Today in Specious Arguments: Lula's Absence at the G20 Destroyed Brazil's Economic Power!

Although editorials like this are all too common and don't surprise, their absurdity never ceases to amaze me. I always marvel at how far some will stretch in order to attack Lula, even when all other evidence suggests their arguments are wrong. Are there good reasons to criticize Lula? Absolutely. It's completely fair to say that his environmental record is at best "not good." Although I wouldn't fully agree, you could also suggest that he did not go far enough with his social programs, and that he compromised too many of his ideals to become president.

But to go after Lula because he skipped June's G-20 to deal with domestic disaster is facile and ridiculous. First, there is the fact that there is very little concrete evidence to suggest that Lula's absence has doomed Brazil. The author provides a lot of conjecture, but no actual evidence of damage. Could Lula's absence possibly be a problem down the line? Theoretically, I suppose so; but the idea that missing deals that could have taken place at one meeting across two days in June will reduce Brazil's economy and political presence globally is not only ridiculous; it's insulting to the expert diplomats Brazil has throughout the world to suggest that their efforts are undone just because a president missed a meeting due to issues at home. And there is absolutely no reason, politically, economically, or historically, to believe that the window that was open for opportunity for economic deals on June 26-27 will magically be closed on October 22-23, when the G20 meets again. Arguing that Lula's absence has caused irreparable damage to Brazil's standing in the global economy and politics is not just specious; it's patently absurd.

And on those issues at home...it's not like Lula dodged the meeting to vacation, or get some fake honorary title or something. There were horrible floods in Brazil; dozens were killed, and thousands more displaced. And this was almost simultaneous with the G-20 meeting. It's not like Lula waited to respond until it was too late. What is more, I just don't buy the "he skipped the G-20 for a few more votes at home argument," for several reasons. First, being president isn't the same as being head of the national bank; Lula has other duties besides economic deal-making. Taking care of his constituents is arguably at the top of the list of presidential duties. Surveying the damage and trying to help alleviate Brazilians' suffering through executive decision-making is probably more important than economic deals that can come later. I imagine most presidents or prime ministers would agree that domestic disasters take precedence over international meetings; you are elected by and serve your country's civilians, not the leaders and deal-makers of other countries.

Finally, this idea that Lula skipped the meetings for "a few more votes at home" is absurd. A) He's not running for re-election. Sure, you could suggest he did it to garner support for the PT's candidate, Dilma Rousseff; certainly, he's been very present in drumming up support for her. But the flooding happened in Brazil's Northeast, an area where Lula got 66% of the vote in 2006 (nearly propelling him to a first-round victory), an area where the PT has traditionally done very well. It's not like this was some opportunity to try to shore up support where Lula and the PT had traditionally lacked it, and to suggest as much is to effectively ignore both regional politics and the social conditions in the Northeast.

In short, this is one of the worst types of editorializing, relying not only on doom-and-gloom predictions based on hypotheses with no grounding in historical realities and gross simplifications of complex negotiations, but also turning to conjecture that ignores social realities and political practicality (who is the president supposed to serve?) in order to launch yet another smear campaign.

On Brazil's Presidential Campaign

I've been terribly remiss at dealing with this topic, in no small part because, while Brazil prepares to head to the polls again, I continue to try to finish a dissertation. However, with the campaign having really picked up steam once Brazil exited the World Cup, now seems as good a time as any to dive into the debates and discussions on the impending election.

Shortly after Dilma Rousseff's nomination, the PSDB, the main political party of the right, once again launched Jose Serra as its presidential candidate, later selecting relatively young Indio da Costa, of the far-right Democratas (Democrats) party as its vice-presidential candidate. Serra had been the candidate against Lula in 2002, when the PT and Lula finally won the election on their fourth try (having lost in 1989, 1994, 1998). Although Serra was seen in retrospect as relatively progressive for the PSDB (especially after the PSDB nominated extreme conservative Geraldo Alckmin in 2006), the 2002 loss apparently has still left him embittered, while the PSDB has continued to futilely and baselessly rail and rant against Lula, taking any chance they can to smear him. Indeed, in an effort to denigrate the PT, da Costa even baselessly claimed that the PT is connected to the FARC and narco-traficantes, in a moment that resembled Sarah Palin suggesting Obama "palled around with terrorists." It is clear that the PSDB and Serra do not want the PT's presence in Brasilia to continue, and while their efforts to do anything to prevent that from happening are fairly disgusting, it's also understandable, for two reasons: first, Lula has seemed to invoke an almost irrational hatred among many in the PSDB and its supporters (especially Rio's middle class); this is often based on classism as well as political jealousy and (to a lesser extent) ideology. Secondly, the PT was and is Lula's party, and the PSDB is Fernando Henrique Cardoso's party. Many have questioned whether the PT could survive beyond a Lula presidency, or whether it would disappear the way the National Reconstruction Party disappeared when Fernando Collor had to resign amidst allegations of extreme corruption. If Dilma wins, it will do much for the PT's ability to remain a strong and vibrant party beyond Lula. With Rousseff having taken the lead in polls after a statistical tie for much of the campaign, these tactics are likely to continue.

What would a Rousseff presidency look like vs. a Serra presidency, though? Many intelligent and respected scholars say there won't be much difference [sorry for the rough translation - Google's Portuguese-English translator isn't the best], and that a PT and PSDB presidency at this point would really vary only in shade, rather than in real policy. They point to what they perceive to be Lula's "continuist" policies following Fernando Henrique in terms of views on the market. This M.O. of Lula as "continuist" has been the main narrative since about 2004, and it clearly hasn't shifted as historians, political scientists, and others consider this year's elections.

However, I think this has always been a bit of a misnomer. If your idea of "continuist" is "a not-sudden and extreme ideological shift," a la from socialism to neoliberalism or from a dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy, then yes, Lula has been continuist, and either Dilma or Serra would be similar. However, this strikes me as a rather facile and useless way to view the two main presidential parties in Brazil right now. There were subtle but important differences between Lula and Cardoso. For example:

-The PSDB under FHC pushed privatization to extremes, trying to privatize everything (and succeeding with just about everything except Brazil's public university system and Petrobras; on both, the Brazilian people drew the line, and FHC had to step back a bit). While some say this did improve services, it also raised prices (when a French company bought out Brazil's public phone system, for example, phone prices in Brazil immediately went up 30%, even as they dropped 30% in France); what is more, as Lula demonstrated, investing in state-run companies and improving efficiency are not mutually exclusive terms, and when both are executed, can make an even stronger company than privatization could, all while offering greater benefits to your own citizens.

-In addition to adhering strongly to neoliberalism, FHC kept his economic relations connected almost strictly to the European Union and the United States, meaning Brazil's economy was by and large dependent on the fluxes of the American and European markets (no small irony, given that, in the 1970s, FHC was a leading theorist in dependency theory). While Lula did not shed the mercantilist policies of his predecessor, he did extend them to all of the world. Trade with Africa; deals with Arab countries in the Middle East; agreements with China; partnerships with India; collaborations with the United States - all were fair game, and Lula fostered these agreements in all parts of the world. This was beneficial both economically and politically; on the economic front, it diversified Brazil's trade, making it less susceptible to one country's or region's economic decline and strengthening its own economy (indeed, it was one of the last countries to enter the 2008 global recession, entering into recession in June 2009 and emerging from it just one quarter later.) Politically, Brazil was able to strengthen its role as a global player, working with everybody but dependent on nobody. Thus, Brazil enjoyed a level of both political and economic autonomy it had never witnessed before. The old joke used to be "Brazil - the country of tomorrow, forever." Yet Lula seems to have guided it very close to being the country of tomorrow today.

