Around Latin America

-Many are aware that Colombia has been in a civil war for 40+ years, but the ongoing process of electoral processes sometimes obscures just how violent Colombia still is. In the last 8 years (2002-2010), 20,915 people in Colombia have died as a direct result of its ongoing war. Stop and think about that: 20,915 people. That's nearly 18,000 more than those the Pinochet regime killed in 17 years; that's 10,000 more than the number of people killed in Brazil's favelas in twelve years. That's a depressing but important reminder that the war in Colombia is ongoing, it is real, and is still extremely violent.
-In Uruguay, former foreign minister Juan Carlos Blanco (who served during Uruguay's dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s) was sentenced to twenty years in prison for his role in the disappearance of a Venezuelan teacher in 1976, marking yet another victory against dictatorship-era officials in Uruguay.

-In neighboring Paraguay, the government has imposed a 30-day state of emergency to combat an armed leftist group operating out of the country's north. The group, Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo, has launched attacks on government buildings and police stations, and a recent attack left four people dead. Among other things, the 30-day state of emergency will allow the Paraguayan government todetain suspects and ban public meetings in the five provinces affected.

-Paraguay is not alone in facing a governmental crisis. In Nicaragua, a showdown between the judiciary and Daniel Ortega is intensifying, after two judges refused to resign in the face of Daniel Ortega's questionable use of an allegedly-expired law, leading to an increasingly uncertain situation in Nicaragua. As Greg points out, it's not a question of leftism; many view Ortega's move as an increasing tendency towards dictatorship, with one critic going so far as to declare that Nicaragua had gone "From Somocismo without Somoza to Somocismo with Ortega."

-Honduras has established a truth commission to look into the coup of last June. However, the commission is already off to a rocky start, with criticisms coming from all sides (including the suggestion of an "alternative truth commission" from non-pro-government individuals). Among the more problematic aspects of the commission: a leading member of the commission's formation declared the report would be archived for 10 years upon completion, meaning nobody would see the commission's findings for ten years. As the good folks over at Honduras Culture and Politics put it, this is effectively an effort to "hide the truth for ten years."

-Evo Morales has offended Brazilian farmers after the Bolivian president declared that eating chicken reduced masculinity and could lead to homosexuality. The claims are silly but fairly unimportant in terms of evaluating Morales's political agenda (though it does say something about societal views of homosexuality and homophobia in Bolivia). Still, given how much agriculture Brazil produces and supplies to the rest of Latin America, including Bolivia, I wouldn't really want to actively alienate any major food producer in Brazil.

-Finally, in doubly-depressing daily news out of Brazil: a 24-year-old housewife was lynched in Rio de Janeiro state yesterday after she ran over a pregnant woman while driving drunk. While the pregnant woman survived, the baby was lost, and in anger, a crowd gathered and shot the housewife. Certainly, drunk driving is not acceptable, but the crowd's response is far more unacceptable.

Around Latin America

-In a particularly tragic story, sixteen teenagers were shot and killed in Juarez this past week. The news has barely made a ripple in the United States, even though the casualties are greater than, say, Bloody Sunday, serving as a sad reminder not only of how horrible the violence in Juarez has gotten, but how immune the United States seems to be to what is going on just south of it's border.

-Rightist billionaire and Chilean president-elect Sebastian Piñera won the presidential run-off in mid-January. While he doesn't take office until March 11, some of his suggested policies and decisions are already raising eyebrows. As Greg points out, Piñera's desire to redirect money from copper away from the military budget indicates a growing willingness not just on the left, but on the right, to use Chile's income from copper in other ways, and the fact that a right-wing politician sympathetic to the economic policies of Pinochet has adopted this stance may mean the military will have to "come around" to the reality that it won't be getting as much funding from Chile's copper industry as it has grown accustomed to receiving. More troubling to many inside and outside of Chile, Piñera has also refused to divest of some of his financial properties while in office, leading some to ask if he isn't exposing himself to a conflict of interests between his financial holdings and his duties as president. This, on top of his profession that he thought the neoliberal policies under the Pinochet regime were the type of policies he would pursue, have many worried about his economic impact on Chile even before he takes office. Beyond that, it's worth noting that his brother appears to be the Chilean version of Billy Carter (and yes, that cake does look like what you think it looks like).

-In Peru, 41 military officers and soldiers have gone on trial for human rights violations for their roles in the murder of eight civilians in 1989. Although the trial is important for bringing justice, it also has become of political importance, as president Alan Garcia (who was also president from 1985-1990) tried to remove one of the officers from beyond the court's reach by giving him high-end political appointments. The trial, its timing (during Garcia's first administration), and Garcia's efforts to gain impunity for at least some of the officers raises important questions about Garcia's role in the violation of human rights during his administration, questions that are not and should not go away any time soon.

-Among the many victims of Colombia's never-ending civil war, the displaced are oft-forgotten. Many poor and small-landholders have lost their homes and lands, and wealthy families have swooped in to take it and then receive farm subsidies from the Uribe administration, serving as a powerful reminder of the fact that gross social inequalities and questionable political alliances are one of the biggest travesties of the Uribe administration.

