Around Latin America

-Uruguay has successfully overturned the amnesty law that pardoned military torturers and assassains during the military regime of 1973-1985, making prosecution of military officials possible. The congressional overturn was made possible in 2009, when Uruguay's Supreme Court declared the "Expiry Law" unconstitutional.

-In another case of military regime leaders finally paying for their blatant human rights violations, Erwin C. has a good write-up of the case of Reynaldo Bignone, the last president of the military regime of 1976-1983, which oversaw the murder of at least 30,000 of its own citizens during the so-called "Dirty War." Bignone had originally gone to trial early last year, and was convicted and given a life sentence for his role in the military regime.

-It is not just military leaders who are increasingly facing pressure for their ties to human rights violations. A Rio de Janeiro politician has been arrested under suspicion of leading a paramilitary group responsible for murdering citizens in Brazil's second-largest city.

-Chiquita is also under scrutiny for its ties to paramilitary groups. New court documents reveal that the banana producer voluntarily paid Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups for "protection," suggesting the company's claims that they were "extorted" are hollow. Families in both Colombia and Panama already sued Chiquita for its involvement in violence in the two countries, and these court documents seem to suggest that Chiquita's economic contribution to violent movements was more voluntary than the company had suggested.

-The Brazilian government continues to try to move forward with the Belo Monte dam. The dam, which would be the world's third largest if it were to go through (behind China's Three Gorges dam and Brazil's/Paraguay's Itaipu dam), would also flood hundreds of square miles of Amazonian forest and displace indigenous peoples. However, in spite of the government's determination, a broad coalition of forces is forming (including high-profile supporters like James Cameron) to oppose the dam's construction, and human rights groups have now gotten involved, making the dam's completion far from a certainty still, in spite of recent governmental victories in the court system.

-The Belo Monte dam isn't the only environmental concern in Brazil, as a new report suggests that farming to fuel the meat industry is causing catastrophic damage to Brazil's cerrado, or savannah.

-As today marks the 50th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion and Raul Castro's recent proposals of limited reforms in Cuba, Boz has an interesting piece up regarding the bureaucracy of authoritarian regimes. The nuance he suggests between top-most positions (in this case the Castros) and the bureaucracy beneath them is an important and oft-overlooked component of military goverments, especially those in places like Chile or Egypt, where dictatorial rule is associated with a particular name/face (Pinochet, Mubarak, etc.). Although his post is just a brief reminder of the complexities of rule, rather than an intense analysis of how such relations between technocrats and autocrats work, it's always worth keeping in mind when discussing modern military regimes, be it in Latin America or elsewhere.

-Finally, there is an article up on the progress of scientific research and study in Brazil that is fascinating for many reasons. The growth of scientific R&D in Brazil is yet another indicator that Brazil's ascension in the international arena most likely is not fleeting.

No Third Term for Uribe

Reports are coming out that the Colombian courts will not allow a referendum for Alvaro Uribe to run for a third term, effectively destroying his hopes for a re-re-election, and opening the way for Juan Manuel Santos to run for election. This is a major victory for the democratic process in Colombia. More analysis once more details emerge.

....and to add to the bad news for Uribe, one of his top political allies has been arrested for colluding with paramilitary groups. The fact that more than a few of Uribe's political allies and aides have been connected to paramilitary groups leaves the stench of illegality all over Uribe, and just throws into relief how good it is that he cannot run for a third term.

Human Rights Issues around Latin America

Lillie points us to a series of excellent posts/issues. First, there's this great report involving the relatives of "false positives," or innocent civilians whom police or paramilitaries murder and then dress them up as "guerrillas" to build up their body count. Paramilitary violence continues to be one of the biggest threats to human rights and innocent civilians' lives in Colombia, and the story gives a harrowing level of personal detail of the liveso f those who have suffered.

She also does a great job chronicling the life of Domingo Antonio Bussi, one of the leading forces in installing repression and torture in Argentina immediately prior to and during its seven-year dictatorship. Bussi has never been repentant for his acts, and is currently on trial at last this past week, where he defended the use of repression and torture and denied that anybody had been "disappeared" in his region of Tucuman .