-Thirdly, there has been Lula's emphasis on state programs. A sort of flip-side to neoliberalism, Lula proposed a greater state presence and higher government spending on programs like Zero Hunger and the Bolsa Familia, which provided money to poor families for food or for their children to attend school longer. These programs have by all accounts been massively successful, and thanks in no small part to them, more people are joining Brazil's middle class than had ever taken place before. These policies ran directly counter to FHC's emphasis on "trickle-down" economics, something that Serra also emphasizes. While there are still enormous gaps between the wealthiest and the poorest in Brazil, the middle seems to be growing, and has done so through increased state spending (something the U.S. could learn from), and not from privatization and hopes for a trickle-down effect.

This is why describing Lula as "continuist" is not wholly accurate. Sure, he didn't radically alter the political or economic system, but there are major and important differences between Lula/PT and FHC/PSDB, and these differences I think in large part explain why Brazil has become such a major player in the global community in the 2000s, and not in the 1990s. And these differences continue between Rousseff on the one hand and Serra on the other. The election of either will not be the same thing (in much the same way that Bush and Gore were not the same thing in 2000); the election will determine whether Brazil continues down the path that garnered so much success in the first decade of the 2000s, or if it returns to the path of the 1990s that continued to perpetuate social and economic inequalities and sent the country spiralling into debt in the 1990s and inflation and recession after 1998 (when the exchange rate of the real to the dollar doubled overnight, immediately after FHC's re-election).

We are already getting good examples of these differences in Rousseff's pledges to continue those social programs, even while Serra denigrates of Mercosur and Brazil's relationship with Paraguay (fostered under Lula), while expressing his desire to return to policies focusing on neoliberalism and partnerships with the EU and the US. That type of policy is pure PSDB, and I think explains in no small part why Brazil did not take off under FHC but did under Lula. Lula did indeed continue to focus on market policies, but he did so with everybody, rather than just the EU and US; in doing so, he was able to expand Brazil's market even while retaining autonomy, rather than becoming dependent on one or two major economies. That success explains in no small part some of that hatred for Lula among the PSDB and its supporters - he succeeded where they failed, and did so by pointing out the weaknesses in their own policies. That these university-educated politicians were schooled by a laborer who never went to college particularly stung.

For these reasons, to suggest that Brazil will be the same whether Rousseff or Serra wins overlooks some very important distinctions. Yes, an overall mercantilist worldview will continue, but the differences between Serra and Rousseff are not just the differences between believing in privatization vs. a strong state with social programs for the poorer sectors, or partnerships with the U.S. vs. partnerships with the whole world. They are the differences between Brazil in the 1990s and Brazil in the 2000s; ask any Brazilian, and those differences are enormous and almost uniformly better in the 2000s. And that is why this year's election is so important and worth watching.

Bad News for Environment and Environmentalists in the Amazonian Basin

There have been some pretty terrible news stories regarding the Amazonian basin over the last few days that are worth pointing out.

First, a leading Amazon activist was shot and killed yesterday in the state of Para, just hours after a court delayed the retrial for the murder of Dorothy Stang. Pedro Alcantara de Souza was the leader of landless farmers in the rural state of Para, and two men on motorcycles apparently shot Souza 5 times in the head while Souza was riding his bicycle. While authorities are sending a team from Belem (the capital of Para) to investigate, the murderers have not been taken into custody. I usually hate to jump to conclusions, but given the strength of elite landowners in the region, combined with Souza's opposition to what are often illegal land-grabs on the part of those same elites, this was almost certainly a contract murder. Such is the way it often works when individuals fight for greater land reform and more equal distribution in the Amazon; it happened with Stang, it happened with Chico Mendes, and it most likely has happened again with Souza.

Additionally, foreign industry is also taking a toll on the environment, with the government's help. I've commented before that environmental policy may be one of, if not the single, deficiencies historians may find in Lula's government. These problems are not always limited to the Amazon, either; a hydroelectric dam that the Brazilian government contracted out to a Canadian company is wreaking havoc on both the environment and citizens in rural Minas Gerais. The dams are one of Lula's pet projects, and he's pushed heavily for hydroelectric power to supply Brazil's growing population with energy. In doing so, he's been nearly blinded by the highly-problematic use of dams, even while ignoring less destructive options like sun- and wind-power (and with well over 4500 miles of coastline, Brazil could easily take advantage of both). Instead, people in the interior are forced to witness dislocation and destruction in the name of hydroelectric power. Certainly, as he gets ready to leave office, Lula is enjoying some of the highest approval ratings he's ever had. However, it's worth repeating: his administration has been far from perfect, and as we begin to assess it historically, environmental policy will mostly likely be a dark stain on what has probably been one of the greatest administrations Brazilian history has seen.

Of course, Brazil isn't the only one facing these issues from foreign investment. This week, a court ruled in favor of Chevron in an arbitration case between the oil giant and Ecuador. Chad has commented before on the role of petroleum companies in the Spanish Amazon. Certainly, oil companies didn't need any more encouragement to degrade the environment and the residents of the Amazonian basin, but the court's ruling in this case certainly strengthens Chevron's arguments that it has done nothing wrong in spite of overwhelming evidence otherwise.

Around Latin America

-In a particularly tragic story, sixteen teenagers were shot and killed in Juarez this past week. The news has barely made a ripple in the United States, even though the casualties are greater than, say, Bloody Sunday, serving as a sad reminder not only of how horrible the violence in Juarez has gotten, but how immune the United States seems to be to what is going on just south of it's border.

-Rightist billionaire and Chilean president-elect Sebastian Piñera won the presidential run-off in mid-January. While he doesn't take office until March 11, some of his suggested policies and decisions are already raising eyebrows. As Greg points out, Piñera's desire to redirect money from copper away from the military budget indicates a growing willingness not just on the left, but on the right, to use Chile's income from copper in other ways, and the fact that a right-wing politician sympathetic to the economic policies of Pinochet has adopted this stance may mean the military will have to "come around" to the reality that it won't be getting as much funding from Chile's copper industry as it has grown accustomed to receiving. More troubling to many inside and outside of Chile, Piñera has also refused to divest of some of his financial properties while in office, leading some to ask if he isn't exposing himself to a conflict of interests between his financial holdings and his duties as president. This, on top of his profession that he thought the neoliberal policies under the Pinochet regime were the type of policies he would pursue, have many worried about his economic impact on Chile even before he takes office. Beyond that, it's worth noting that his brother appears to be the Chilean version of Billy Carter (and yes, that cake does look like what you think it looks like).

-In Peru, 41 military officers and soldiers have gone on trial for human rights violations for their roles in the murder of eight civilians in 1989. Although the trial is important for bringing justice, it also has become of political importance, as president Alan Garcia (who was also president from 1985-1990) tried to remove one of the officers from beyond the court's reach by giving him high-end political appointments. The trial, its timing (during Garcia's first administration), and Garcia's efforts to gain impunity for at least some of the officers raises important questions about Garcia's role in the violation of human rights during his administration, questions that are not and should not go away any time soon.

-Among the many victims of Colombia's never-ending civil war, the displaced are oft-forgotten. Many poor and small-landholders have lost their homes and lands, and wealthy families have swooped in to take it and then receive farm subsidies from the Uribe administration, serving as a powerful reminder of the fact that gross social inequalities and questionable political alliances are one of the biggest travesties of the Uribe administration.

-Lula continues to rely on hydroelectric dams for Brazil's future power sources. It just allowed the controversial Belo Monte dam on the Amazon river to proceed, in spite of opposition from environmentalists and residents in the Amazonian basin. With his term coming to an end this year, there will be many reasons to look back on Lula's administration and point at the positive things he accomplished; however, it already seems that his environmental policy may be one of the blackest marks on his administration, and the Belo Monte serves as just another strike against Lula on the environmental front.