-Lula continues to rely on hydroelectric dams for Brazil's future power sources. It just allowed the controversial Belo Monte dam on the Amazon river to proceed, in spite of opposition from environmentalists and residents in the Amazonian basin. With his term coming to an end this year, there will be many reasons to look back on Lula's administration and point at the positive things he accomplished; however, it already seems that his environmental policy may be one of the blackest marks on his administration, and the Belo Monte serves as just another strike against Lula on the environmental front.

-A European spaceport in French Guiana may be "booming," but it's isolating and alienating many French Guianans.

-Speaking of Europeans' presence in Latin America, though it seems unlikely to come to fruition this time, Russia has begun exploring the possibility of helping construct a canal through Nicaragua to connect the Atlantic and Pacific. Nicaragua has been the center of such talks since the early-1800s, so it's not clear why this time it will come to fruition. Nonetheless, it makes an interesting story, and if Russia goes through with helping Nicaragua finally construct a canal, there will probably be all kinds of hand-wringing among politicians in the United States.

-Evo Morales is not only interested in creating greater socio-economic and ethnic equality in Bolivia; he's also interested in opening up opportunities for women, a fact recently demonstrated in his appointments for cabinet: 10 of the 20 positions were filled by women, a first for Bolivia (and for many other countries in the world).

Brazil and Spain Express Concern over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia

Brazil and Spain Express Concern Over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia
The recent agreement to put more U.S. troops in Colombia is raising concerns beyond just Venezuela:

Spain’s Miguel Angel Moratinos and Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim expressed their reservations about the effects the military program could have at a press conference within the framework of the Spanish official’s visit to Brazil.

The two ministers also called for dialogue between Venezuela and Colombia and agreed to work “to avoid a spiral of misunderstandings” between those two countries.

This is a good diplomatic move that gives greater weight to regional concerns than Chavez's opposition alone could ever achieve. However, I don't know how much it will actually accomplish.

To be clear, I think the U.S.'s decision is a bad one, for a number of reasons. The "war on drugs" is pretty ineffective in its focus on the supply side rather than the demand side, and basing more troops in Colombia isn't going to solve this problem. What is more, it is clear that this will add to regional suspicion and tension in South America. While Obama's diplomatic efforts in the hemisphere thus far have been admirable in comparison to past administrations (dating to about, oh, 1848), the presence of more U.S. troops on any country's soil is a legitimate cause for concern, regardless of who is president of the United States. For these reasons, I think it's important that Brazil and Spain, who are far from antagonistic towards the U.S., raise these concerns. Again, I'm not sure it will result in any real change in the decision to move troops to Colombia when the Ecuadoran bases close (rather than, you know, having the troops actually come back to the U.S. when the bases close). But Brazil's and Spain's questions and objections should at least make the U.S. stop and take notice, and give the opposition to such a move much greater legitimacy than Chavez's opposition alone could accomplish.

And, on a side note, can we please stop referring to Daniel Ortega as part of some "leftist" "alliance?" Firstly, as I've noted before, these notions in the American media of "leftist alliances" in Latin America are false and lazy. Just because countries are friendly with each other, or from relatively similar political ideologies, does not mean they are some new axis, and American journalists' inability to look at Latin America with a view that is more complex than "leftist" is just shameful. Secondly, and more directly related to Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega has hardly been "leftist." If you want to refer to the Sandinistas as leftist, fine - it's still probably a lazy categorization on the part of the media, but at least it's fairly accurate. But when the actual major "leftist" political group in a country disowns the president as not representing leftist goals, ideals, and missions, could we at least respect that country's political spectrum, and agree that just because a leader isn't as "conservative" as America would like does not mean he/she's some radical "leftist" political force?

Chile, Panama Lead Latin America in Incarceration Rates; Brazil Still Has Highest Total Number

While not as high as the U.S., a recent study has shown that Chile and Panama have the highest rates of imprisoned among their populations, with rates of 310 and 275 per 100,000, respectively. And I admit, I was somewhat surprised - I had expected Brazil to be higher (though it is fifth, with 226 per 100,000, behind El Salvador and Uruguay). On the other end of the spectrum, Bolivia has the lowest rates (85 per 100,000), followed by Guatemala (88), Paraguay (100), Ecuador (118), and Nicaragua (120).

Of course, extrapolating that data to actual population stats, Brazil's prison population is quantitatively higher than any other country in Latin America. What's more, statistics don't reveal the appalling conditions of Brazilian prisons (or elsewhere - I can't help but think that, with overcrowding going well above 120%, Panamanian prisons are also in bad shape). The report also makes several other observations that should be common sense, but still need to be said: that the crime rates are due to socio-economic factors like wide gaps between wealthy and poor, and not to a breakdown in societal morals; or that the death penalty (used in Guatemala and the U.S.) does not deter violent crime. I don't know if this report will accomplish any real change, but it does highlight the problems facing many countries in how to deal with crime, the appalling conditions many prisoners are facing, and the need to push hard for basic human rights for prisoners, too, no matter how heinous the crime.