Finally, Lillie points us to these poignant images from Chile's recently-opened Museum of Memory, which chronicles the events and abuses of the Pinochet regime. Like Lillie and many others, the images and layout of the Museum strike me as very impressive and well-done, and must be overpowering in communicating their message in person.

Around Latin America - Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Honduras, Colombia, and Panama

-A high-ranking official in the Argentine government is saying that the country does not plan to invade the Malvinas/Falklands islands or go to war with England, but that it does want to negotiate with Great Britain over the issue of oil drilling (part of the islands' new economic boom) in the ocean near the islands.

-Bolivia has opened up its military archives from its dictatorship period of 1960-1980. This is a major gain for historians and scholars interested in the Bolivian dictatorship, and scholars of dictatorships in the Americas more generally, as the Bolivian dictatorship has remained relatively understudied. Access to archives should lead to a new boom in research and new insights into one of the "forgotten" dictatorships in South America.

-Justice in Peru's Amazonian basin continues to be lopsided, as two indigenous peoples cleared of the killing of police in 2009 remain behind bars even while police officers involved in the murder of 10 indigenous protesters remain free.

-Speaking of the Amazonian basin, this article does a great job of demonstrating the vulgar and violent abuse of power that politicians and elites use in getting land in northern Brazil, as well as some of the ways that the poor and small-landholders are fighting back against elites' land-grabs. Another article does an interesting job in suggesting the ways in which the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil has been disappointed by Lula's policies, and the uphill battles the MST is facing. Meanwhile, Brazil's agricultural production is looking at a boom year for soybean farming in the wake of beneficial rainfall. Of course, accompanying that rainfall is an increase in the mosquito population, with the result that five states in Brazil already have had dengue outbreaks this year.

-Although most in the world associate Carnaval with partying and scantily-clad women, this article does a great job detailing the complicated and conflicting meanings behind Carnaval for women and homosexuals. The article comments on how the relatively free attitudes towards sexuality, women, and homosexuals during Carnaval highlights the often-repressive social context these groups are forced to endure during the majority of the year, an argument that James Green has demonstrated has a strong historical precedent.

-A report in Pravda is saying that Colombian paramilitaries killed 30,000 people between the early-1980s and 2003. Though I'd like to see more research into the numbers, there's no doubt paramilitary groups are responsible for a large number of the total deaths in Colombia's civil war.

-RNS has a great preview of a few of the members of the Honduran Truth Commission, and what their appointments mean for the process of chronicling the abuses of the coupist government last year. Among other things, RNS suggests that "human rights abuses might actually be on the agenda after all."

-As Venezuela's economy faces the possibility of recession, as well as electrical shortages, Colombia is turning to look for trade partners elsewhere, and has begun exploring the possibility of a free-trade agreement with Panama.

-Finally, I'm not terribly convinced by this article suggesting that slums offer insights into how to better plan cities and help "save the planet." Among other things, it really glosses over the economic and socio-political issues that many slum residents have to deal with, focusing on global slums more as planning models than as the result of very real inequalities and suffering.

Mapping out a Potential Post-Uribe Political Landscape in Colombia - Juan Manuel Santos

Even if Alvaro Uribe is determined to be ineligible for a third term, it's quite possible that the next president of Colombia could be equally terrible on human rights. Uribe's former defense minister, Juan Manuel Santos, has said that if Uribe is ruled ineligible, Santos will be the candidate for the ruling Unity party. Santos's background as Minister of Defense is full of controversy. It was under his watch when the Colombian military attacked a FARC camp and killed Raul Reyes. While many Colombians were thrilled with the news, there was the little issue of Santos having the military violate Ecuadorian sovereignty in the attack. Additionally, Santos admitted that extrajudicial killings and the murder of civilians were not infrequent under his watch. While he claimed he admitted as much so that the Ministry could "resolve" the problem, he did not really take any substantial activity to combat tese type of extrajudicial and paramilitary activities, which continue to be one of the biggest problems for human rights in Colombia.

Santos's potential candidacy isn't some pipe dream, either. Certainly, Uribe is seeking re-re-election, a move that Congress has approved. However, the possibility of a third campaign for Uribe is not a done deal. While a top judge has recommended the rejection of a referendum on allowing a third term for Uribe, and even a majority of Colombians opposing a third term for the current president. While far from decisive, this legal and popular opposition gives some hope that democracy in Colombia can continue as it has. But with candidates like Santos, it's hard to imagine that there will be any real effort to rein in the out-of-control paramilitary activity in the country.

