't unilaterally declared war over "perceived threats" before. Thus, while I don't think there's much to the Mercopress article right now (and, like the New York Times article, I think the connections it and the Estado de Sao Paulo are trying to make are a bit tenuous), it does raise the interesting specter that, down the line, Brazil could become a bit of a regional bully in South America as the regional, hemispheric, and global geopolitics shift.

Bolivia's Situation Deteriorating, Threatening to Affect South America from the Caribbean to Tierra del Fuego

Events in Bolivia this week have gotten virtually no attention in the U.S. (due in no small part because people don't care, as well as the fact that the media has had the presidential campaigns, the non-Chilean 9/11 anniversary, and now Hurricane Ike to discuss). However, in the last few days, things have escalated to a point that Bolivia's internal crisis between Morales and the highlands vs. the four lowlands regions are threatening to blow up into a transnational diplomatic crisis.

In summary, despite Morales winning the referendum on his administration in early August, the situation has only worsened between his administration and the four eastern lowlands regions that have wanted virtual economic and political secession. As Erik accurately surmised, the situation has come to a standstill, with neither side gaining the upper hand as violence only escalates. Confrontations between rural workers (often of indigenous backgrounds) and the opposition (often of "whiter" and wealthier backgrounds) have escalated, with 8 deaths (seven of them campesinos who were surrounded and attacked) and 34 injuries yesterday alone. Morales also expelled the U.S. ambassador from Bolivia on Wednesday, claiming that the ambassador is supporting the four regions in an effort to undermine Morales's leadership. While the U.S. State Department called such claims "baseless," there is absolutely no more reason to trust the U.S. than there is Morales, particularly given our history of having the highest levels of the executive branch undermining leaders we didn't like in the past (Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973 [hat-tip to Randy], Argentina in 1976, Nicaragua in the 1980s, or Venezuela in 2002).

However, unlike previous times of conflict in Bolivia, this time, the threat of hemispheric involvement is greater. Already, as a sign of "solidarity," Hugo Chavez has expelled the U.S. ambassador from Venezuela. While this is the story that's getting the most press in the U.S., though, in many ways it's the least important for the rest of the South American continent. In addition to the violence, opponents of Morales blew up one of the major pipelines between Bolivia and Brazil. The attack on the pipeline had an immediate effect on Brazil, as Brazil gets 25% of its daily fuel from Bolivia through this pipeline.

Although the service was restored relatively quickly, Brazil and Bolivia's other neighbors are finding it more difficult not to get involved. Marco Aurelio Garcia, Brazil's special assessor for International Affairs for the President, said yesterday that Brazil "will not tolerate any rupture of institutional order in Bolivia," saying that Morales's overthrow would cause enormous problems for the entire continent. And Lula spoke with Argentine president Kristina Fernandez Kirchner, Chile's Michele Bachelet, Morales, and Chavez yesterday, in an effort to (as the article puts it) "mobilize the countries of the region - especially the Group of Friends of Bolivia, formed by Brazil, Colombia, and Argentina - so that they can serve as an intermediary channel between the government and the opposition in Bolivia."

These actions and statements are far from empty international bluster (even Chavez is probably not making empty threats when he promised to aide an armed resistance movement if the democratically-elected Morales were to be overthrown) that will not be backed up by action. It has been a very long time since the governments of so many South American countries were in such quick contact to try to aide another country (and the last time they were in contact, it was to root out and kill subversives in Operation Condor). The fact that Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are all clearly concerned and not afraid to enter into the equation to make sure Bolivia's institutions remain in tact reveals just how severe the situation has gotten. Certainly, I hope things will get better, but like Erik back in August, I just don't see how they can right now, given how much of a stalemate it's become between Bolivia and the lowlands regions.