Around Latin America

-Brazil is going to resume construction on its third nuclear power plant this September. Construction had originally halted on Angra 3 in 1986 after environmental groups and media reports led to the shutdown. In explaining the return to construction 23 years later, state-run Electronuclear president said "Our nuclear program will not be as spectacular as those of China or India, but we will have a moderate and constant growth from Angra 3 on." The timing of the decision is strange - Brazil has been facing growing power concerns, but it has found ways to address those (see the next story), and the option for wind energy remains undeveloped in Brazil. However, the "from Angra 3 on" suggests Electronuclear plans to continue developing nuclear power plants beyond Angra 3, and while it may be nothing, I find the reference to China and India interesting. There's nothing to say this is the case, but I wonder if the decision to return to Angra 3 after 23 years is in part based on fears of falling too far behind other emerging world powers in Brazil's own quest to become a global leader.


-I commented last time that Brazil and Paraguay had reached an agreement on the power supplied by the Itaipu dam. Apparently, that deal is based on the agreement that Brazil will be paying triple what it had been paying to Paraguay for Paraguay's excess energy, as well as helping Paraguay develop infrastructure for the smaller country's own needs. As for who wins in this, I agree with Boz: both Lula and Lugo come away winners, especially Lugo.


-For those who get worked up in a froth over the sheer fact that illegal immigration can happen, there is this tragic reminder that many times, illegal immigration happens to reunite families. Not that the "family values" party would ever stop to consider the irreconcilability of fierce anti-immigration and so-called family values (which, to be fair, they clearly only spout for Machiavellian purposes without ever practicing what they preach).


-Apparently, it has gotten increasingly difficult to find a movie theater in Guyana over the past couple of decades (though I doubt the inability to see the latest Hollywood blockbuster " has in some way resulted in the decay today of the current moral fibre" of Guyana, as the author ponders).


-Greg found some mystifying data suggesting that Bolivians and Hondurans feared military coups the most in 2008, with 36% and 29% respectively believing their countries were heading towards coups. Strangely, Chile came in with 11%, as did Costa Rica, which doesn't even have a military.


-Greg also does an excellent, concise job in pointing out the ridiculous-ness of the charges from the left and the right against Obama in dealing with the Honduras crisis. To quote Greg:

It has become almost a political game to determine who is influencing Barack Obama with regard to Honduras. It can be tough to keep track.

• He is being influenced by Clintonites to support Zelaya.


• He is being influenced by Clintonites to oppose Zelaya.


• He is being influenced by The Empire to oppose Zelaya.


• He is plotting with the UN to support Zelaya.


• He was duped by Bush administration officials while in Russia to oppose Zelaya.

Heh. Indeed.


-An interesting new study says that climate change allowed the Incas to build Machu Picchu, as a receding treeline created more space for farming, cultivation, sculpting steppes, and building the roads that allowed them to reach Machu Picchu. I don't know if the science is accurate or not, but it's an interesting suggestion. (And I'd be worried about wingnuts in the U.S. pointing to this as evidence that the current environmental crisis we're facing is good, but that would require them to both look outside of the U.S. and acknowledge the genius of pre-Contact non-European civilizations, and that doesn't seem too likely).


-There's been a lot of hubbub and misunderstanding over Zelaya's stance on re-election (once again: he wasn't seeking it for himself, and it wasn't for this election; he was overthrown because he wanted a vote to determine whether the Honduran population could decide in the next election if they wanted to allow re-election or not). However, Alvaro Uribe continues to show far more anti-democratic tendencies than Zelaya. Uribe has postponed until September his decision on whether or not to run for re-re-election. No word yet on whether the military is planning on overthrowing him, too, or if the Republicans will be able to defend the coup in Colombia.


-Daniel Ortega could be taking the Uribe-path, too, as he is considering removing term limits in Nicaragua, conveniently enough so that he could possibly be re-elected. Sounds like it's time for another coup*.


-Speaking of Nicaragua, the total ban on abortion has had about all the effects one would expect, "endangering the lives of girls and women, denying them life-saving treatment, preventing health professionals from practicing effective medicine and contributing to an increase in maternal deaths across the country."


-While relatively under the radar, things are getting tense in the northern part of South America. FARC guerrillas were discovered having Swedish weapons, including surface-to-air missile launchers, weapons which Sweden said it sold to Venezuela. Sweden and Colombia are demanding an explanation, while Venezuela is saying that the allegations are lies meant to harm Venezuela and to justify Colombia's recent agreement to allow more U.S. troops in Colombia. And tonight Venezuela has cut diplomatic ties with Colombia over the allegations. While relations between Colombia and Venezuela are often full of bluster and posturing, this seems like it could become fairly serious.


-Finally, I've mentioned before the environmentally appalling conditions and devastating consequences of salmon farming in Chile. In spite of a claim that the Chilean government would try to reducethe use of antibiotics in salmon production, things continue to be depressingly grim, as a report has been issued that says that Chile uses more than 350 times the antibiotics in its fish that rival Norway uses in its salmon production. I fortunately don't eat salmon, but if I did, reports like this would convince me pretty quickly to abandon that habit.




*Sarcasm

The Right Country

How do I know that Nicaragua is a good country for me?