Around Latin America: Human Rights

-While ending DADT continues to stir debate in the U.S., it's far from the only country dealing with the issue of homosexuals in the armed forces. A Brazilian general has caused outrage in Brazil after commenting that gay soldiers should not be able to have troops under their command. Gen. Raymundo Nonato, who has been nominated to the top military court in Brazil, commented that while he believes homosexuals who kept their sexuality private should be allowed to remain in the military, he also believed that homosexual officers "will not be obeyed by his subordinates in combat situations."

-In a baffling decision that defies common sense and mocks justice, a Swiss court ruled that "at least $4.6 million from Swiss bank accounts previously awarded to charities must be returned to the family of former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier." The Duvalier family attained "its" wealth via the monopolization of the tobacco industry in Haiti, helping to keep the Haitian population in poverty even while the Duvaliers became millionaires. That this ruling happened just 12 hours before the earthquake was an extra thumb in the eye of Hatians; according to the report, the $4.6 million could have fed one million Hatians for two weeks.

-As General Reynaldo Bignone, the final dictator of Argentina's military dictatorship (1976-1983) went to trial for human rights abuses this week, he hopefully felt extremely uncomfortable upon seeing the images of the disappeared in the public gallery of the court.

-Finally, the Human Rights Watch report on Colombia came out. Not surprisingly, paramilitaries are a major focus, though exactly who these paramilitaries consist of and what to call them is increasingly challenging and complex. What is clear is that the current activities of paramilitaries draws upon the groundwork and actions of previous paramilitary groups, even while branching out and coming to incorporate elements of gangs as well as drug traffickers. The report also says that the AUC continues to be a major threat, as many of its soldiers never demobilized and new elements have entered into its forces. Overall, the report paints a very grim picture of the human rights situation in Colombia, and given Alvaro Uribe's neglect of these issues and connections to some of these paramilitary groups, and the likelihood that he will be elected to a third term later this year, there seems little hope that the situation will improve in Colombia anytime soon. The report is worth reading in its entirety (~120 pages) for those interested in human rights, Latin America, or policy. Still, gird yourself - it's depressing news all around, made even moreso by the fact that we're unlikely to see any improvements as long as Uribe is in office.

Around Latin America

I had hoped to write in depth about some of these stories in individual posts, but an unexpected trip out of town will keep me from blogging for several days. I still hope to come back to a couple of these, but until then, the stories themselves are well worth checking out.

-Death squads in Colombia have apparently begun targeting Afro-Colombian activists. The racial tensions in Colombia are often under-acknowledged, but stories like this serve as a strong reminder that complex race-relations among Afro-descendants and others in the Americas are not the monopoly of Brazil and the United States alone.

-Also in Colombia, another 14 soldiers have been set free from jail in the Soacha murders case. Like the previous 17 soldiers, the men were set free on a technicality, thus setting back efforts against paramilitary actions and human rights violations in Colombia even further.

-Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom has been cleared in the assassination of an opposition lawyer. The investigation arose when Rodrigo Rosenberg was murdered last May, with a videotape surfacing with Rosenberg claiming that if he were killed, it was because Colom had ordered it. The incident led to protests both against and in favor of Colom, and even the FBI had gotten involved with the investigation. The investigation ruled Rosenberg's death a suicide in which he tried to take down Colom's government with him, which sounds somewhat unlikely, but isn't so strange within the way the report narrates the events. They may be wrong still, but it appears Colom has emerged from this strange challenge to his office.

-Some in Brazil and the U.S. wonder if a new film on Lula's early years as a metal-worker and union leader will influence the elections this year. [I'll certainly have more on this later.]

-It turns out, Roberto Micheletti isn't the only perpetual participant in Honduran politics, as the Honduran Congress handed out 50 other lifetime government positions. And as for Micheletti himself, not only is he remaining in politics, but he plans to continue to be a very vocal participant.