Prospects Facing Fernando Lugo and Lula Over Electricity

This Friday, Fernando Lugo, the "leftist" president-elect of Paraguay, will take office, marking the first time in over 55 years that neither the military nor the Colorado party has been in the presidency. I commented before on the issues he might be facing upon the beginning of the administration, but I think the Economist reiterates a lot of the points already made pretty well. The one thing I would add is that, at least right now, I don't see much trouble erupting over the Itaipu issue. Certainly, Brazil and Lula are interested in maintaining their low rates with Paraguay in their joint-deal for electricity from the dam. However, Lula's nothing if not the consummate polite diplomat. Through his 5 and a half years as president, he has consistently negotiated with any and every country that might help Brazil, all while respecting the countries he negotiates with.

This was certainly the case when Bolivia nationalized its oil. When that happened, the outcry from O Globo and the middle class was extreme; they demanded Lula cut off all aid to Bolivia and even declared that that oil was rightfully Brazil's, and that Bolivia had no right to nationalize it (nevermind the inconsistency that Brazil's own oil company and petroleum-producer, Petrobras, is nationalized). However, Lula paid attention to Morales's promise not to automatically cut countries off as long as the countries that Bolivia supplied renegotiated their deals so that Bolivia was getting fairer prices for its oil. Lula agreed, and Brazil's doing just fine.

The point of this Bolivia tangent is to say that, given how Lula dealt with Bolivia when they nationalized their oil, I don't see any reason to believe that there will be a major falling out between Paraguay and Brazil/Lugo and Lula over the Itaipu electricity issue. Lula's proven that he's open to renegotiating deals that are fair to both countries, and it seems that Lugo is also going about the issue with in a very friendly, "conciliatory" way. Of course, things could change, but it looks right now that Lugo will have much greater difficulties in dealing with internal opposition and land issues within Paraguay than electricity deals with Brazil.

Brazil Resuming Nuclear Reactor Construction

Lula has authorized resuming the establishment of a third reactor, which had sat idle for 22 years at Brazil's Angra dos Reis nuclear power plant, in southwestern Rio de Janeiro state. The power plant was originally decreed in the 1970s as part of the military dictatorship's demonstration of how Brazil was finally attaining the levels of "development" it required to assume it's rightful place in the world (in what I would call Brazil's historical "order and progress" complex). The idea of the power plant was borne equally out of the fact that many members of the military brass saw nuclear power as the next necessary step to achieve progress in Brazil, as well as being influenced by broader geopolitical factors, including Argentina gaining nuclear power. Interestingly, the public met such plans with an at-best lukewarm response in Brazil when they first came up, but after Jimmy Carter heavily pushed Brazil not to turn to nuclear power, it attained a level of popular nationalism the military government itself could never have achieved on its own, thereby giving the project far greater popular legitimacy as well. Brazil ultimately gained its nuclear technology and capabilities via help from West Germany, and began working on two reactors. The third, begun in 1986, was quickly abandoned as Brazil entered inflation rates in the hundreds and even thousands in the late-1980s and 1990s. Now, with a booming economy and a growing need for energy, Lula has authorized resuming construction of the third reactor.

I am really ambivalent about this. Many Brazilians argue that if there is any country in the world that does not have the right to tell countries whether they can or cannot use nuclear power, it's the United States, given its arsenal and the fact that it's the only country that has used a nuclear weapon against an enemy. While I'm not sure that the latter part is fully germane to the issue at hand, I generally agree that any nation that has already attained nuclear power and has an absurd amount of nuclear capabilities, particularly in the military area, they really do not have a very strong base upon which they can tell other countries not to use the power they have enjoyed for decades.

Additionally, while nuclear power may not be the best options, I think it's demonstrated that, if done correctly, it can be safe. Yes, there are risks; there always were, always are, and always will be. Yet the fact that Brazil is looking to improve its energy system by moving beyond hydroelectric power. I'd still really like to see Brazil further explore wind power, which it's showing no sign of doing (though things can change). That said, I suppose if Brazil wants to turn to nuclear power in order to not have to dam up so much of the rivers in the Amazon and elsewhere, I'm ok with that.