One reason is this--what the 2 of us bought for $8
4 mojitos
2 beers (crappy to be sure, but it is Central America, where beer went to die)
1 serving of quite tasty bean dip

My 4th of July

I spent the day on a Nicaraguan beach, reading Joan Didion´s Play It As Is Lays. Definitely more interesting than fireworks, although thanks to a wedding celebration that night, I actually did see some fireworks.

But I also thought about what the great ol´USA has done to Nicaragua over the years. What is the greatest moment? Recognizing the ¨government¨of William Walker when he took the country over briefly in 1856 and reinstituted slavery (another black mark against the Pierce Administration)? The government allowing banana companies to dominate the nation for decades, including a 2 decade Marine invasion to protect banana interests and fight the rag tag forces led by Augusto Sandino? Supporting the Somoza government for 4 decades? Creating the Contras in the 1980s to undermine the Sandinista revolution in the 1980s? W openly threatening Nicaragua when Daniel Ortega was running for president in the 2000s?

Land of the free and home of the brave indeed.

Discussing Latin America (II): Where is Nicaragua Headed? Part Two

Several days ago, Mr. Trend pointed out a couple contrasting interpretations about Nicaragua's economic future from Foreign Policy and World Focus. I won't rehash what was already said in the previous post, but I do want to make a few observations. 

First, the Foreign Policy article really has nothing useful to say about Nicaragua's future. The comparison with Iceland, as pointed out in the comments in the previous post, is absurd. Iceland is an industrialized nation with major connections to the global economy. The financial collapse in Iceland could not even possibly take place in Nicaragua largely because of the nature of Nicaraguan economy. Nicaragua is already incredibly poor, right up there with Haiti as one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere. The connection between the health of financial institutions and the well being of most Nicaraguans is fairly tenuous; any collapse of financial institutions in Nicaragua would have an impact on the daily lives of people, but since they are so close to subsistence levels as of now, it is hard for me to imagine how a collapse would in any way be comparable to what happened in Iceland. 

Moreover, the reasons why Nicaragua's economy might be on the verge of collapse as stated by Foreign Policy make little sense. They first suggest a drop in remittances from the U.S. will affect the Nicaraguan economy. While the role of remittances from the US to Nicaragua does matter to a certain extent, it is much smaller than in other countries such as Mexico and El Salvador. There just aren't that many Nicaraguans living in the U.S. compared to other Latin American populations. Nicaragua also depends a lot on remittances from Costa Rica, so the extent to which the U.S. financial crisis affects the Costa Rican economy will matter just as much for the health of Nicaragua's. Maybe Mr. Trend has some insight on how Costa Rica is doing economically? I really have no idea. 

Foreign Policy also points out the fall in coffee prices as a sign of pending financial ruin in Nicaragua. Please. First off, Nicaragua exports other agricultural goods, as well as textiles and apparel. The economy is not completely dependent on coffee prices. Second, the fluctuations in coffee prices is basically a constant throughout Central American history. While they have an impact, governments and economies do not rise and fall with the price of coffee.

The World Focus piece seems a little over optimistic and sugar coats a lot, but I do tend to agree Nicaragua has the potential to grow economically. However, the key word here is 'potential.' What the article does not mention (because it primarily focuses on just Managua) is that there is a major lack of basic infrastructure in Nicaragua. This lack of infrastructure, such as paved roads, sewage, water, electricity, and development of  communications networks, is a major stumbling block for encouraging capitalist investment in the country. Tourist infrastructure is still fairly basic, and nonexistent in many parts of the country. As a result, tourism is likely to remain limited to those who enjoy a more rustic experience. 

The other major stumbling block is the political situation, and I don't mean just Ortega. Political and legal institutions are generally not respected, and have been in a constant state of flux since 1990. From an foreign investment standpoint, the fluidity of the rule of law may not be particularly attractive since the political situation is unpredictable. 

I want to make clear that my particular criticisms of the Nicaraguan economy and the state, are not a result of anything unique to Daniel Ortega, or the Sandinistas more generally. These are historical problems that I would argue go back to the beginning of the 20th century, and maybe before. Generally, I think recent governments, including Ortega's, have been making attempts to promote economic growth, but the problems they face are so huge that its hard to be optimistic about anything that happens in the short term.

Discussing Latin America (II): Which Way Is Nicaragua Headed?

Last week, the Latin Americanist put up two conflicting articles on Nicaragua. On the one hand, Foreign Policy suggested that Nicaragua was one of five countries that could be "the next Iceland" (i.e., go bankrupt), saying remittances from the to Nicaragua, which play a major role in the Nicaraguan economy, will probably drop, perhaps drastically. This drop would accompany a drop in coffee exports, one of Nicaragua's major sources of income in the international market, as prices drop off in the face of a global depression (this is nothing new - Brazil was similarly hit in the 1930s, and Costa Rica and others were ravaged in the 1970s and early 1980s. Incidentally, in the case of Costa Rica, the collapse in the coffee economy actually played a major role in the development of eco-tourism as an alternate source of national income, a hugely successful policy that is still keeping that country stable even today). Finally, Foreign Policy argues that Ortega's increasingly authoritarian rule is isolating foreign partners, leading to reduced international aid for and investment in Nicaragua under Ortega.