-Finally, in Argentina, prison riots are bringing the issue of prisoners' rights to the fore in Argentina, which, like many other countries in the Americas (including the U.S.), suffers from an appalling penal system that demonstrates little concern for the conditions of prisons and rights of prisoners.

Around Latin America

A few items regarding human rights worth noting:

-In Colombia, a court sentenced a former general to 40 years in prison for his role in the massacre of at least 49 civilians in 1997. Jaime Humberto Uscategui was accused of having ignored pleas for help from a local judge who reported the massacre, which took place over five days in July 1997. Uscategui not only ignored the pleas, but his garrison was the location where two planes of paramilitaries who committed the massacre landed and were dispatched. The fact that Uscategui (now 61) will hopefully spend the rest of his life in jail is a good step in curbing impunity for paramilitaries and for officers connected to paramilitaries in Colombia.

-Speaking of paramilitaries, a group of right-wing paramilitaries in Oaxaca apparently shot four children on Sunday, killing one. I don't know much about the particular political claims of the groups involved (though Erik or Yann may know more), but it's clear that Mexican right-wing paramilitary groups and even politicians are still trying to prevent indigenous groups and left-wing community organizations from organizing and effecting change in southern Mexico, and their silly display of power and intimidation this weekend resulted in a dead child.

-In Argentina, former dictator Jorge Videla is denying charges that he helped to put the kidnapped children of "disappeared" women in the homes of other families. Given that other kidnapping charges are among those that in 1998 helped to get Videla back in prison after Carlos Menem's unforgiveable pardon in 1990, these new charges could help in making sure Videla rots in prison until the day he dies.

Depressing Human Rights News from Colombia and Honduras

Yesterday, Colombian prosecutors made a grisly discovery:

The chief prosecutor's office said Friday it has unearthed the remains of 17 peasants tortured and killed at a ranch that belonged to the since-slain, far-right militia leader Carlos Castano in Colombia's northwest. [...]

The peasants were believed slain 10 to 12 years ago by men under the command of Jesus Ignacio Roldan, alias "Monoleche," a Castano lieutenant who later participated in the 2004 murder of the right-wing militia leader, the prosecutor's office said in a statement.

Castano was apparently killed because he was upset that other militia warlords had turned his anti-guerrilla movement into regional drug-trafficking criminal mafias and they were afraid he would betray them to U.S. drug agents.

All the bodies found at the "La 35" ranch in the Uraba banana-growing region "were dismembered and showed signs of torture," the statement said.

Of course, since Castano is dead, prosecutions are out of the question. Still, one can't help but suspect that this was and perhaps still is a common tactic among paramilitary groups and leaders, who can act safely, knowing that Uribe won't do anything about it.

Meanwhile (and h/t Randy), on Wednesday, Honduran police shot and killed an 18-year-old. His crime? He shouted out "golpistas!" (coup supporters) at the military. So, for shouting one word at the military that accurately described what they did (an illegal coup), the police killed the young man exercising freedom of speech in a non-violent way. And I expect that prosecutions against the police who committed this act are about as likely as prosecutions against the dead Castano, which is to say, not likely at all.

Alvaro Uribe Eligible for Third Term, As Colombia Moves Further Away from "Democracy"

Taking a page from its neighbor and sometimes-rival, Venezuela, Colombia's Senate has removed the 2-term limit for president, opening the path for a potential third term for Alvaro Uribe. Of course, if this were Chavez, there would be all kinds of rumbling and grumbling about "democracy" and "dictatorships" and "violence," but since it's Uribe, something tells me such criticisms will be much more muted despite the factif Uribe has been tied to more death squads than Chavez ever was. Still, this move is already raising question marks, and Michael Striffler has a good editorial about how this is as bad for democracy not only in Colombia, but potentially in other parts of Latin America, too. The fact that this could go through, and Uribe could be elected to a third term, is awful for democracy, human rights, and reducing violence in Colombia.