-A European spaceport in French Guiana may be "booming," but it's isolating and alienating many French Guianans.

-Speaking of Europeans' presence in Latin America, though it seems unlikely to come to fruition this time, Russia has begun exploring the possibility of helping construct a canal through Nicaragua to connect the Atlantic and Pacific. Nicaragua has been the center of such talks since the early-1800s, so it's not clear why this time it will come to fruition. Nonetheless, it makes an interesting story, and if Russia goes through with helping Nicaragua finally construct a canal, there will probably be all kinds of hand-wringing among politicians in the United States.

-Evo Morales is not only interested in creating greater socio-economic and ethnic equality in Bolivia; he's also interested in opening up opportunities for women, a fact recently demonstrated in his appointments for cabinet: 10 of the 20 positions were filled by women, a first for Bolivia (and for many other countries in the world).

The Brazilian Military's Opposition to a Truth Commission

A couple of months ago, I commented on Brazil finally launching a truth commission into the use of torture (thousands of victims) and disappearances (several hundred) during its twenty-one year military dictatorship. A couple of weeks ago, Lula sent a bill to Congress creating the "committee". I don't have much to add in terms of my own opinions expressed in the link above.

However, an interesting little knot has emerged in the process, as certain sectors of the military have already come out against the establishment such a committee, and the heads of the army, navy, and air force all tendered their resignations to Lula, who refused them. Still, he promised to "review" the bill again. This is, suffice to say, a step backwards, even if the bill proceeds. Scholars have done a good job of showing how, through much of the 1990s, military leaders were able to exert undue influence on presidents Collor, Itamar Franco, and Cardoso from behind the scenes, with the specter of possible military intervention always hovering over the leaders. While I haven't seen similar studies on Lula's administration, it's clear that much of the military's influence has remained in spite of Brazil re-writing its constitution in 1988 in an attempt to remove the military's constitution of 1967. If Lula buckles into this pressure, then there has been little change in this arena, and the military can still influence politicians in ways that should have disappeared with the dictatorship itself.

Beyond the obvious self-serving efforts of the military leaders on this (who I imagine may very well have entered the military and even began working their way up the chain of command during the dictatorship), there are a lot of reasons why their complaints that it will "tarnish" the military's reputation are bunk. Firstly, the fact that torture and disappearances happened is not only well-know, but very detailed and chronicled in the Nunca Mais project, an abbreviated version of which was published shortly after the end of the dictatorship, and is incredibly easy to find in Brazil (I actually have a copy sitting on my desk here next to me. The names of individual torturers are even pretty well-known, and the fact that such a commission may reveal more names doesn't tarnish the military's reputation; after all, we know what it did already. It simply tarnishes some of the individual torturers who may still be alive, and I'm sorry, but I just find little reason to sympathize with torturers. Additionally, this is as much about giving closure to the families of the hundreds of disappeared in Brazil. Their rights have been repeatedly violated over the years as this has remained unstudied and hidden away; it's time that the families, rather than the murderers, get some special treatment.

As the UPI article that Lillie links to points out, Lula may lose more face if he backtracks on the bill (which is now public) than the military would if he sticks with it. But this is about more than political face-saving. It's about justice and truth for thousands of Brazilians, and it's 25 years overdue.

Social Mobility in Brazil Gradually Improving

A new study out of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas is reporting that, since 2003, "more than 20 million of 198 million people in Brazil have risen above poverty, and 32 million have entered the middle class." Brazil's growth hasn't stopped there, either, as foreign investment in Brazil in 2008 was at $45 billion, triple what it was in 1998, and Brazil's economy is bigger than Russia's or India's.

Brazil's growth, especially in terms of the economy, hasn't been a big secret over the last five years or so, and anybody doubting the strength of that growth became very quiet as Brazil was one of the fastest countries to emerge from recession brought on by the global financial collapse of 2008 (exiting its recession just one quarter after entering it).

Oftentimes, when one sees economic growth, it doesn't necessarily have much to do with the leadership of the country at that moment. However, as I've pointed out before, Lula certainly has every right to take much of the credit for this (though he doesn't). His willingness to expand his trading partners beyond the U.S. and Europe has helped Brazil diversify its importation and exportation and strengthened the value of the Brazilian Real in the international market, which, as I pointed out, has helped the consuming power of the working classes, and this expanding access to consumption has in turn only further strengthened Brazil's economy. Additionally, programs like offering federally-funded "internships" that help college graduates to get established in the job market has also been another direct program of Lula's that has aided the workforce and students finishing school (a number that, while still relatively small compared to the U.S., is constantly growing in Brazil).

And these reports of growth, especially in terms of the social mobility of those 20 million exiting poverty, is much better news than the report from last June, which focused only on middle class growth and which, as Randy and I both pointed out, said nothing about the very real problems facing Brazil's poor. Certainly, this latest report still does nothing to address the poverty that many face, nor the police violence (and impunity) waged against the urban poor, nor the broader social and racial prejudices against Brazil's poor. Still, the fact that 20 million have exited poverty is just another testament to the success of government programs like Bolsa Familia and Fome Zero, and Lula's institution of these programs (in the face of strong conservative opposition) has been nothing short of vital in helping this broader social turnaround.

Obama, Lula, and Iran: Understanding the Complexities of International Relations

One of the refrains I've heard from some in Latin American and in the U.S. is that Obama is no different than Bush in terms of policies. These claims are clearly laughable at face value, and every value beyond that. Still, some still make those claims, based mostly on a "reasoning" that (and I paraphrase) "Obama hasn't stopped the wars, and Obama's a leader of an empire, just like Bush was." Again, stupid and simplistic arguments, but they exist.

In the face of such baseless and unrealistic accusations, this week offered yet another reminder of just how different the two administrations are:

President Obama sent a letter on Sunday to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil reiterating the American position on Iran’s nuclear program, a day before Iran’s president made his first state visit to Brazil, an aide to Mr. da Silva said Tuesday.

Mr. Obama did not explicitly criticize Mr. da Silva for hosting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, implying instead that he hoped Mr. da Silva would use the occasion to express support for the international effort to forge a compromise on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, according to two American officials.

In the three-page letter, Mr. Obama restated his support for a proposal by the International Atomic Energy Agency that would try to steer Iran into developing nuclear energy for peaceful, civilian purposes. The proposed accord calls for Iran to export most of its enriched uranium for additional processing into a form that could be used in a medical reactor in Tehran.

The differences between Bush and Obama should be fairly clear here. In Bush's black-and-white, with-me-or-against-me vision of foreign relations, I just don't see how he would have been nearly as nuanced in his letter-writing (if he even bothered to write a letter). Instead, we probably would have gotten some tired mashup of the "axis of evil" rhetoric, with no efforts to use Ahmadinejad's trip to Brazil to try to emphasize the policy we felt should be taken (which, to be fair, called for war against Iran during the Bush years - not exactly a policy to push at any time).

Under Obama, we get a cordial letter that clearly shows a far more nuanced understsanding of how international politics work not just between the U.S. and other countries, but between other countries and other countries. It's a far more multi-lateral position that understands and acknowledges the importance of other countries in the global arena without ever "conceding" the U.S.'s own role. Indeed, I think it's safe to say that Obama's move, while it may not be effective, was rather brilliant: he found a way to try to get the U.S.'s message to Ahmadinejad without ever having to talk directly to the Iranian president. Whether Obama's letter came up in conversation between Lula and Ahmadinejad (and what the nature or tone of that conversation was) may never be known, but moves like this should obliterate any declaration that Obama and Bush are "the same thing."