On the other hand, World Focus foresees Nicaragua on the verge of great economic success. In the video, it reports that anti-Americanism has declined, leading to a growth in tourism. It also suggests that Ortega has taken a pro-business stance that has helped the economy to grow, and that while there is political opposition, the economy is ready to boom because of the increased business opportunities for foreign investment and a rise in tourism.

Clearly, these are two diametrically opposed stances. I asked Yann about this, and he will have more to say later, but I wanted to comment on a few things (though I will defer to his expertise on Nicaragua, which is much greater than mine). I suspect it falls somewhere between the two. I really don't see any evidence that Nicaragua's government is about to go bankrupt, for a couple of reasons. First, from what I can see, there's just no evidence that it's on a major economic precipice. Secondly, it goes without saying that Iceland's particular conditions and contexts are different from Nicaragua's. I can't see any current or historical reasons or evidence to believe that, if Nicaragua were to really flounder economically, organizations like the IMF or the World Bank wouldn't be ready to swoop in with more loans that Ortega very well may take. After all, the U.S. has had economic interests in Nicaragua for well over one hundred and fifty years. Yes, the U.S. has withdrawn aid due to Ortega's actions, but we've never had a problem looking the other way in the past when it was to our financial or political interests.

That said, I don't think Nicaragua's really ready to boom, either. Ortega can make all of the pro-business pitches he wants, but the fact that the U.S. and the European Union are witholding aid are important. Businesses may be investing in Nicaragua, and that could set off some of the aid withdrawal, but not all. What is more, the World Press article seems to put a lot of faith on the importance of tourism and ex-pats, which would be fine if we weren't in the midst of a global recession with no sign of exiting anytime soon. But we are, and one of the first things that goes when recessions hit globally is tourism. Certainly, some people who would have like to go to Asia or Africa or some expensive vacation may opt for Nicaragua instead, but I don't think that would be a very significant number of people. And the evidence for an inexpensive lifestyle seems deceptive, as the report only cites an American ex-pat who comments, "I can afford it. I can live the good life on a postal pension." That's fine, but that says more about borderline colonialist and exploitative mentalities than it does about the general cost of living for Nicaraguans themselves, many of whom remain in poverty despite government programs designed to finally help Nicaragua's poor.

In short, it will be interesting to see where Nicaragua goes, but it's as interesting to see how two respected journalistic sources could come to opposite conclusions on this issue. Again, I think it's somewhere in the middle - Nicaragua is neither about to experience a full-blown collapse, nor is it about to enter a new golden age. Political repression under Ortega is a real problem. And while he may be making strides to help the poor, his human rights record is far from good, and claims that he wants "equality for all" are hard to swallow when one considershis stance towards women's rights). If push came to shove, I'd probably have to say Nicaragua is facing an uphill climb, simply because there are few countries in the global economy right now that aren't facing an uphill climb, but I could be wrong. I look forward to Yann's comments on this.

Discussing Latin America - A (Very Belated) Response on Political Parties

Awhile back, Yann and I discussed the nature of political parties whose identities were rooted in a particular historical figure. I originally pondered the roles of figures like Augusto Sandino, Farabundo Martí, and Juan Peron might have had in current party politics in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina, respectively. Yann had some really great thoughts, particularly in regards to efforts to re-interpret past national figures into current worldviews of national and global politics in Latin America. These figures can remain controversial, as with Sandino ("Whether or not Sandino was an anti-imperialist hero, or a criminal lunatic is still very much a debate in Nicaragua"), but Yann argued strongly that my exclusion of Bolivar was perhaps misplaced, as Chavez has attempted to re-interpret Bolivar as one of the original "anti-imperialists." While I think (and I believe Yann agreed) that Bolivar differed from a Marti or Sandino in that Bolivar is still a part of the nationally-accepted myth of Venezuela when compared to Sandino or Marti, I agree that, in light of Chavez's efforts to re-interpret Bolivar, we can lump him in with the other two.

However, I want to actually address the issue of Peronism. Yann suggested that Peronism was the outlier from these groups/parties, as he founded the party that became central to national political contestation, rather than serving as a model for future parties, a la the Sandinistas' uyse of Sandino and the FMLN's use of Marti. Yann went on to suggest that we could therefore consider Peron closer to Chavez or Castro in that their parties were "formed around charismatic individuals."

I agree in that sense, but I think we shouldn't necessarily overstate that differentiation, either. In terms of party creation, I completely agree. However, I think there are important similarities between Peronism and the Sandinistas as they currently exist. Peron has been dead for nearly 40 years now, and his two administrations (1946-1955 and for 9 months, from 1973 to his death in 1974) had radically different legacies. Peron certainly was never a left-wing leader, but historically he was probably one of the most "populist" leaders of Latin America. In spite of his efforts at top-down control, the workers' movement developed strongly under Peron, and in many ways used and developed further Peron's fight for causes that often are (probably rightfully) considered "left," including labor rights, more equal wealth distribution, greater control and profit from laborers' efforts, etc. With Peron out of the country for 18 years, this leftward shift among many in the Peronist party happened without having Peron be able to directly counter them or divulge his true beliefs on these issues. At the same time, more conservative sectors that were drawn to his top-down (and even borderline authoritarian) control of the movement and social change, as well as his more fascistic sympathies, seemed justified in their beliefs of what Peronism was when he returned in 1973, far more right-wing in his campaign, brief administration, and attitudes than many portions of his own party. In short, Peron was able to represent, in his words, deeds, and ideas, many different things to different groups, and none of those groups was completely "wrong" or "right." (And this isn't even to consider those who hated and stood against Peron from start to finish).