The Hideous and Appalling Violence and Tactics Colombia's Paramilitary Groups Employ

I have written several times before about how paramilitary groups are responsible for a not-insignificant amount violence in Colombia. This article shows just how repulsive and appalling the paramilitaries' tactics are:

Prosecutors and human rights researchers are investigating hundreds of such deaths and disappearances, contending that Colombia’s security forces are increasingly murdering civilians and making it look as if they were killed in combat, often by planting weapons by the bodies or dressing the corpses in guerrilla fatigues.
With soldiers under intense pressure in recent years to register combat kills to earn promotions and benefits like time off and extra pay, reports of civilian killings are climbing, prosecutors and researchers say, pointing to a grisly facet of Colombia’s long internal war against leftist insurgencies.
The deaths have called into question the depth of Colombia’s recent strides against the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and have begun to haunt the nation’s military hierarchy.

The whole article is depressing, but must be read. The U.S. tacitly supports these tactics via its financial support for the Uribe administration and its funding in the "drug war," whose funds often end up in the hands of these paramilitaries. Additionally, the complete failure to categorize such tactics as "terrorist" simply because Colombia is the U.S.'s biggest ally in the region, while nothing new, is no less inexcusable.

And then there's the issue of Uribe's leadership. He can insist he has nothing to do with these groups, and make public demonstrations of his "intolerance" for such actions, but they ring hollow, considering how closely paramilitary groups have been tied to Uribe's administration and friends, allies, and cabinet members.

This is in no way an apologia for the FARC or its actions; still, it has become increasingly clear of late that the FARC is far from the sole responsible agent for the civil war that plagues Colombia, and at times it seems the paramilitary groups are willing to go even further than the FARC in their "war." It's things like this that make me suspect that the disappearance of the FARC would not lead to the disappearance of violence in Colombia, in spite of what many both in and outside of Colombia may believe. As long as these groups act with relative impunity, and as long as there is a president who is unwilling to go after these groups in anything but a symbolic fashion when things get too appalling, there just doesn't seem to be a lot of hope to me that the violence in Colombia will go down anytime soon.

Details on the Deaths Colombian Paramilitaries Cause (and How the U.S. Is Involved)

I've talked repeatedly (here and here, for example) about the significant role paramilitary groups play in the high levels of violence in Colombia and the continued impunity they enjoy. The L.A. Times has a good article up giving detailed statistics on how the paramilitaries are directly responsible for growing violence in Colombia.

There were 329 so-called extrajudicial killings by the Colombian military and police last year, a coalition of Colombian rights groups asserts in a report, a 48% increase from the 223 reported in 2006."

In addition to this, the article states that, out of 900 cases of murder brought against military members and police officers, only 18 cases have resulted in convictions, and 14 of those 18 happened only after a special prosecutor's office was created in the middle of 2007. And politicians tied to paramilitaries still aren't being held responsible or accountable for their ties; indeed, just yesterday, one of Colombia's top senators (and a top ally of President Uribe) closely tied to the paramilitaries was released from jail after only four months. The prosecutor's office claimed a lack of sufficient evidence, but the likelihood that politics played a part in the inability/refusal to find enough evidence against him is pretty decent.

The LA Times article is also really worth checking out because it details the ways in which the U.S. under Bush has tacitly supported the paramilitaries' killing of innocent civilians that it later labels "subversives" (much in the way the innocent in Brazilian favelas are invariably "traficantes" once they're dead) by sending over $4 billion dollars in military and economic aid to a government that, again, is repeatedly and closely tied to the paramiliary groups; the best defense a U.S. spokesman could offer in face of the statistics above was the tepid defense that "such numbers were only "examples among a wide variety of statistics" gathered by various civil society groups that monitor human rights in Colombia.". Again, it's worth checking out the article in full, and it offers some bitter reality-checks for those who think that, just because the FARC has recently suffered some significant setbacks both politically and morally, Colombia is heading towards peace.

A Colombia Follow-Up: FARC, Paramilitaries, and Cocaine in the Rural Areas

Following up on my observations and thoughts on Colombia the other day, today the NY Times has this article up on cocaine production and FARC/paramilitary violence in Colombia's rural areas. Suffice to say, despite Uribe's recent efforts to show how successful he's been against the FARC, it's far from a victory by any stretch of the imagination (even wingnut imaginations). The article offers is an important reality check on those who are getting overly hopeful for Colombia (something I fear I may have inadvertently taken place in by not qualifying enough how ambivalent my hope for Colombia is now; things still look better than they have in a long time, but that doesn't mean they are better).