However, this is where my ambivalence enters. While hydroelectric dams are definitely damaging to the environment, the disaster that could happen with the nuclear plant is infinitely worse. And again, that doesn't mean things will happen, but the sheer risk makes me antsy. Additionally, I've travelled around Angra dos Reis, and the location of the nuclear power plant is one of the most beautiful places I've ever seen, with amazing beaches in the region and thick forest butting up against small mountains; even the historical legacy of the area is great, as Paraty, an old colonial town that has been for the most part preserved, is less than an hour away from the plant. And there's no question that the plant could have amazingly awful damage, given that it rests directly on the oceanfront. Certainly, nuclear meltdown is nuclear meltdown; nonetheless, I have no doubt that there could be many places in Brazil that could host a nuclear power plant, and why the military government picked one of the most beautiful parts of the country (only 3 hours from Rio de Janeiro) is beyond me. In this sense, then, I'm really hesitant about Lula's decision. I don't presume to tell Brazilians where their power should come from. Still, the location of the plant makes me uneasy, and again, I just don't understand why the government doesn't investigate and invest in wind power more, especially given the amount of coastline that Brazil has.

All this is pretty much a long way to say I'm just not sure about Lula's decision today. I hope to god it works out well, and it probably will; France hasn't had any accidents, and it's drawing 78% of its power from nuclear power, and while accusations of corruption often fly in Brazilian politics, I'm fairly certain that nobody (even Brazilian politicians) is so stupid as to try to employ corruption when it comes to nuclear engineering and technology. I guess at the end of the day, I have the same unease about nuclear power as I do everywhere, that equal combination of "it will probably be fine" but with that vague "but what if..." and fleeting thoughts of Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl, all combined with a knowledge of the physical location of the plant that makes me sad and confused as to why anybody would put nuclear energy there.

There Is No Coordinated "Lula-Calderon-Uribe Troika"

While it's an interesting idea, I don't buy this idea of a "Uribe-Lula-Calderon" troika countering Chavez at all, for several reasons. Firstly, as I've stated repeatedly, Lula has been willing to negotiate with many non-traditional (i.e. non-European, non-U.S.) partners. Simply because he has been working with Uribe on some issues (including strengthening military ties via a binational military base on the Colombia-Brazil border) does not mean he's out to undermine Chavez's influence. Indeed, while I'm just making a rough guess here based on news in Brazil over the last couple of years, Lula has cooperated with Chavez far more than Uribe, and certainly far more than with Calderon. Lula's first job is to build up Brazil's strengths in the hemisphere and the globe. If that means entering economic, political, social, or economic agreements (open or tacit) with Chavez, he'll do it; if it means entering such agreements with Uribe or Calderon instead, he'll do that too. He (and Uribe and Calderon) are working first and foremost to steer their respective countries in the directions they deem are the best, and I just really find it hard to believe there could be any "anti-Chavez" axis emerging between the three of them, explicitly or tacitly; each is going to look after the interests of his own country, and to assume some "alliance" of any sort between the three to bring down Chavez is rather far-reaching.


Secondly, I think Tannock really overstates Uribe's importance both presently and in a broader historical context. Yes, the FARC has been reduced through deaths (natural and violent) and embarrassments (accidentally turning over high-profile hostages to the Colombian army, who you mistakenly think are your own troops; using a boy that it turns out you don't even realize is no longer in your possession in hostage negotiations), and Uribe's efforts have played no small part in this. This to a large extent explains his high approval ratings (which, according to some, hit 91% in the wake of the Ingrid Betancourt rescue). However, basing your entire perspective of Uribe's popularity and historical importance based on these recent developments is premature and wrong-headed. There is still the fact that Uribe's close friends and allies are closely tied to paramilitary groups. While this does not make him immediately guilty by association, he has done virtually nothing to make a strong case that he is not to some extent tied to paramilitary groups, either; indeed, in a rather Bush-like way, he has dug in further, simultaneously denying his knowledge and/or involvement while dodging the question. Even if Uribe is never directly tied to the paramilitaries, he has done virtually nothing to combat their power, either, and this will be a lasting stain on his record, too.