All this is to say that I think Peronism and Peron doesn't represent a complete break from the divisive role Sandino and Marti had in their own countries. Yes, Peron formed his namesake party, and Sandino and Marti did not. However, the image of Peron was a divisive one almost from the start, not just among his party and other parties in Argentina, but within the party itself, and his absence for 18 years only exacerbated these divisions. You still see this today - the Peronists are still deeply divided and torn over the role they should take, a division made even deeper by the military's "Dirty War" of 1976-1983 and the presidency of Carlos Menem, a Peronist who drove Argentina to economic collapse with his extreme neoliberalism while opening old wounds by pardoning convicted war criminals from the dictatorship.

As one final note here, I agree with Yann that Chavez has the potential to be similar to Peron down the line. I would also add Lula to this mix. The PT is completely Lula - he was one of its founders, he has been its main leader and spokesperson since its formation in the early 1980s as Brazil's dictatorship opened, and he has been its only presidential candidate in Brazil's 5 post-dictatorship elections (the failed elections of 1989, 1994, 1998, as well as the victory of 2002 and re-election in 2006). Come 2010, Lula's term is up, and the PT is facing the first post-Lula election of its existence. As Yann cautioned, it is too soon to say for sure if Lula (or Chavez, or Castro) will end up having the same effect as Peron on their parties. The PT in 2010 will be aided in no small part that Lula is still alive, and can make clear which direction he thinks the party should go. Still, he faces a difficult challenge, as divisions among middle-class intellectuals and ideologues vs. workers and politicians seeking more practical demands have emerged. Indeed, Lula's own administration has jaded many of his more intellectually leftist supporters, who felt he abandoned the true "revolutionary" cause when he actually had to navigate real political channels (in this regard, I have little sympathy for such ideologues, I openly admit). I'm certainly not saying the PT will end up going down the same road as Peron's Partido Justicialista, and I would be amazed to see Lula end up doing a massive rightward shift, both for ideological and historically contextual reasons. Still, I think that, as with Chavez and Castro, it will be very interesting to see how the PT functions in a post-Lula road, and Peronism will more likely than not serve as a fascinating and important point of comparison and contrast.

Discussing Latin America, Part 2 - The role of iconic figures in political party conflict

Mr. Trend raises an important question in  Part 1 of this post related to understanding political parties in a number of Latin American countries.

Among the political parties mentioned in the previous post, I think there are some important distinctions that need to be made in how the symbolic figure becomes adopted. Among the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador, both parties were attempting to recover a national history that was somewhat lost or hidden through the iconic use of Nicaragua's Augusto César Sandino and El Salvador's Farabundo Martí. What sets these two parties apart from others is that the importance of these two individuals as national figures is still hotly contested in both countries (at least I think this is the case in El Salvador). Whether or not Sandino was an anti-imperialist hero, or a criminal lunatic is still very much a debate in Nicaragua. 

Both the Sandinistas and the FMLN were in some sense attempting to reinterpret the historical narrative in their respective countries, which is much different than say the use of José Martí in Cuba or Bolívar in Venezuela. My sense of the use of José Martí and Bolívar is that these two figures were, and remain so, national icons used to give nationalist legitimacy to a movement. There was not a conflict over the importance of these two figures to each country's national history as exists in Nicaragua and El Salvador. 

Mr. Trend suggests that Bolívar does not belong in this category, but I think it is an interesting case that does belong here. There has been an attempt by Hugo Chávez to reinterpret Bolívar as an anti-imperialist hero, and sort of whitewash his more unsavory characteristics. What is going on there is somewhat similar to how the Sandinistas chose to present Sandino during the Nicaraguan Revolution. Sandino's thought was collected in ways by Sandinista leaders to present a very narrow portrait of the man that would serve the Revolution's interests. Chávez is doing something similar by issuing collections of Bolívar's thought that highlight his thought in ways that serve the Bolivarian Revolution, but ignore some of the more anti-democratic and aristocratic tendencies of Bolívar. However, this use of Bolívar is not quite comparable to Nicaragua and El Salvador, because both sides in Venezuela accept Bolívar as a national icon. Anti-chavistas oppose Chávez' use of Bolívar for political ends, but not his place in Venezuelan history. 

As for Perón, I'm not sure I would lump his Justicialist Party (PJ) in with the other cases, since it was Perón himself who formed the party. There is a fairly decent sized literature in political science on political parties formed around charismatic individuals (which maybe I will delve into in future posts?) that sets these types of parties apart from others on a number of organizational and ideological dimensions. I am somewhat familiar with the effect his leadership had on the future of the party, but I'm not familiar with the current status of Peron as a myth or national icon in Argentina. Does it cross party lines, or is he more seen as a symbol to supporters of the PJ rather than to all Argentines?