In addition, Simon Romero, the article's author, brings up the drug trade and its ties to the struggle. I suggested that, even if the FARC were to disappear, there's no good reason to believe the cocaine production and the violence tied to it would drop, and the article seems to back that up: "while the FARC’s share of the cocaine trade has declined, Colombia’s share of the world cocaine production has remained stable at about 60 percent. That means opportunities for new players like Colombia’s resurgent right-wing militias [my italics] and small-scale armed gangs taking the place of disassembled cartels."

Which leads us to the U.S.'s involvement in Colombia. It's been repeated so often that it may sound like a tired argument, but it's worth repeating once again: the "War on Drugs" does not, cannot, and will not work as long as it focuses strictly on production. When fields are attacked, they are either quickly replanted and/or pushed into more remote regions where it's easier to conceal your production. Additionally, the U.S. has made no secret in its willingness to pump lots of money into Colombia to fight "terrorism" (and, since Bush became president, maintain one of its few friends in the region in the figure of Uribe). However, given how close some top-level Colombian officials are to the paramilitary groups, the tie of U.S. foreign aid to Colombia is not hard to follow. I have no doubt that some of the U.S. funds end up in the hands of Colombian paramilitaries who are directly involved in the drug trade. Thus, while the U.S. is on the one hand spending millions and millions of dollars to combat drug production in Colombia, it is at the same time offering money to governments (both present and past) that are in bed with paramilitaries who are increasingly producing drugs. And even the farmers who are simply growing cocaine for survival aren't ignornat peasants; they are finding new ways to produce, all while the demand in the United States (where almost all of Colombia's cocaine goes) does nothing to force them to turn to other, more legal crops. So the United States ends up throwing money away by trying to combat the production of cocaine, while failing to address issues of demand or even reconcile how they can tacitly (and perhaps covertly) support groups involved in the drug trade even while combatting the drug trade.

These two pictures of the continuing local violence in rural areas and drug production are indeed depressing, and serve as an important reminder of how far Colombia has to go. Do things look better than they have in a long time? Sure. Does that mean that they are even close to improving? Absolutely not. And it indicates how many other problems Colombia will face, even if the FARC were to collapse. So while we can be thrilled that hostages have been released and that FARC has sustained true losses, it is still, as Erik said, a group that is often little more than an organization of criminals and thugs. As depressing as it is, the problems Colombia is facing run far deeper than a "revolutionary" group involved in a 40+ year civil war, and the country is still far, far away from the day when these types of conflicts can come to a close.

Thoughts on Colombia, the FARC, and the Possibility of Hope

I agree with the majority of Erik's points below: that the FARC hasn't been anything more than a criminal organization hiding behind a thin veil of "ideology" for decades; that things are genuinely looking better than I could have hoped for in terms of civil conflict (and its potential end) in Colombia, and this shift has indeed been far more rapid than I could have imagined; and, regardless whether the FARC disappears or not, paramilitaries can, should, and need to be brought to justice, for they have been as involved as the FARC (if not moreso) in drug production and running and the murder of innocent civilians in the name of (stop me if this sounds familiar) "combatting terrorism."


That said, I think the hope still has to be somewhat guarded. First, the FARC isn't gone yet. As I've said before, the recent setbacks have been embarassing, and the deaths of major FARC leaders (including second-in-command Raul Reyes, Ivan Rios, and Manuel Marulanda Velez) are significant. That said, that doesn't mean some charismatic leader can't emerge or come out of nowhere to give the FARC new impetus. There are reasons to believe that FARC may very well be entering its death throes, but this isn't the first time that this outcome has seemed possible.

Another issue that of course will demand attention is what happens with the cocaine production. Both the FARC and paramilitary groups are closely tied to its production and sale in Colombia. Should the FARC be eliminated, I don't see cocaine production just dropping or disappearing. The demand is still out there globally, and there will certainly be others, be they members of the paramilitary groups or just standard drug-lords with no politics other than profit, who will want to fill the FARC's void (again, if there is a void ever). The possible end of the FARC does not mean an end to cocaine production or the violence tied to the industry, and the government will really have to work hard via social and economic programs to turn cocaine producers into productive units in other, more legal areas. Given how Colombia's presidents have acted in the past, I don't see a lot of reason to be hopeful of this.

