An Addendum to Honduras: Brazil's Role

In my original post below, I wanted to include Brazil's role, but had neither a decent way of stating that role nor a good place to put it. Fortunately, Randy perfectly and concisely summarizes the importance Brazil has played in the Honduran crisis, in his "winners and losers in Honduras" post. Among the winners:

Lula. Brazil's president's vigorous leadership on the issue was a model for the region: unwavering, but not bombastic; providing support behind the scenes (e.g., the Brazilian embassy for Zelaya's refuge), while maintaining diplomatic pressure was a sign of true diplomatic skill, a trait common in Brazil, arguably Latin America's most skilled diplomats.

I couldn't put it better myself.

Micheletti Blames Brazil for Excessive Honduran Police Violence

Give me a break.

Honduras is accusing Brazil's government of instigating an insurrection within its borders, and gave the Brazilian Embassy 10 days to decide the status of ousted Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelaya, who has taken refuge there.

"Since the clandestine arrival to Honduras by ex-president Zelaya, the Brazil embassy has been used to instigate violence and insurrection against the Honduran people and the constitutional government," the secretary of foreign affairs for Honduras' de facto government said in a statement late Saturday night.

Really? Brazil instigated the violence and insurrection? It should be clear how ridiculous this is. Brazil did not order Honduran troops to illegally remove Zelaya in the first place. Brazil did not order Honduran police to attack Zelaya's supporters. Brazil did not order Honduran police to punch handcuffed women in the face. Brazil did not order police to shoot and kill 18-year-olds who called the police what they in fact are ("golpistas"). Indeed, reports indicate that Brazil only knew about Zelaya an hour before he showed up at the embassy, and Lula's advisors believe Hugo Chavez "schemed" to help get Zelaya to Honduras and to the Brazilian embassy.

The plain and simple fact, as it has become increasingly clear, is that Micheletti is demonstrating the worst characteristics of an authoritarian leader who refuses to let go of his power. He's curtailed freedom of the press; he's established curfews; he continues to simultaneously insist that he's open to "negotiations" while declaring that he will have Zelaya arrested immediately. He has repeatedly sent the military to attack and repress protesters through brutal violence. To lay the blame for this at Brazil's doorstep is more than disingenuous; it's offensive, ridiculous, and absurd. It's yet another painful reminder that Micheletti and his administration are unable to either accept any responsibility for their actions or behave even remotely like adults.

More Analysis/Observations on the Honduran Coup

Greg hits it on the head in his four points about Zelaya, the coup, and issues of constitutionality and legality:

1. According to the constitution, taking Zelaya out of the country was illegal. Period.

2. Zelaya is charged with trying to amend the constitution to allow re-election of the president (which would be illegal), yet no one has ever provided evidence to that effect. It is illegal to amend seven particular parts of the constitution, but the wording of the proposed vote did not mention any of them.I do not care if you are positive he wanted to, as that does not constitute evidence. He said before the coup that he would leave office in 2010. Maybe he was lying, maybe not. But it deserves more investigation before overthrowing him. Ousting a president requires more than just assumptions about intent.

3. At various times, commenters have mentioned Venezuela as intruding (such as with the plebiscite materials) but I have never seen the Supreme Court or Attorney General mention evidence. Until I do, I think Venezuela is irrelevant. That Zelaya liked Hugo Chavez is not relevant to his standing as president. That Chavez says ridiculous things about invasion is not relevant to Zelaya's case either.

4. Zelaya was unpopular (even with his own party) and many people in Honduras are glad he's gone. This is irrelevant to the law. Surprisingly, I have not yet seen anyone make an argument for how a parliamentary system might have mediated the situation better--Honduran political institutions are so weak it might not have mattered.