Thinking about parties formed around charismatic individuals, my sense is that we would be better off comparing Perón to Chávez, and possibly to Fidel Castro in Cuba and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and his foundation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico. This comparison would be somewhat difficult because we haven't been able to observe a post-Chávez party or a post-Castro party, but the consequences for these political parties is likely to be distinct due to their foundational characteristics in ways unlike the FMLN or the Sandinistas.

In short, what I am suggesting from all of this in response to Mr. Trend's question is some form of conceptual typology to look at the consequences particular individuals have on political parties. I think we could look at these parties along three lines:

1) The use of contested national symbols (i.e. Farabundo Martí and Sandino)

2)The use of accepted national symbols (i.e. José Martí and Bolívar)

3)Parties formed around charismatic individuals (i.e. Perón, Chávez, Castro)

This typology allows for one party to fit in multiple categories, but I think it makes more sense to look at these parties in this way, rather than in a sort of holistic comparison of political parties across countries. 

Discussing Latin America - Political Parties in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Argentina

I was already thinking about Yann's post about Nicaragua's municipal elections from last week, and it, combined with a story at the New York Times about the divisions among current and former Sandinistas who are fighting over the role of the party, raised an interesting set of questions for me. Basically, those two posts/articles got me thinking about political movements/parties based on the "icon-ization" of a particular figure/hero/leader. I've been trying to figure out exactly what role(s) such a figure might have on political parties and party identities, how the timelines of mythification and division over the hero's supposed "vision" (which is often contested among the individual's followers) play out, etc.

In thinking about this, I was able to come up with three countries off the top of my head to whom this political scenario applied currently or in the past: Nicaragua with the Sandinistas; Argentina with Peronism; and El Salvador, with the Frente Farabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional (FMLN).

In addition to these three countries with current political parties based on a single figure, there was also the case of Cuba with Jose Marti, but I think that, while Marti was particularly important to daily politics in pre-1959 Cuba, the ways in which Fidel has shaped Cuba over the past 50 years have resulted in Cuba being an outlier from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Argentina - there just isn't a struggle over Marti's thought in political life in Cuba today. It seemed possible that Venezuela could apply to this, as well, but I wasn't really sure it did merit a comparison to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina (though further discussion may convince me it does). I didn't think it was in the same category because Chavez's "Bolivarian project" doesn't seem on the surface to include much debate over what Bolivar "wanted" for Venezuela. Although Sandino, Marti, and Peron were/are all symbols, too, the use of Bolivar seems almost purely symbolic, rather than evoking an ideological debate over the meanings of his views.

Anyhow, in all of these efforts at comparisons and contrasts, while I know a decent bit about Argentina and Nicaragua, I know virtually nothing about the case of El Salvador and Farabundo Marti. I e-mailed Yann, asking him several questions for discussion, and we've decided to move the discussion to the blog. He and I will be addressing each other here on this particular question, but we invite others to please join in in the comments. We don't really have any expectations as to how long this will last - as long as the conversation is worth having, I guess. However, Yann and I hope that this is also the beginning of a series of dialogues over Latin America between Yann, myself, and others here at the blog, and that this series of "Latin American discussions" can perhaps even become a semi-permanent feature of the blog.

Nicaragua's 2008 Municipal Elections

On November 9th, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 municipalities. It seems these elections have somewhat gone under the radar, but there is a growing conflict over the results of those elections. The Sandinistas have claimed to have won in roughly 100 of those municipalities, although coming up with an exact number is still difficult at this point because official results have still not been released. On Tuesday, there were violent clashes between Sandinistas (FSLN) and Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) supporters in Managua, and last week there were a number of other conflicts between Sandinistas and Liberals in Managua, León, and Matagalpa.

The Washington Post on Sunday printed an editorial claiming that Daniel Ortega, the current President, is attempting to consolidate a dictatorship, although a number of the claims in this article have been refuted by the Nicaragua Network, which I reprint here (this was sent out on their email list, and is unfortunately not on their website):

There were international observers at the Nov. 9 municipal elections from respected groups of officials from Latin American electoral councils. The three teams of high level experts reported seeing no instances of fraud.

The opposition should pursue its claims of fraud through the available legal mechanisms rather than exclusively in the media.

The integrity of Nicaragua's elections is insured, just as it is in the United States, by the presence in each polling place of each party's poll watchers who also witness the vote count.

US favored Managua mayoral candidate, Eduardo Montealegre, was not favored to win. An independent and respected polling company-CID Gallop-put him five points behind the FSLN candidate, former world boxing champ, Alexis Argüello, a week before the election.

While, sadly, there has been post-election violence on all sides, the right wing Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) initiated it, injuring several people including a Sandinista radio reporter who was stabbed and whose car was torched.

The Supreme Electoral Council is an independent branch of government. It has three Sandinista representatives, three PLC representatives, and the chairman is affiliated with no political party. It certified the results of the 2008 municipal elections.

Montealegre presented discrepancies in only two precincts out of 2,200 in Managua to support his claim of fraud.