Thirdly, as Erik alluded to, there is the issue of paramilitary groups. They are as awful and violent as the FARC in many regards, indiscriminately and often contemptuously killing innocent civilians and extracting payments from international companies via protection rackets, all in the name of the "war on terror" or "drug war" or in the name of combatting "subversives." Colombia has refused to deal with this issue, especially under Uribe, in part no doubt because both the current and past governments have been in bed with the paramilitaries via "unofficial" (and sometimes official) channels. Colombia needs to tackle the paramilitary issue as much as it does FARC. I have shards of hope that, were FARC to fade away, dealing with paramilitaries would be facilitated as human right organizations could deal more directly with paramilitary violence in ways similar (albeit in different contexts) to those campaigns in Chile and Argentina. Nonetheless, such hopes are indeed just glimmers without the promise of much coming of it, particularly given the close ties of multiple politicians, administration officials, and even presidents tied to the paramilitary groups directly or indirectly. Certainly, as time goes on things could change on this front, but right now, I see no real reason to believe the politicians will stand down on this issue and let the true issue of paramilitary action at all levels, illegal and governmental, come to light.

All this is not to belittle where things are right now. As Erik correctly pointed out, this is the most hopeful we can be about Colombia for a long time. Of particular interest is how Colombian politics might play out on the ideological level if the FARC were to all but die out. Would they be as beholden to the U.S.? Would Colombians start electing more centrist and leftist leaders? Would the rightighst politicians who are popular right now really be able to maintain their popularity in a political context where the opponent on whom they base their legitimacy no longer is a threat? There's no way of knowing now, because the FARC still is around, even if diminished for the time. Still, one can't help but think that maybe, after 40+ years of conflict and 25+ years of stagnant, useless violence that has torn the country apart, things are looking better than they have for awhile.

Hope in Colombia?

This is really more Trend's thing, but I thought I would comment briefly on the situation in Colombia. I've long had a list of countries that I thought would never get better--Haiti, Palestine, Congo, Somalia. And Colombia. The problems Colombia faces are so intractable that I thought it would take a miracle for the nation to normalize itself.

But perhaps that miracle is happening. The FARC has weakened signficantly in the last year, which I have occasionally commented upon. Although I usually support left-leaning Latin American movements, the FARC have been nothing but criminals for at least 25 years and have made any kind of real social reform in Colombia impossible. It was quite unlikely that Colombia could become a functioning nation with the FARC still active. But their decline, topped off by the rescue of Ingrid Betancourt and other prominent hostages two weeks ago, makes me feel hopeful.

Even if the FARC goes away though, the paramilitaries have to be brought to justice. My fear is that a right-wing victory in Colombia could lead to revenge killings by the paramilitaries and perhaps a purely military regime. But Colombian senator Carlos Garcia, a right-wing politician, was arrested on Friday for his ties to paramilitary groups. Garcia's case bears watching closely. If he is prosecuted for his crimes, and if the Uribe government can bring the paramilitary groups to justice, perhaps Colombia can become a functioning nation-state for the first time in several decades.

Would you care to add anything Trend?

More Evil Deeds from Banana Companies in Latin America

Following last year's lawsuit in Colombia, in which over 400 people sued Chiquita for supporting paramilitary troops, the families of 5 men in Panama have also sued Chiquita. They maintain that Chiquita paid the FARC to "protect its workers" (if you'll recall, Chiquita also admitted to paying AUC, the largest paramilitary group in Colombia, to "protect its workers"). The families maintain the FARC raided Panama, kidnapping 5 men and killing them. The lawsuit maintains that Chiquita should be held partially responsible, as they paid the FARC (which the United States government has categorized as a terrorist group) and the FARC was responsible for these deeds.

Given the recent ruling in favor of Dole, I find it unlikely Chiquita will be held responsible or have to pay anything. Chiquita already has been ordered to pay a $25 million (with an m) fine for supporting the AUC, but the lawsuit of the 400 families hasn't been settled yet. I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if a judge ruled that the evidence tying FARC's murder of these 5 men to the Chiquita payments was not enough or that Chiquita had already paid enough, but I could be wrong. The plaintiff's use of antiterrorism laws to try to prosecute Chiquita in the civil court is definitely an interesting approach that would probably not have existed in a pre-2001 context. Still, I imagine this will get thrown out, and once again, a banana company will not have to suffer the consequences for its unethical support of and payment to groups from both the left and right that commit crimes against the regular populations of multiple countries, all in the name of "protection" of its own interests.

