An Addendum to Honduras: Brazil's Role

In my original post below, I wanted to include Brazil's role, but had neither a decent way of stating that role nor a good place to put it. Fortunately, Randy perfectly and concisely summarizes the importance Brazil has played in the Honduran crisis, in his "winners and losers in Honduras" post. Among the winners:

Lula. Brazil's president's vigorous leadership on the issue was a model for the region: unwavering, but not bombastic; providing support behind the scenes (e.g., the Brazilian embassy for Zelaya's refuge), while maintaining diplomatic pressure was a sign of true diplomatic skill, a trait common in Brazil, arguably Latin America's most skilled diplomats.

I couldn't put it better myself.

Did Brazil Play a Minor or a Major Role in the Return of Manuel Zelaya?

More news agencies are reporting on Manuel Zelaya's return to Honduras, and there will be many interesting developments over the next few days and perhaps weeks, accompanied by a decent amount of speculation as to what might happen next.

However, one aspect in all of this may go relatively ignored, with little comment on, but it's something I raised in these comments. Specifically, what, if any, role did Brazil play in this?

As we all know, Zelaya is staying at the Brazilian embassy in Honduras, a brilliant move considering that embassy grounds are soverign soil of the country they represent. Thus, while the Honduran military did not mind breaking the law to exile Zelaya back in June, to try to arrest him at the embassy (as Micheletti blustered) would effectively be an act of war, and while Brazil hasn't been involved in an open foreign war since World War II, I know who I'd pick in a Brazilian-Honduran war.

That said, it's clear that Brazil has some role in this whole incident, obviously. There are three alternatives I can come up with (though there may be others I haven't thought of):

1) Brazil had no idea Zelaya was coming back, and when he showed up at the embassy doors, they just decided to let him in. This strikes me as plausible - Brazil, like the rest of the world, has held that the June coup was illegal and that Zelaya, and not Micheletti, is the proper president of Honduras. Zelaya may have gone there just hoping, and if it didn't work out, he could hope to get to another friendly embassy before he was arrested. This does raise the question that, if many embassies would accept him, why go to Brazil first? It may be because Brazil is a big power (bigger than, say, Costa Rica or Italy or most other countries), and he knew it was friendly to his cause. It may also be because, again, the Brazilian embassy allegedly sits next to Micheletti's private home. This would make it the obvious first choice of Zelaya if he wanted to thumb his nose at Micheletti.

2) Zelaya actually tried to go to other embassies for protection before Brazil's, but was turned down. This is possible, too, and could help explain why early reports said that Zelaya was in Honduras, but with no knowledge of where he was staying. There's not much that distinguishes this from the first possibility; still, I'm inclined to believe the first possibility over this one, primarily because Brazil seemed like such a sure bet in terms of friendliness, Honduras' inability to bully Brazil, and Brazil's high standing in the diplomatic community.

3) Brazil knew well in advance, through direct or indirect contact, that Micheletti was coming, and was prepared to accept him should he arrive safely in Tegucigalpa. Whether or not Brazil was active, they would make sure he was taken care of upon his arrival in the embassy. Perhaps they actively wanted to help undermine the Micheletti government, though this strikes me as the most implausible likelihood. Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim (who is in New York, preparing for the UN's meeting on climate change) denied any previous knowledge, and right now, I don't see any reason not to believe him. More importantly, if the Brazilian government was actively trying to undermine a regime, it would mark a major departure from Brazilian foreign relations over the last 7 years. If there's anything one can say about Lula's approach, it has been that he has been the consummate diplomat during his two terms; even politicians in neighboring countries look up to the way in which he conducts foreign relations. To suddenly throw all caution to the wind in any event seems extreme; to do so with the Honduran case in particular pushes the envelope of believability.

4) Brazil knew shortly before or after Zelaya's official departure (from where is still unknown) that he was coming to Honduras, and quickly prepared for his arrival. Again, I just don't see why they would do this; the foreign relations minister insists it's not the case, and again, it would mark a major departure from all that Brazil has stood for in international relations over the last 7 years under Lula.