I couldn't agree more with each of these items. As I said before, I think Zelaya overextended himself, I suspect thinking he'd have more support than he did when he tried to get the paper ballots for the referendum from the air force base and go against the Supreme Court - it wasn't necessarily that he was wrong in deed (and, as Greg points out, the definition of power in the constitution is nebulous at best); rather, he was wrong in the estimation of his limits. It is in this regard that I think you can say Zelaya is somewhat responsible (not "guilty") for what happened. However, the burden of the events rests on the military and the opposition (and those in Zelaya's own party) who supported the way things have played out since Sunday morning. Nothing was legal about this, if Zelaya is guilty of misestimations, the military and opposition are guilty of a blatantly illegal coup, and it shouldn't be too difficult for anybody to discern which of those two offenses is more severe. And given the points Greg makes, it really shouldn't be that hard for anybody to understand why Obama would want to come out against this coup. It's not about "meddling" in Latin America - it's about condemning an injustice committed against a democratically elected leader, something the global community has also vocally condemned.

In Anticipation of the Fifth Summit of the Americas

The Fifth Summit of the Americas is coming up, and in anticipation of this, Latin American scholar Greg Grandin has an absolutely outstanding article up on how FDR could be a model for Obama in his Latin American foriegn policy, as well as the obstacles Obama is facing and the interest groups that may undermine real change. There are some absolutely fascinating bits in there in terms of little-known policy decisions (like how the anti-imperialist stance of Ernest Gruening, who would eventually be one of only two senators to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, came to play a major role in American diplomacy under Roosevelt and beyond), as well as depressing current news, including the role of American private interest groups (like the NRA) in Latin America and the efforts to use failed models like Plan Colombia (whose "success," as the article points out, is dependent upon the use of death squads) in Afghanistan, and even the impact immigration may have on the Summit of the America's.

Obama's behavior, statements, and agreements at the Summit will be of major importance to understanding America's direction - it's his first major (planned) diplomatic mission in terms of policy-making (this weekend's pirate-incident notwithstanding), and will really give us a sense of how much of a change Obama will bring in terms of international relations and foreign policy. What's more, it's his first and only chance to make a "first impression" with many leaders from Latin America, and he has a lot to overcome from the Bush administration, so the Summit is of tantamount importance not just to Latin America, but to Obama's administration and American foreign policy over at least the next four years and beyond.

I hope to have more up on the Summit of the Americas as time allows, but for now, go read Grandin's article - it's just wonderful stuff, and highly informative.

To Hell with Good Intentions

Sorry I haven't been writing, but I haven't had internet access since last weekend...  On Sunday all the students in my study abroad program traveled to a small rural town called Ixtlilco el Grande, where we stayed until Wednesday.  While we were there we stayed with families, many of whom didn't have running water or refrigerators let alone any luxuries.  Then we moved to an ex-hacienda which had been turned into a resort/hotel, where we stayed for two nights.  At the ex-hacienda, we had various conversations about cultural issues and such, one of which was based on Ivan Illich's article "To Hell with Good Intentions."  

Many of the students in my program are Social Work majors, so they obviously rejected the notion that there is nothing we can do to help other people.  But I also think it's really important to recognize that even trying to help often does damage.  One student told a story about a village where a bunch of do-gooders put in a well for easier access to water, and they probably expected a giant "Thank you, you've saved our lives."  But actually the women were really unhappy with the well because it took away the time that they previously had to bond with the other women in the village when they went to the river for water everyday.  

Similarly, I heard of someone who visited a small rural town (much like Ixtlilco) and noticed that there weren't any recycling bins.  So in her quest to "green" the town, she organized a project to have them collect their recyclable materials, but it took eight months for them to gather enough to make it worth anyone's effort to haul it off to be recycled.  Because the people of the town were forced to make their money stretch as far as possible, they lived by the first two R's of "Reduce, Reuse, Recycle."  And because of that, they most certainly are much "greener" than any city with a shopping mall and a lame-ass recycling program.  

I don't agree with Illich that there is nothing we can do.  I think that there are a lot of really good programs that are doing a lot of good things for the people of Latin America.  But successful programs need to based on the needs of local peoples, not the "needs" that foreigners see.  Solving Latin American problems with U.S. solutions will never work.