And as for Ahmadinejad's trip to Brazil, while it has sparked controversy, it hasn't been on the level of Chavez's alliance to Iran. Earlier this month, Lula met independently with Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas and with Israel's president, Shimon Peres, in an effort to try to increase negotiations for peace in the middle east. Lula has made little secret of his goal to use Brazil's newfound diplomatic presence in the global community to try to work towards peace in the region, and has even gone so far as to recommend the Brazilian national soccer team play a friendly game against an Israeli-Palestinian team. From Lula's point of view, Ahmadinejad's visit is a part of that broader effort. While the U.S. media has grossly misrepresented the Iranian president's trip to Brazil, declaring the trip, as Time magazine did, to be in "defiance" of the U.S., Time's own report indicated otherwise, and revealed Lula's motivation for hosting Ahmadinejad:

Lula enjoys considerable respect internationally, and the incorrigible talker believes problems can be resolved through dialogue. Before Ahmadinejad arrived, Lula pointedly declared, "It is important that someone sits down with Iran, talks with Iran and tries to establish a balance so we can get back to a kind of normality in the Middle East."

Exactly. Treating Iran's trip to Brazil as some isolated incident totally misses the point. Lula isn't meeting with Iran to thumb his nose at the U.S., or to show his support for "terrorism," or any such matter. The Iranian visit is part of a month-long effort to accelerate peace efforts in the Middle East, and Lula is well aware that Iran would be central to any such efforts. And it's not like it was some sycophantic, "best friends forever!" trip:

Of course, Lula has plenty of differences with his guest from Iran. He has made it clear he supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has made a point of repudiating all acts of intolerance or terrorism, and has subtly criticized Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust and of homosexuality in Iran.

Those are messages that Ahmadinejad needs to hear from friends, notes Anoush Ehteshami, a professor at the Centre for Iranian Studies at Durham University in England. Since Iran does not appear to be listening to the West, especially not the United States, on the issue, the emergence of interlocutors who could help bridge the gap between the two sides ought to be welcomed. "Hearing [these messages] from Lula will be a little bit better received than if it were coming from U.S. President or E.U. leaders," Ehteshami says.

Once again, that's exactly right. This latest trip is just another example of Lula's model of diplomacy throughout his career. Diplomacy depends on talking, on dialogue, and not on rejecting other leaders or countries simply because you disagree with them. And any effort towards peace, no matter who is leading it, is a valuable step. Sometimes, other countries may be in a better position for these kinds of talks than the U.S. is, and this is one of those instances. And anybody who insists Brazil is suddenly "palling around" with terrorists or directly contradicting the U.S. intentionally simply has no understanding of how diplomacy and foreign relations do and should work.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Caetano Veloso - Angry, Bitter, Jealous Old Men

A couple of Brazil's more famous political and cultural leaders have decided to make complete asses out of themselves in the past few weeks. The ugliest, worst, most infuriating, and most hypocritical incident comes from Fernando Henrique Cardoso himself, writing about Lula. The not-too-subtle title of his editorial? "The Time Has Come to End Lula's Monarchy in Brazil." This is rich on so many levels, not least of which because Lula has only served two terms. Why was it possible for him to serve two terms? Because of a constitutional amendment passed in 1998....giving Fernando Henrique Cardoso permission to run for re-election (an amendment that was surrounded by controversy and not-unsubstancial accusations that Cardoso engaged in corrupt practices and promises in order to get Congress to pass his request for an amendment that would allow him to run for re-election).

From there, Cardoso's rhetoric just gets more hilarious. He accuses the Lula administration of offering little more than "odd government decisions, apparently meaningless presidential phrases and so much propaganda," which sounds really witty and completely out of touch with reality. Aside from getting the World Cup and the 2016 Olympics (which aren't exactly empty statements of "propaganda"), Brazil's economy has bloomed under Lula in ways that Cardoso only dreamed of as he used the blank check he received for the plan that stopped hyperinflation in 1994 in Brazil in order to ravage the country with his neoliberal policies and hollowed-out monetary policies that saw the real drop in value by half to the dollar immediately after his re-election.

As I said, the development and growth Brazil is now experiencing dwarfs even Cardoso's hopes, and to add insult to injury, Lula was able to achieve this growth by basically taking the opposite approach to the national economy that Cardoso did. Lula halted the privatizations that Cardoso pushed; he increased federal investment in state companies like Petrobras, with great results; where Cardoso tried to attract foreign businesses and offer tax relief to the upper class, Lula invested in programs like Fome Zero and the Bolsa Familia to help the country see real improvements in standards of living and consumption rates; and instead of relying on investment from European and American multinationals, as Cardoso did, Lula instead sought to diversify Brazil's global economic relations, bringing in deals with Africa, China, and India, even while continuing to establish deals with the U.S. and Europe when it was practical and beneficial to Brazil.

In short, Lula did everything Cardoso spurned, and under Lula's policies, and not Cardoso's, Brazil has finally seen the growth that many have expected for Brazil for decades. As a result, Cardoso's rant comes off as little more than the humorous, impotent rumblings of an angry bitter man whose policies have been rightly spurned, and, what's worse, proven to be ineffective in the face of a political rival's much greater successes.

If Cardoso has reached the point of a hollow shell of an angry old man, then Caetano Veloso has gone beyond the point of self-parody. Veloso is highly respected musically globally, even while he puts out pretty middling stuff. However, while Veloso may have once been pretty politically engaged in opposing Brazil's dictatorship, he jumped the ship of political progressivism years ago. Back in the 1990s, he declared that Brazil no longer had racism (something with which his former collaborator and friend Gilberto Gil strongly disagreed with, and in any debate on whether a country is racist or not, I'm going to tend to side with the guy who would experience racism).

With a tendency for ridiculous statements in the past, you'd think Veloso would know when to keep his mouth shut. But he doesn't. In proclaiming his support in Brazil's 2010 elections for Green Party candidate Marina Silva, Veloso declared that Lula is "illiterate," a president "who doesn’t know what to talk about and when he does he’s coarse." That's fine - if Veloso wants to hold to that belief, that's his right. But that notion of Lula as an incompetent speaker was pretty much passe by 2002, as years of political experience had helped Lula sharpen his rhetorical abilities. Is he an Abraham Lincoln or Cicero when he opens his mouth everytime? Of course not, but neither is Obama, nor was Cardoso, nor are most people (including Veloso, in spite of how highly he holds his own lyrical ability). In his comments, Veloso doesn't come off as angry as Cardoso. Still, positions and statements like these are risible at this point; Lula's proven time and again he's far from "illiterate," and even if you don't think his every word is poetry, one might hope you'd realize that presidents are supposed, first and foremost, to help lead and improve their countries, and in that arena, Lula has been a major success. Sure, there are shortcomings even in his administration (hello, environmental policy), but to hear Veloso and Cardoso tell it, you'd think Brazil was ruined by the cult of personality of an illiterate laborer. It would be offensive if it weren't so disconnected with the actual current situation in Brazil.

Instead, Veloso and Cardoso just show their true colors: as bitter old men out of touch with Brazilian politics and development.

Brazil's VP Suggests Brazil Develop Nuclear Weapons (But It's Not Going to Happen)

Brazil's vice president, Jose Alencar, made some waves this week in international politics, declaring that Brazil should work on building nuclear weapons. In an interview, Alencar went on record as saying "The nuclear weapon, used as an instrument of deterrence, is of great importance for a country that has 15,000 kilometers of border to the west and a territorial sea" that has deep oil reserves.

While this has raised some eyebrows, it's not too much to be worried about. Lula and his spokespeople made it clear immediately that those opinions were Alencar's and Alencar's alone, and in no way reflect the goals and opinions of the administration, something Alencar also declared through an aide.