Ultimately, of these four scenarios, the first one seems most likely to me, though I wouldn't be remotely surprised to learn that it was the second. If it's either three or four, I will be more than surprised, and were it to be either of those scenarios, it would raise all kinds of interesting (and perhaps troubling) questions about the direction Brazilian foreign relations were heading. Still, while not the most commented-upon aspect of Zelaya's return, it does offer some fascinating questions about that return as well as possible insights on the role of Brazil in Latin America, in the defense of democratic processes, and in international relations more generally.

Brazil and Spain Express Concern over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia

Brazil and Spain Express Concern Over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia
The recent agreement to put more U.S. troops in Colombia is raising concerns beyond just Venezuela:

Spain’s Miguel Angel Moratinos and Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim expressed their reservations about the effects the military program could have at a press conference within the framework of the Spanish official’s visit to Brazil.

The two ministers also called for dialogue between Venezuela and Colombia and agreed to work “to avoid a spiral of misunderstandings” between those two countries.

This is a good diplomatic move that gives greater weight to regional concerns than Chavez's opposition alone could ever achieve. However, I don't know how much it will actually accomplish.

To be clear, I think the U.S.'s decision is a bad one, for a number of reasons. The "war on drugs" is pretty ineffective in its focus on the supply side rather than the demand side, and basing more troops in Colombia isn't going to solve this problem. What is more, it is clear that this will add to regional suspicion and tension in South America. While Obama's diplomatic efforts in the hemisphere thus far have been admirable in comparison to past administrations (dating to about, oh, 1848), the presence of more U.S. troops on any country's soil is a legitimate cause for concern, regardless of who is president of the United States. For these reasons, I think it's important that Brazil and Spain, who are far from antagonistic towards the U.S., raise these concerns. Again, I'm not sure it will result in any real change in the decision to move troops to Colombia when the Ecuadoran bases close (rather than, you know, having the troops actually come back to the U.S. when the bases close). But Brazil's and Spain's questions and objections should at least make the U.S. stop and take notice, and give the opposition to such a move much greater legitimacy than Chavez's opposition alone could accomplish.

And, on a side note, can we please stop referring to Daniel Ortega as part of some "leftist" "alliance?" Firstly, as I've noted before, these notions in the American media of "leftist alliances" in Latin America are false and lazy. Just because countries are friendly with each other, or from relatively similar political ideologies, does not mean they are some new axis, and American journalists' inability to look at Latin America with a view that is more complex than "leftist" is just shameful. Secondly, and more directly related to Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega has hardly been "leftist." If you want to refer to the Sandinistas as leftist, fine - it's still probably a lazy categorization on the part of the media, but at least it's fairly accurate. But when the actual major "leftist" political group in a country disowns the president as not representing leftist goals, ideals, and missions, could we at least respect that country's political spectrum, and agree that just because a leader isn't as "conservative" as America would like does not mean he/she's some radical "leftist" political force?

Brazil and Colombia: Offering a How-to and How-NOT-to Crash Course in Diplomacy

I'm can only echo what Randy said in regard to this editorial (translated here):

While President Lula da Silva of Brazil meets face-to-face with President Obama in the White House to discuss global and Latin American policy, the Colombian vice president laments the mistreatment that, according to him, Colombia receives from a sector of the Congress and U.S. civil society, and proposes to do away with Plan Colombia, considering it to be a source of humiliation.

Those news [sic] make apparent the shameful contrast bewteen Brazilian and Colombian foreign policy. Thanks to the former, Brazil will become the United States’ strategic partner in the region, and thanks to the second Colombia will be it no longer. Brazil will take on this role for obvious reasons. Because it is the 10th-largest economy on the planet, the most stable and progressive democracy on the continent, the only one with a world-class foreign ministry and president, a player with regional and global leadership.

[...] If you want to be treated like statesmen, behave like statesmen. Stop asking, stamping your feet and threatening. Take the initiative, propose things and keep your word. Develop a bilateral agenda that incorporates both countries’ issues, interests and concerns, and propose specific goals within specific time periods.