But there is an even more fundamental problem with the argument that Uribe's influence is extending throughout the America's at Chavez's expense based on the recent victories over the FARC. As popular as Uribe's successes have made him in Colombia, it is radically faulty to assume that his recent successes have left the rest of South America falling under his sway and abandoning Chavez. Simply put, the ideologies and beliefs of other leaders and populations in South America don't fall in line with Uribe's ideology and locus on the political spectrum. Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador are all run by popularly-elected leftist leaders. Uribe is the only rightist leader on the entire continent, and outside of Colombia, many Latin Americans from multiple nations loathe him as much for his ideological stance as for his close ties to the United States, which they view as an anachronistic and damaging model of economic reliance on the U.S. that hearkens back to the 20th century and that these other countries are successfully leaving behind. Simply put, in some ways, Uribe is a "stain" to the rest of Latin America for his cooperation with the U.S. and right-wing positions. To presume that his recent successes have put him at the forefront of international leadership and cooperation as the lone rightist leader on a continent of leftist countries is tautological.


I think the final major problem with this article is the insistence that Calderon is part of this "troika," yet Tannock does absolutely nothing to really establish how and why Calderon is a major player in undermining Chavez's influence in the hemisphere aside from the fact that Mexico has "geostrategic" influence. Specifically, Tannock makes a Uribe-Calderon connection simply because both presidents are trying to deal with the drug trade and repress it; the fact that the two "wars on drugs" share very few similiarities and are in two completely different political, historical, and even geographic contexts seems to be of little importance to Tannock. And the assumption that Calderon and Lula are similar because they are both trying to renegotiate and strengthen their ties to Cuba is ridiculous; to reiterate what I pointed out above, Calderon, like Lula, is simply trying to do what he sees is economically and politically best for his country. To sit out negotiations and dialogues with Cuba while other hemispheric powers were improving relations with Cuba would be stupid, alienating Mexico even further. Calderon isn't doing this because of some new "troika"; he's doing it because it's the smart thing to do.

In short, I just don't buy this whole notion of a "Uribe-Calderon-Lula" troika. Lula is far more tied to Chavez than to Calderon or Uribe (without being dependent on Chavez), and there is absolutely no evidence that these three men are trying to collaboratively and collectively undermine Chavez's influence.

As a final point somewhat unrelated to the above, I also really take umbrage with Tannock's contention "that Latin America was going through one of its regular bouts of leftwing destabilization, given the rise of Bolivian President Evo Morales, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa, and their ringleader, Chavez." Firstly, leftism is not an inherently "destabilizing" force, and when leftist leaders in Latin America have witnessed "destabilization," it has been because of foreign powers' (particularly the U.S.) undue influence and open subversion of national sovereignty, be it in Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, or Nicaragua in the 1980s. There's nothing naturally "destabilizing" about left-wing leadership. And the suggestion that the rise of left-wing leaders in Latin America appeared to be little more than a "bout" is totally ignorant of recent history, when country after country in South America witnessed its economy devastated by neoliberal policies instituted by rightist presidents, leading to a backlash that perfectly coincided with Bush's insistence on focusing only on Iraq and the Middle East, leaving Latin American leftists and leaders with an unprecedented ability to establish themselves and chart new, non-dependency-based economic and political courses for their countries. To suggest that the continent-wide victories of leftists in Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, is a "flash in the pan" is absurd; if anything, at least right now, it would seem that it's Uribe's administration that is the outlier.

In short, Tannock is right that Chavez's influence in the hemisphere may be declining, but not for any of the reasons he then tries (very unsuccessfully) to outline.