What is more, the production and/or possession of nuclear weapons is illegal in Brazil - the 1988 Constitution expressly prohibits nuclear weapons. Boz has a list of other reasons why this is a bad idea, and I agree with his points. However, I don't think this is anybody's "idea" - it's just an opinion that Alencar has, and he is a tiny minority not just within the government, but within Brazilian society generally, in his belief.

Did Brazil Play a Minor or a Major Role in the Return of Manuel Zelaya?

More news agencies are reporting on Manuel Zelaya's return to Honduras, and there will be many interesting developments over the next few days and perhaps weeks, accompanied by a decent amount of speculation as to what might happen next.

However, one aspect in all of this may go relatively ignored, with little comment on, but it's something I raised in these comments. Specifically, what, if any, role did Brazil play in this?

As we all know, Zelaya is staying at the Brazilian embassy in Honduras, a brilliant move considering that embassy grounds are soverign soil of the country they represent. Thus, while the Honduran military did not mind breaking the law to exile Zelaya back in June, to try to arrest him at the embassy (as Micheletti blustered) would effectively be an act of war, and while Brazil hasn't been involved in an open foreign war since World War II, I know who I'd pick in a Brazilian-Honduran war.

That said, it's clear that Brazil has some role in this whole incident, obviously. There are three alternatives I can come up with (though there may be others I haven't thought of):

1) Brazil had no idea Zelaya was coming back, and when he showed up at the embassy doors, they just decided to let him in. This strikes me as plausible - Brazil, like the rest of the world, has held that the June coup was illegal and that Zelaya, and not Micheletti, is the proper president of Honduras. Zelaya may have gone there just hoping, and if it didn't work out, he could hope to get to another friendly embassy before he was arrested. This does raise the question that, if many embassies would accept him, why go to Brazil first? It may be because Brazil is a big power (bigger than, say, Costa Rica or Italy or most other countries), and he knew it was friendly to his cause. It may also be because, again, the Brazilian embassy allegedly sits next to Micheletti's private home. This would make it the obvious first choice of Zelaya if he wanted to thumb his nose at Micheletti.

2) Zelaya actually tried to go to other embassies for protection before Brazil's, but was turned down. This is possible, too, and could help explain why early reports said that Zelaya was in Honduras, but with no knowledge of where he was staying. There's not much that distinguishes this from the first possibility; still, I'm inclined to believe the first possibility over this one, primarily because Brazil seemed like such a sure bet in terms of friendliness, Honduras' inability to bully Brazil, and Brazil's high standing in the diplomatic community.

3) Brazil knew well in advance, through direct or indirect contact, that Micheletti was coming, and was prepared to accept him should he arrive safely in Tegucigalpa. Whether or not Brazil was active, they would make sure he was taken care of upon his arrival in the embassy. Perhaps they actively wanted to help undermine the Micheletti government, though this strikes me as the most implausible likelihood. Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim (who is in New York, preparing for the UN's meeting on climate change) denied any previous knowledge, and right now, I don't see any reason not to believe him. More importantly, if the Brazilian government was actively trying to undermine a regime, it would mark a major departure from Brazilian foreign relations over the last 7 years. If there's anything one can say about Lula's approach, it has been that he has been the consummate diplomat during his two terms; even politicians in neighboring countries look up to the way in which he conducts foreign relations. To suddenly throw all caution to the wind in any event seems extreme; to do so with the Honduran case in particular pushes the envelope of believability.

4) Brazil knew shortly before or after Zelaya's official departure (from where is still unknown) that he was coming to Honduras, and quickly prepared for his arrival. Again, I just don't see why they would do this; the foreign relations minister insists it's not the case, and again, it would mark a major departure from all that Brazil has stood for in international relations over the last 7 years under Lula.

Ultimately, of these four scenarios, the first one seems most likely to me, though I wouldn't be remotely surprised to learn that it was the second. If it's either three or four, I will be more than surprised, and were it to be either of those scenarios, it would raise all kinds of interesting (and perhaps troubling) questions about the direction Brazilian foreign relations were heading. Still, while not the most commented-upon aspect of Zelaya's return, it does offer some fascinating questions about that return as well as possible insights on the role of Brazil in Latin America, in the defense of democratic processes, and in international relations more generally.

Brazil and Spain Express Concern over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia

Brazil and Spain Express Concern Over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia
The recent agreement to put more U.S. troops in Colombia is raising concerns beyond just Venezuela:

Spain’s Miguel Angel Moratinos and Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim expressed their reservations about the effects the military program could have at a press conference within the framework of the Spanish official’s visit to Brazil.

The two ministers also called for dialogue between Venezuela and Colombia and agreed to work “to avoid a spiral of misunderstandings” between those two countries.

This is a good diplomatic move that gives greater weight to regional concerns than Chavez's opposition alone could ever achieve. However, I don't know how much it will actually accomplish.

To be clear, I think the U.S.'s decision is a bad one, for a number of reasons. The "war on drugs" is pretty ineffective in its focus on the supply side rather than the demand side, and basing more troops in Colombia isn't going to solve this problem. What is more, it is clear that this will add to regional suspicion and tension in South America. While Obama's diplomatic efforts in the hemisphere thus far have been admirable in comparison to past administrations (dating to about, oh, 1848), the presence of more U.S. troops on any country's soil is a legitimate cause for concern, regardless of who is president of the United States. For these reasons, I think it's important that Brazil and Spain, who are far from antagonistic towards the U.S., raise these concerns. Again, I'm not sure it will result in any real change in the decision to move troops to Colombia when the Ecuadoran bases close (rather than, you know, having the troops actually come back to the U.S. when the bases close). But Brazil's and Spain's questions and objections should at least make the U.S. stop and take notice, and give the opposition to such a move much greater legitimacy than Chavez's opposition alone could accomplish.

And, on a side note, can we please stop referring to Daniel Ortega as part of some "leftist" "alliance?" Firstly, as I've noted before, these notions in the American media of "leftist alliances" in Latin America are false and lazy. Just because countries are friendly with each other, or from relatively similar political ideologies, does not mean they are some new axis, and American journalists' inability to look at Latin America with a view that is more complex than "leftist" is just shameful. Secondly, and more directly related to Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega has hardly been "leftist." If you want to refer to the Sandinistas as leftist, fine - it's still probably a lazy categorization on the part of the media, but at least it's fairly accurate. But when the actual major "leftist" political group in a country disowns the president as not representing leftist goals, ideals, and missions, could we at least respect that country's political spectrum, and agree that just because a leader isn't as "conservative" as America would like does not mean he/she's some radical "leftist" political force?

Political Partisanship and the Congressional Inquiry into Petrobras

Last week, Brazil's Senate launched a Congressional inquiry into charges of corruption in Petrobras, the state-owned energy company. Based on the reporting in Brazil and now the Times, though, I suspect there isn't much to these charges, and that it's pure partisan politics and political theater at its worst. To wit:

The vote was sealed by senators who oppose President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Workers Party, setting up an inquiry that is likely to drag on for months.
The investigation [...] could also be damaging to Dilma Rousseff, Mr. da Silva’s chief of staff and his handpicked candidate to succeed him in next year’s presidential elections, since she is also the chairwoman of the Petrobras board of directors. Ms. Rousseff’s ability to make a competitive run for president has already been questioned by some politicians and analysts because she is undergoing treatment for lymphoma, even though doctors say her chances of a full recovery are very high.