Exactly. Like Randy, I have had nothing but praise for the Brazilian diplomatic corps and Lula's diplomatic approach, and Colombia during the Uribe administration has offered a thorough course on how not to conduct productive diplomatic relations. Brazil has conducted itself as masterful diplomats, respectful of differences and making clear their agenda, while Colombia has behaved like a spoiled little brat. It's easy to see why Obama met with Lula, and not with Uribe - after all, the Bush years are in the past.

Lula and Obama Meet

Lula and Obama met this weekend in what was Obama's first meeting with a Latin American leader, demonstrating how Brazil has really emerged as a global power , which also indicates that the U.S. is going to have to (and seems willing to) deal with Brazil and Latin America in general on much more balanced (if not perfectly equal) footing than in the past. Publicly, the discussions were, as Boz says, no surprise - Doha, energy, the global economy. I am curious if/how the Venezuela talks played out privately - I suspect if there is anything, we'll only know more later. Overall, the meeting seemed to have went well, and just the overall demeanor and relationship between the two men already is just another reminder of what a radical change and galactic-sized improvement we are witnessing between Bush's administration and Obama's when it comes to foreign policy and representing the United States globally. It's really too early to say much about the consequences of the meeting, but it's definitely a good step, and will be interesting to watch Obama's, Lula's, and the rest of Latin America's actions leading up to the Summit of the Americas in April.

Is Brazil the Next Major "Imperialist" Power in South America?

A few weeks back, Upside Down World published an interesting report asking if Brazil is "creating its own 'backyard' in Latin America?" The article looked at Brazil's rapidly expanding foreign investments in recent years (from $250 million dollars US in 2003 to $10 billion dollars US in 2004 alone) and some recent points of contention (with Ecuador and Paraguay, particularly), and asks if Brazil is on its way to becoming an imperialist force in the region. It chronicles the various investments Brazil has made recently, from cattle farms in Uruguay to private companies' involvement in Ecuador to the Itaipu dam agreement with Paraguay to suggest Brazil may be trying to become a hegemonic power in Latin America.

I find the charge of "Brazilian imperialism" interesting but wrong-headed. I suppose from the strictest economic standpoint, Brazil's growth may look somewhat like imperialism, particularly to the political left of the region. I have a hard time buying into this right now, though, simply because countries can only grow their investments internally so much before they have to invest elsewhere. Brazil has invested wisely, and is succeeding for this. Accusing Brazil of becoming "imperialist" simply because it has succeeded in what all of the countries of South America have been trying to do to one degree or another for quite some time makes about as much sense to me as accusing a successful local coffee shop of becoming "corporate" when it expands and has multiple locations in an area.

What is more, I think the "imperialist" charge loses any legitimacy when it comes to dealing with the term from a geopolitical standpoint (because it's not just about economics). Indeed, I would even suggest that having Brazil become such a major global force is probably a net gain for South America as a whole. For too long, Latin America (including Brazil) hasn't really had a powerful geopolitical or economic voice that was willing to stand up for its interests in the global market. Now that Brazil is gaining that power, and has similar past experiences with its neighbors in the global economy, Brazil is definitely in the position to defend the region as a whole, and to use its power to sway American and European powers. I admit that Brazil could disregard its neighbors demands on issues such as equality and fair treatment in the way that the United States and Europe has traditionally disregarded anything that didn't line their own pockets and the pockets of their allies.