Colombian Families Sue Chiquita for Funding Terrorism

Banana companies in Latin America have never behaved, to put it mildly. However, the Chiquita company seemed to reach a new low in its relations with Latin America, as earlier this year a court ordered the company to pay a $25 million fine for paying the Colombian terrorist paramilitary organization AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia). AUC, one of the largest paramilitary groups in Colombia, is also one its grosser human-rights violators, having killed thousands of peasants and "leftists" in Colombia's civil war. In the case this year, the courts ruled against Chiquita when it became clear that the fruit company had paid $1.7 million to AUC between 1997 and 2004 for what Chiquita claimed was coerced "protection." The word "protection" itself seems to have taken on a new meaning in this case, though, for Chiquita used the AUC to try to gain even more land for banana production in Colombia, using the AUC to force out poor farmers via eviction or, where there was justified resistance, murder. Colombia was shocked, SHOCKED! to find multinational big business in bed with the paramilitaries (President Álvaro Uribe didn't seem so bothered, though, given the steps he took at the time of the ruling).

Now, almost 400 family members of victims of the AUC have filed a civil suit against Chiquita, seeking $7.86 billion in damages (a fee that seems much fairer for sponsoring terrorism, widespread human rights violations, and murder than the $25 million court ruling). I don't know enough about civil cases (especially those involving multinationals) to predict how a case like this would work out. It strikes me that the $7.86 billion wouldn't actually be the final figure if the Colombian civilians won, but any major (hundreds-of-millions to billion) decision would be meaningful, I think. Chiquita really has to be punished severely for this, and given its enormous profits from its domination in the fruit sector, $25 million, while real money to you and me, is probably no more than a slap on the wrist for the company. One especially wants to see Chiquita bled dry in the face of their attitude towards this whole episode. Chiquita spokesman Michael Mitchell defended the company, claiming in the Times piece "that Chiquita and its employees were victims and that the actions taken by the company were always motivated to protect the lives of our employees and their families.”

Memo to Mitchell: when hundreds of people end up dead or dislocated thanks to your funding of a true terrorist group, you aren't the victim. Here's hoping Chiquita pays very VERY dearly for this.

The Continued Refusal to Deal with Colombia's Paramilitary Forces

In the wake of the recent positive development involving heavy fines for Chiquita for paying paramilitaries for protection, the efforts to curb Colombia's paramilitary groups has suffered another setback. President Álvaro Uribe's administration rejected a leaked CIA report that ties Colombia's right-wing paramilitary groups directly to army chief Gen. Mario Montoya. Uribe's administration, which recently won re-election in a fiercely contested election, has faced myriad problems as strong ties between ranking members of his administration and the paramilitary groups have become clearer.

Uribe could do the right thing and fire those involved, disavowing himself of anybody who supports these terrorist groups that patrol Colombia's rural areas and often kill indiscriminately in the name of tracking "subversives". Instead, though, he continues to refuse what is becoming increasingly clear, and what many have suspected since the strong rise of the paramilitaries since at least the 1980s: the Colombian state, through its material, economic, and moral support of the paramilitary groups, has waged state-sponsored terror, killing indiscriminately in the name of trying to subdue the revolutionary group FARC's 40-year guerrilla war.

Instead of taking real steps towards an actual resolution to this conflict, he has stubbornly dug his heels in, refusing what even the courts are now acknowledging somewhat in the trials and testimonies of paramilitaries: that the Colombian government and the paramilitaries are in the same bed. If he really wanted to see an end to the useless violence and to find a peaceful solution to the 40+-year struggle in Colombia, then he wouldn't talk about the need for the "courts to do their jobs". He could take the initiative, disavow any and all such activities and those involved with them, and move towards peace. Unfortunately, Uribe's refusal of the increasingly open facts would seem to indicate that we will have to continue waiting for a real leader in Colombia who will not only say he or she wants peace; he or she will actually work for it every chance they get.