There are two reasons I am fairly confident that this is just partisan politics and theater at its worst. First, this is pretty much how politics works in Brazil (and is often one of the main critiques of the presidential parliamentary system in Brazil from political scientists both in Brazil and the U.S.). I've commented before on the PSDBs and Democratas (ex-PFL)'s sheer hatred of Lula and opposition to any of his policies, even when he seeks to continue policies former PSDB president Fernando Henrique Cardoso put in place with overwhelming support from his party. What is more, the Congressional Inquiry is going to bog down Lula's administration as it relates to Petrobras for quite awhile at a time when the president is trying to increase the revenue the state brings in from oil production. Under Lula's plan, this money would be used "to set up funds for social programs like health and education." And that's the second reason I doubt the legitimacy of this inquiry. The PSDB and Democratas have been against Lula's social programs (such as Bolsa Familia) since he took office in 2002, in no small part because it simultaneously tries to somewhat level a social playing field that they don't want levelled, and it builds further support among the poor for the PT and related parties, cutting into the PSDB's and Democrata's support.

In short, I have little doubt as of right now that this inquiry is not based on any substantive corruption charges in Petrobras, but rather is an effort on the part of the politically conservative opposition to prematurely influence the 2010 presidential elections and to stall the furthering of social programs these politicians hate for ideological and political reasons. This is not to say that the behavior of every employee at Petrobras has been saintly, or that every decision has been made without taking into account personal interests; indeed, Petrobras has "already fired two people and punished three others for their involvement in irregularities" in contract bidding. However, it will take a lot more evidence than has been provided thus far to prove that there is some major problem at Petrobras, and that this isn't what it seems to be now: the worst kind of partisanship politics in Brazil.

China Turning to Brazil for Naval Training

Rob over at LG&M recently broke down the fascinating report that the Chinese are pushing forward their aircraft carrier program. As his IR/military policy posts always are, this one is outstanding, but this part in particular really grabbed my attention:

The PLAN has apparently arranged to begin training its carrier pilots on board the Sao Paulo, Brazil's full deck aircraft carrier.
[...]Sao Paulo, formerly the French Foch, operates A-4 Skyhawks. It appears from this interview that the PLAN has arranged with the Brazilian Navy to train some of its pilots and crews on board Sao Paulo. It's fair to say that this represents a substantial step forward for Chinese naval aviation. This agreement with Brazil will presumably allow the Chinese access to Brazilian naval aviation experts in addition to the carrier itself. This should accelerate the development of Chinese naval aviation
by quite a bit.

I either didn't know or had forgotten that Brazil had an aircraft carrier, and I was certainly surprised to know that it is ahead of China in this regard. Rob does an excellent job outlining why training is so difficult and important. He also does a fine job quickly explaining why China didn't go to the U.S., France, or Russia for training, but I think he misses something. He basically suggests that Brazil was the default trainer for the Chinese, given the reasons the U.S., French, and Russia have to not train China. While it's true in one sense that Brazil was the default ally for China, there was nothing dictating that Brazil had to agree to help China develop its naval power. This isn't a case where China bullied Brazil (and, though it's a gross simplification of complex issues, I like the idea of a country without aircraft carriers threatening a country with an aircraft carrier); through economic agreements, China needs Brazil as much (if not moreso) for its agricultural imports (especially soy), industry, and (down the road) oil as Brazil needs China's money and investment. I certainly don't believe this was a case of Brazil getting forced into an agreement it otherwise wouldn't have made. Yet Brazil signed on happily, with the Minister of Defense going to China later this year to further work out I think it's also evidence of the strengthening ties between China and Brazil, not just economically, but politically.

Of course, I don't envision some future "Sino-Brazilian" hegemon or anything. However, the agreement is mutually beneficial for both China and Brazil; China gets training, and Brazil strengthens its reputation and power as a global force. These efforts have been primarily economic up to this point, but this latest military agreement fits within a broader pattern of each trying to increase its role in international politics. The agreement on the carrier training was apparently part of the private meetings between China and Brazil during Lula's trip to Beijing last week, itself a noteworthy event as China and Brazil strengthened their trade relations in what they hope is a mutually beneficial agreement that would reduce both countries' dependency on the U.S. economy (and also agreed to jointly send 3 satellites into space by 2013). China will send military leaders to Brazil to train, and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim will be going to China in September, presumably when the details of the arrangement will be worked out.

Although Brazil has little it is materially gaining directly from China in this agreement, I think it could be the biggest "winner" here. That a country as powerful as China is turning to Brazil (and only partly out of necessity) is a real coup in Brazil's efforts to demonstrate its equality with the other major world powers. Nothing is assured down the road, but other countries are certainly taking notice of this. I doubt anybody outside of South America is worried about Brazil's military potential, and they shouldn't be; Brazil isn't gunning (no pun intended) for global military domination, and this is certainly not the first time that Brazil has demonstrated its growing power among the biggest international leaders, be it in economic, diplomatic, or military aspects. However, it does mark another major demonstration that Brazil isn't going away anytime soon, and it's a major feather in Brazil's cap in strengthening its position in the international community.

Brazil and Colombia: Offering a How-to and How-NOT-to Crash Course in Diplomacy

I'm can only echo what Randy said in regard to this editorial (translated here):

While President Lula da Silva of Brazil meets face-to-face with President Obama in the White House to discuss global and Latin American policy, the Colombian vice president laments the mistreatment that, according to him, Colombia receives from a sector of the Congress and U.S. civil society, and proposes to do away with Plan Colombia, considering it to be a source of humiliation.

Those news [sic] make apparent the shameful contrast bewteen Brazilian and Colombian foreign policy. Thanks to the former, Brazil will become the United States’ strategic partner in the region, and thanks to the second Colombia will be it no longer. Brazil will take on this role for obvious reasons. Because it is the 10th-largest economy on the planet, the most stable and progressive democracy on the continent, the only one with a world-class foreign ministry and president, a player with regional and global leadership.

[...] If you want to be treated like statesmen, behave like statesmen. Stop asking, stamping your feet and threatening. Take the initiative, propose things and keep your word. Develop a bilateral agenda that incorporates both countries’ issues, interests and concerns, and propose specific goals within specific time periods.

Exactly. Like Randy, I have had nothing but praise for the Brazilian diplomatic corps and Lula's diplomatic approach, and Colombia during the Uribe administration has offered a thorough course on how not to conduct productive diplomatic relations. Brazil has conducted itself as masterful diplomats, respectful of differences and making clear their agenda, while Colombia has behaved like a spoiled little brat. It's easy to see why Obama met with Lula, and not with Uribe - after all, the Bush years are in the past.

Bolivia and Brazil Joining Forces in Combatting Drug Trade

This is a few weeks old (I apologize for the light blogging - I currently have two grant proposals, a conference paper, a dissertation chapter, and a part-time job on my plate, and things have actually calmed a bit from the first 4 weeks of the year), but I wanted to point out that Bolivia and Brazil have joined forces in combatting the cocaine trade along their border in the wake of the expulsion of the DEA. It's a fascinating agreement that serves both wonderfully - Brazil is making an effort to implement some national drug policy efforts rather than letting police blaze their way into favelas, and Bolivia is making a strong effort to make clear that while coca leaf production is non-offensive and important to its economy, it has little tolerance for the cocaine trade. Additionally, Bolivia gets more infrastructural agreement as part of the deal, and Brazil strengthens its role as a regional leader in lending and development projects for its neighbors. Boz reminds us also that combatting the drug trade behooves more nations than the U.S., and that fighting it doesn't always have to involve the U.S.

But there is another major aspect worth mentioning here, too. Although the U.S. under Bush constantly chastized Morales for Bolivia's coca production (leading to occasionally humorous interactions between the two countries), Morales has always made it clear that the coca leaf itself is not a drug, and that he's against the proliferation of cocaine production. The distinction is important and relatively easy to understand, but one that the United States has never bothered to grasp. This request to Brazil just further evidence both of that fact, and of fact that U.S. really has gone about in the "war on drugs" in the Andes in the totally wrong way.