However, this just doesn't seem likely to me. First, these are Brazil's neighbors, and not just foreign countries, and it would really hurt Brazil's standing in the region. Secondly (and deriving from the first point) Brazil's global standing in the economy, while growing exponentially, is still relatively new and fragile, and Brazil can't afford to isolate entire neighboring countries where it has invested so heavily. Unlike China, the U.S., or major European countries (at least before the global meltdown), Brazil could not just cut its losses in one part of the world and focus elsewhere without major repercussions in its own economy. Thus, I think it is fair to say that, at least thus far, Brazil in the 2000s has been rather sympathetic to the interests of its neighbors, even while it tries to defend its own economic interests. There was evidence of this "sympathy-factor" when Evo Morales nationalized petroleum production, including holdings by Brazil's Petrobras, back in 2007. Lula calmly responded to the nationalization and took Morales on his word to "re-work" the deal, ultimately still getting a good deal on gas coming from Bolivia, but with terms more favorable to Bolivia than they previously had been, as well. The Paraguay case makes things look bad, but the Itaipu issue has been a contentious one that has been bubbling for years. It may still work to Paraguay's disadvantage, which would be disappointing and unfortunate. Brazil has a lot invested in that dam in terms of economy and infrastructure, and it very well may end up being shortsighted in its efforts to get the best deal possible for Brazil, while angering Paraguay and perhaps offending neighboring countries. But the operative word here is "may" - things still aren't resolved, and there's not a lot of concrete evidence that lets us conclude already that the Itaipu discussions are going to go well or poorly. And even if things do work out in a way in which Brazil comes off as an economic bully on this issue, I still don't think the dam and the recent issues between Ecuador and Brazil (which were since resolved) are enough to really point towards an emerging but latent imperialism on Brazil's part, at least not right now. I could be wrong on this down the road - presidents do funny things for strange reasons sometimes - but for the foreseeable future, at any rate, I really don't see Brazil joining the "traditional exploiters" in its treatment of the other South American countries anytime in the near future.

Bolivia and Brazil Joining Forces in Combatting Drug Trade

This is a few weeks old (I apologize for the light blogging - I currently have two grant proposals, a conference paper, a dissertation chapter, and a part-time job on my plate, and things have actually calmed a bit from the first 4 weeks of the year), but I wanted to point out that Bolivia and Brazil have joined forces in combatting the cocaine trade along their border in the wake of the expulsion of the DEA. It's a fascinating agreement that serves both wonderfully - Brazil is making an effort to implement some national drug policy efforts rather than letting police blaze their way into favelas, and Bolivia is making a strong effort to make clear that while coca leaf production is non-offensive and important to its economy, it has little tolerance for the cocaine trade. Additionally, Bolivia gets more infrastructural agreement as part of the deal, and Brazil strengthens its role as a regional leader in lending and development projects for its neighbors. Boz reminds us also that combatting the drug trade behooves more nations than the U.S., and that fighting it doesn't always have to involve the U.S.

But there is another major aspect worth mentioning here, too. Although the U.S. under Bush constantly chastized Morales for Bolivia's coca production (leading to occasionally humorous interactions between the two countries), Morales has always made it clear that the coca leaf itself is not a drug, and that he's against the proliferation of cocaine production. The distinction is important and relatively easy to understand, but one that the United States has never bothered to grasp. This request to Brazil just further evidence both of that fact, and of fact that U.S. really has gone about in the "war on drugs" in the Andes in the totally wrong way.

Relations between Brazil and Ecuador Normalize

Last month, I wrote about Ecuador defaulting on its loans to Brazil. At the time, I commented that the defaulting, combined with tensions between Brazil and Ecuador over dams Brazilian companies constructed in Ecuador, had created a lose-lose situation for both Brazil and Ecuador; the former was paying financially and had strained relations with one of its "leftist" allies on the continent, while the latter was isolating itself and creating a situation that would cause problems both presently and in the future both in terms of diplomacy and in terms of Ecuador's on infrastructural development.

Apparently, cooler heads have prevailed, though, as a couple of weeks ago (I haven't really had time to get around to this until now) Ecuador has paid back Brazil's BNDES for the funds to build the dams, and, in response, Brazil has sent its ambassador back to Ecuador, thereby reopening normalized relations between the two countries. While Brazil does gain a bit here diplomatically, it's really Ecuador that wins out in resolving this problem. Brazil was one of the few friends and willing foreign creditors able to help out Ecuador as the global economies deal with crisis; had Ecuador continued to alienate itself from Brazil, it would have faced real obstacles in infrastructural development, financial aid, and diplomatic relations in the region. I completely agree with Boz that Ecuador blinked first because it really couldn't afford not to, and this does help Brazil strengthen its position in the region even further. Overall, I think it's a satisfying end to what was a point of contention between the two countries that could have been increasingly damaging (particularly for Ecuador) had it been drawn out further.