Relations between Brazil and Ecuador Normalize

Last month, I wrote about Ecuador defaulting on its loans to Brazil. At the time, I commented that the defaulting, combined with tensions between Brazil and Ecuador over dams Brazilian companies constructed in Ecuador, had created a lose-lose situation for both Brazil and Ecuador; the former was paying financially and had strained relations with one of its "leftist" allies on the continent, while the latter was isolating itself and creating a situation that would cause problems both presently and in the future both in terms of diplomacy and in terms of Ecuador's on infrastructural development.

Apparently, cooler heads have prevailed, though, as a couple of weeks ago (I haven't really had time to get around to this until now) Ecuador has paid back Brazil's BNDES for the funds to build the dams, and, in response, Brazil has sent its ambassador back to Ecuador, thereby reopening normalized relations between the two countries. While Brazil does gain a bit here diplomatically, it's really Ecuador that wins out in resolving this problem. Brazil was one of the few friends and willing foreign creditors able to help out Ecuador as the global economies deal with crisis; had Ecuador continued to alienate itself from Brazil, it would have faced real obstacles in infrastructural development, financial aid, and diplomatic relations in the region. I completely agree with Boz that Ecuador blinked first because it really couldn't afford not to, and this does help Brazil strengthen its position in the region even further. Overall, I think it's a satisfying end to what was a point of contention between the two countries that could have been increasingly damaging (particularly for Ecuador) had it been drawn out further.

Lula's Plan for Brazil's Military to Upgrade, Improve, Diversify

This has been in the works for awhile, but yesterday, Lula finally announced his restructuring plan for the Brazilian military. Among other things, the plan reorganizes the entire military into brigades for faster mobilization abilities; seeks to decrease Brazil's dependence on other nations for arms and weapons and increase its own military technology production (including satellites and nuclear-powered submarines); and, in what is perhaps the most novel part of the plan, to actually enforce mandatory conscription on people from all classes.


The technological and tactical parts of this plan are interesting, and could have a profound impact on Brazil's economy, it's role in the region and the world, and its military and international relations. I admit that, upon first learning of this, I was a bit uneasy - after all, Brazil's military was frequently involved in politics in the 20th century. (In addition to the 1964-1985 dictatorship, the military also intervened in politics in 1930, 1937, 1945, 1955, 1961, and finally, 1964; these interventions were not always direct, and could often take the form of "the military is providing vague threats if we politicians don't do X," as was the case in 1961; nor were these interventions always successful, as in 1955; still, one can easily identify at least those 6 cases of military involvement to one degree or another in Brazilian politics, and you can argue that there were other instances, too). Up until the announcement of the plan, there were just vague mentions of "increasing the military's power" in Brazil. Still, it seems that this is directed mostly at improving the ability of the military to mobilize, improve its standing in the region, protect Brazil's territory (no doubt, the discovery of a major oil field off Sao Paulo's coast providing some additional motivation for this latter issue), and other measures. Certainly, increased firepower and greater mobility could lead to a greater role of Brazil's military in politics down the road, and I'm still a bit uncertain about this, but it is at least not openly increasing the military's presence in the political sphere, which is a small victory I guess. And the fact that Brazilian progressive Roberto Mangabeira Unger (who, tangentially, was one of Obama's law professors at Harvard) is the author of this project is also encouraging if for no other reason than it wasn't drawn up by some conservative or a hawk.

However, I find Lula's efforts to actually enforce military conscription for everybody to be quite a fascinating aspect. Although the military is technically and legally supposed to conscript from all Brazilian sectors regardless of class, race, etc., the reality is Brazil's military ranks are composed overwhelmingly of the poor and marginalized who do not have recourse to get out of such service and who often accept it because they need the money. For decades and even generations (dating back to at least the Paraguayan War) there has been an unspoken understanding that elites and (more recently) the middle classes were "above" military service. So in one sense, any effort to break through this mold to prove that "mandatory conscription" applies to all Brazilian citizens, and not just those who don't have an economic/cultural/political way to avoide it.

While I like the idea of forcing the middle class and elite youths into the military, in practice I don't think is this automatically a great thing. Taking the most recent case, when Brazil's military led the coup in 1964, it did so with the support of the middle and upper classes. Many of the working class men who were actually in the military at the time were strong supporters of Joao Goulart, the deposed president, and the military really had to crack down on its own troops in order to "keep the ranks in line." Even today, a majority of the Brazilian middle class and elites are social and political conservatives with little tolerance for the poor or the racially marginalized (a marginalization made greater by the fact that Brazilians by and large culturally deny the existence of racism by claiming extreme miscegenation makes racism "impossible," which is, of course, bunk). Filling the ranks with conservatives who believe the poor are poor because they are "lazy" and "criminals" seems to make it more likely that, if the military were to launch another coup because somebody was too "progressive" in the future, the military would have much more support from the ranks than it did in 1964. What is more, it's not like conscription of all classes will lead to some amazing social levelling. It still seems highly likely that, even if the ranks were levelled out socially, the children of middle-class and elite families probably stand a much greater chance of promotion into the officer corps, due to factors such as better education as children, economic power, political connections, etc. Thus, while the face of the ranks might become more diverse, I really don't think the officer corps would, and given that it's the officers who are responsible for strategy, the power structure in the military would continue to be lopsided.

In spite of all this, though, I just don't see this enforcement of mandatory conscription for all happening anytime soon; rather, I think that part of the plan is simply the first step in trying to force the issue in Brazil. And I think that Lula's administration recognizes this, too - after all, Unger himself said this should start a "novel debate" on the issue of conscription and exactly what role sectors like the middle-class and the elties play in the Brazilian nation. Generally, if you're really trying to enforce a strong program, you don't comment that y our plan will spark an "novel" debate. Still, the fact that any presidential administration is even going so far to admit that there's definitely a social inequality when it comes to who has to serve in teh military and who does not is a decent step. I don't honestly know if this will go any further, and wouldn't be surprised if it doesn't (Lula has plenty on his plate between now and 2010, and there's no reason to believe his successor would strongly push this issue). But it is an interesting if subtle shift in the way the governments since 1985 have dealt with the issue of military service and nation. This fact, together with the significant changes in more technical and technological aspects of the plan, make it a fascinating and potentially game-changing plan not just in terms of military composition, but of Brazil's internatinoal relations, regional politics, and militarization throughout the continent in the near future.

Lula's New Plan to Stop Deforestation and Climate Change - Reason for Hope?

It's no secret that I think that Lula has been genuinely concerned about deforestation in the Amazon, but that his continuous approach of taking one step forward (such as reducing deforestation from 10,500 square miles in 2004 to 4,261 this year) and another step backwards (and his environmental record more generally) is one of the biggest disappointments of his administration.

That said, Lula's announcement last week to reduce deforestation by 70% and cut back on Brazil's own greenhouse gas emissions (many of which come from deforestation) is nothing short of outstanding. And as Randy comments, the fact this plan is gaining support both from environmental NGOs and from farmers is hugely important.

It's still too early for unguarded optimism - Lula's administration has had great plans before, and they haven't necessarily panned out, both because he has occasionally launched contradicting policies when it comes to the question of environment vs. development, and because it is difficult for any country to patrol that much forest, much less a country that historically has not had a very strong presence in that area. That said, the plan is more encouraging than anything else Lula has launched for a couple of reasons. First, it's focused not just on the present, but on the long-term; this isn't a simple measure to reduce deforestation for next year, but for the next 10 years, and the accompanying efforts to reduce greenhouse gases and efforts to get farmers involved with re-foresting some of their lands shows that Lula is finally thinking in the long term here.