Tensions between Brazil and Paraguay

The New York Times has a story up about "mounting tensions" between Brazil and Paraguay. This week, Brazil is conducting military training along their border with Paraguay. Paraguay is rather nervous over this, and Fernando Lugo this week made some strong statements about what would happen if Brazil violated even "one inch" of Paraguay's territorial sovereignty.

I must say, the tensions mentioned in this story seem to fall far more on the Paraguay side of the equation than the Brazil side. I think the implicit connections that the story tries to make between the training practices and the Paraguayan landless' efforts to seize land owned by Brazilians in Paraguay is tenuous at best. Yes, there is the possibility that naturalized Brazilians' ownership is at risk in Paraguay, and it is in the Brazilian government's interests to make sure its citizens are not harmed, be it in Paraguay or elsewhere. Still, I'm not really convinced that the Paraguayan landless movement and the military training have led to heightened nervousness in Brazil. That may be the case, but the article really offers nothing in the way of evidence to back that up.

As for Paraguay, I have little doubt that their tensions are very real and a bit more pervasive. None can fault Paraguay for being a bit worried about the fact that, just as there is a growing movement to remove foreign (mostly Brazilian) farmers from there lands in Paraguay, Brazil is training its military along Paraguay's border. Although it was nearly 140 years ago, the War of the Triple Alliance, in which Brazil (with nominal and brief aid from Argentina and Uruguay) invaded Paraguay. The 6-year war (1864-1870) ended up with nearly half of Paraguay's population dead, and more than 80% of its men over the age of 20 casualties of war or disease. It's not hard to understand why, even if so much time has passed, Paraguay might still be a bit on edge over this.

Still, I really don't think much is going to come of this, at least for now. Brazil does often train troops in that region, and it (along with the Amazonian basin) is a major site of illegal smuggling of drugs, weapons, and especially products like electronics and housewares, whose smuggling helps circumvent Brazilian taxes and tariffs. What is more, if there's any single word that could describe Lula's foreign policy, it's "diplomatic." Even when popular opinion in Brazil calls for sabre-rattling and takes a more aggressive stance towards its neighbors, Lula has practiced a calm, peaceful foreign policy. In short, "cooperation" has been the word for the last 6 years under Lula, and there is absolutely no good reason to see the military training as a sudden shift in that policy over what amounts to a domestic issue facing Paraguay.

That said, this does raise the specter of uglier regional politics in the post-Lula era. There can be no doubt that, since the beginning of the decade, Brazil has come to assume a new role as regional leader in South America, gaining a very real presence as the major power of the region, rather than a nominal presence (which is what Brazil's role as a regional leader often was throughout the 20th century). While Lula's administration has been one of reasoned diplomacy and cooperation, there's nothing to guarantee that future leaders will be as calm and patient in dealing with their neighbors, particularly when said leaders perceive Brazil's own interests to be at risk. In light of Lula's foreign policy over the past several years, I really don't see much aggression in and of itself in Brazil's recent definition of foreign aggression as "whoever threatens or commits “hostile prejudicial acts against Brazilian sovereignty, territorial integrity or the Brazilian people”. However, it is open-ended enough to leave room for future leaders to interpret it in a far more aggressive fashion than Lula probably would. And while it may seem strange to suggest that Brazil would provoke a war with another country over a perceived threat, geopolitics is strange, and it's not like countries haven't unilaterally declared war over "perceived threats" before. Thus, while I don't think there's much to the Mercopress article right now (and, like the New York Times article, I think the connections it and the Estado de Sao Paulo are trying to make are a bit tenuous), it does raise the interesting specter that, down the line, Brazil could become a bit of a regional bully in South America as the regional, hemispheric, and global geopolitics shift.