Secondly, it the government's openness to listen to NGOs demands is important. Culturally, Brazil is very proectionist towards the Amazon, and does not like foreign groups or governments telling it what to do. These attitudes are understandable - in a broad history of exploitation of its resources by Europe and the U.S., Brazilians are more than a little cautious that foriegn efforts to tell Brazil how to deal with the forest are little more than imperialist ploys to get at the resources in the Amazon themselves (and to be clear, I don't think that's what many groups are trying to do, but to presume all NGOs or governments have nothing but the best intentions in terms of the forest is naive, too - if nothing else, there are doubtless some major pharmaceutical companies that would love to get in there without restrictions and start trying to exploit natural remedies with little to no reward for Brazil). It's a very complicated dynamic, and Americans are often confused when Brazilians get a little "snappy" towards advice on how to save the rainforest (particularly given the U.S.'s awesome environmental record). Still, the fact that both NGOs are being a little less paternalistic in this case, and the Brazilian government a bit more open, is highly encouraging.

Again, it's still too soon to be fully optimistic. There's no telling if the government will be able to actually enforce its plans here, or if farmers will really adhere to the program. Still, given how comperehensive this plan is, it is definitely a major step (vs. previous minor steps) in the right direction.

The Wiretapping Scandal in Brazil

Some pretty ugly news came out of Brazil yesterday. Apparently, high-ranking officials of Brazil's intelligence service have been tapping the phones of high-level politicians, including Lula's chief of staff, the president of the Senate, and the head of the Supreme Court.

Although Boz and Greg both beat me to it, there are a couple things I still want to highlight here. Although the opposition is immediately attacking Lula as abusing his powers and deserving of impeachment (even if he was unaware of the tapping), I find it extremely difficult to believe Lula knew of the tapping. Wiretapping is relatively easy as it is in Brazil from a strictly legal standpoint. What is more, wiretapping and spying have a rich history in Brazil's military and intelligence units dating back to the extensive use of wiretapping during the military dictatorship and even beforehand. The culture of spying within the military was never really dealt with after the dictatorship's end in 1985, and I have little doubt that that culture still exists today; no government in Brazil has tackled the military's continued impunity on this issue, leaving the military and intelligence organizations little incentive to stop unsolicited wiretapping or tapping for political purposes. As for the demand that Lula be impeached even if he was unaware of the tapping (and again, I really, really doubt he would be so dumb as to order these kinds of things), that is nothing but pure political posturing on the opposition's part.

It's important that Lula moved quickly to "suspend" those involved, and if there's anything he's proven, it's that people who abuse their power during his administration, be they friend or foe, will not be tolerated. However, his quick response, while good, is not enough; he really needs to use his position, combined with his popular support, to crack down on these practices. It's really time that a president in Brazil put an end to the last vestiges of the military dictatorship within the intelligence community. The 1988 constitution reduced and redefined the military's role in the Brazilian state; it's time that the intelligence community also see some heavy-duty reforms that make their operations less opaque and things like spying more difficult.

Around South America

-In Peru, official outrage erupted as a magazine ran pictures of a nude model sitting astride the national flag. Defense officials are outraged, wanting prosecution of the journal, while the journal's editor suggests there is no higher patriotism than celebrating national holidays and symbols by placing a naked woman on top of the flag. Seriously.

-Alvaro Uribe offered the rarest of rare things yesterday: criticism of the U.S. from his own mouth. Uribe took the U.S. to task for giving extradited drug-lords lighter sentences in return for information. I'm not sure who's right or wrong here; I don't think that more draconian sentences is going to solve the drug problem in Colombia (working on the demand-side will), but certainly lighter sentences in the U.S. prisons probably don't have many drug-lords shaking in Colombia, either.

-Ecuador's constituent assembly approved a new constitution for the country, now sending the issue to a national vote referendum at the end of September. Among the items that would be included in the new Constitution (if the population approves it, which it may not do) would be broader social programs; more presidential power to accomplish things (as the system is established now, Ecuador's Congress, wracked by cronyism, inefficiency, and a political elite that does little but take care of its own, can and does easily prevent anything from being done by what is probably a too-weak executive authority; the new constitution hopes to amend this); the president could close Congress once, but Congress could also unseat the president (with elections following in either circumstance); and, very interestingly for a Latin American and/or Catholic country, give same-sex unions the same rights as opposite-sex marriages.

-Bolivian indigneous groups from the Eastern lowlands are planning to meet with Congress in September to discuss how Chevron lied to Congress in an attempt to avoid paying $16 billion (with a "b") in damages for polluting the region (the decision stems from a case filed way back in 1993, and still has to receive a judge's approval some time next year). Representatives from the Cofan, Secoya, and Siona tribes are trying to get reimbursed for environmental damage caused by "dumping 18.5 billion gallons of toxic waste into Amazon waterways from 1964 to 1990, thereby decimating the ability of the indigenous groups to live off the rainforest. Texaco [bought by Chevron in 2001] also built roughly 1000 unlined open-air waste pits that have been leeching toxins into the soil and groundwater for decades." The indigenous leaders will be traveling in order to talk to Congress themselves and explain how Chevron's lobbyists, including Trent Lott, John Negroponte, and many other governmental officials past and present, have misled Congress and tried to get the U.S. government to pressure Ecuador to drop the case with the threat of withdrawal of economic support from Ecuador. (Erik may be right about coal companies in the U.S., but in my book, globally none is as despicable as the oil companies are.)

-Argentina's president Kristina Fernandez Kirchner has an amazingly sane take on how to deal with the drug issue, proposing to decriminalize possession and work harder at rehab programs and going after distributors and dealers (if you're going to attack the supply-side, that's the way to do it).

-The New York Times finally gets around to talking about the economic growth in Brazil that I've discussed before (for example, here, here, here, and here). The report offers the general picture of growth, but there are some pretty impressive stats, including the facts that "Brazil has shrunk its income gap by six percentage points since 2001, more than any other country in South America this decade," and that "while the top 10 percent of Brazil’s earners saw their cumulative income rise by 7 percent from 2001 to 2006, the bottom 10 percent shot up by 58 percent." I would just blatantly point out what the New York Times does not here, but is something I absolutely believe: these changes have happened in large part because of Lula's approach to governing, which has not shied away from investment but has avoided privatizations or short-term fixes, while simultaneously investing public money into social programs. Certainly, Brazil still has a very long way to go in terms of the income gap. Still, the facts that Lula's social programs are doing more than anybody predicted, people are gaining more access to purchasing goods that they previously never could afford, and Brazil's economy doesn't have any signs of slowdown ahead, as its currency is doing great and it's industrial base has diversified, are all excellent news, and I think a lot of the credit does belong to Lula on this.

-While we're on the subject of Lula, he took a new step in environmental protection, setting up a fund designed to "promote alternatives to forest-clearing for people living in the Amazon, and support conservation and sustainable development." As critical as I (and Erik and Randy) have been of Lula on environmental policy, this is truly a great step, primarily because it not only puts money into conservation efforts, but also because it puts money towards social programs that will hopefully prevent people from deforesting for money. I don't begrudge him his efforts to maintain sovereignty on the Amazon and in fact actually think the fund finally puts some efforts behind Brazil's rhetoric. (Up to this point, Brazil has often insisted that the Amazon is its business, and has often bristled at outside help, but without ever really trying to do much financially itself). Anyhow, this is just a small step, and will not radically shift Lula's environmental legacy. That said, it's still a great step in the right direction, and it's the best step he's taken environmentally yet.

-And finally, an interesting (if sometimes disjointed) article at the Times uses the rumor of a Brazilian immigrant winning the lottery to get into broader issues of what "the American dream" means to immigrants, how the economy's collapse is affecting them, and the ways in which modern technology allows Brazilians in the U.S. and Brazil to communicate more quickly than ever.