An official recount in Managua confirmed the victory of the FSLN candidate Arguello.

It is unfortunate that this type of conflict is happening in Nicaragua, but not all that surprising as several months ago I suggested that an FSLN win would likely lead to more political unrest. It is important to place these elections in a context, which much of the reporting linked to above does not do. A lot of the problems that have come to a head in these elections are actually related to reforms from 1999-2000, commonly referred to as the PLC-FSLN Pact that was orchestrated by Ortega and former PLC President Arnoldo Alemán. As part of these reforms, the electoral law was changed to make it more difficult for smaller political parties to participate, although it was not all that restrictive compared to other Latin American electoral laws and has not really served until recently as a mechanism to block the participation of minor parties. Back in May, Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council banned the Sandinista Renovation Movement and the Conservative Party from participating in the municipal elections due to some violations of the electoral law. While both of these parties have very little electoral support in Nicaragua, it was a bad public relations move for Nicaragua's government, and it seems the requirements for political party participation were not evenly applied, as the minor Alternative for Change Party (AC) was allowed to participate in the municipal elections. Another major component of the 1999-2000 reforms was the partisan division of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) which divided the seats between FSLN and PLC supporters, and has since lost a lot of legitimacy as an institution in charge of running elections. Finally, as part of the reforms, the percentage of the vote needed to win the presidency was lowered, and was really the crucial factor in explaining why Daniel Ortega was able to win the 2006 Presidential elections with only 38% of the vote.

However, there are two factors that are not really talked about much in all the vitriol spewed out against Ortega and the Sandinistas. First, the Liberals were just as much supporters of the Pact's reforms, as the Sandinistas have never had a legislative majority, and the PLC controlled the Presidency when these reforms passed. This does not make the reforms more legitimate, but the PLC was a critical player in designing the current institutions governing elections. Second, the Right, and principally the Liberals, have been divided since before 2006. In the 2006 elections, Ortega ran against two Liberal candidates who together won over 50% of the vote. Had the Liberals been able to coordinate better, Ortega would not be president. The same can be said for the most recent municipal elections. On the Left there was the FSLN, but on the Right there were four parties, the PLC, the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, the Nicaraguan Resistance Party, and AC. Notwithstanding that these Right parties have very little to offer most poor Nicaraguans besides anti-Sandinista rhetoric and dubious claims about good government, they would be more successful at winning elections if they ran as a single coalition.

While the final results of the municipal elections have not been released, the CSE has released provisional results for 100 municipalities. I have analyzed these and compared them to previous results from 2004, when the FSLN won 87 out of 152 municipalities. Of these 100 municipalities, there is a slight increase in the number won by the FSLN, but not much. 77 out of the 100 municipalities for which I have results were won by the FSLN, but if I add together the votes on the Right, the FSLN would have lost 10 of these municipalities had the Right parties been able to coordinate. Out of the 100 municipalities, 15 changed hands from the PLC to the FSLN, of which 5 could have remained in PLC hands had the Right only ran one candidate. The FSLN lost control in only 2 municipalities.

When final results are finally released, I will try to write some more about this election. While there are a lot of claims right now that fraud occurred, I have not seen anything that suggests systematic fraud at the level of counting votes. There are plenty of stories about isolated incidents of polling place irregularities, and some ballots being dumped in León, but these incidents by themselves do not amount to a systematic attempt to commit fraud. However, the claims against the legitimacy of some of Nicaragua's electoral institutions, of which I tend to agree, date back before Ortega's presidency and the Liberals deserve as much blame for the reforms as the Sandinistas.

Opposition March in Nicaragua violently attacked by Sandinistas

Quoted from the Nicaragua Network's NicaNet hotline:

On Sept. 20, people identifying themselves as Sandinistas prevented an opposition march and rally from taking place in the city of Leon. Attacks on opposition demonstrators wounded five people; many more were bruised and battered. Sandinista activists blocked highways to prevent busses from entering Leon for the planned march. National Assembly Deputy Luis Callejas of the “Let’s Go with Eduardo” Movement (MVE) told La Prensa that members of the Sandinista group broke the windshield of his car, stopped busses, and attacked with machetes three people who were taken to the Chinandega hospital. On the Pan American Highway between Nagarote and La Paz Centro, police intervened to remove Sandinistas who had blocked the highway with burning tires, boulders and tree trunks.

FSLN historic combatant, Benito Quiroz, who fought in the Sandinista war to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship, told La Primerisima Radio that the Sandinistas would not permit groups which would sell out the country to march in the city. “We are acting within our rights; it is our duty; they are not going to take the revolution away so easily,” Quiroz said, adding “Leon is FSLN territory.” Leon FSLN Political Secretary Evert Delgadillo told La Prensa that days previously it had been decided to “carry forward the battle to defend the red and black [the traditional Sandinista colors] people’s bastion [of Leon].”

On the campus of the Autonomous Catholic University, Sandinistas burned a car belonging to the president of the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), Enrique Saenz, and threw bags of black oil at MRS and MVE politicians. Police officers protected the political leaders until they left the city a few hours later. Horacio Roca, sub-director of the National Police, said that they were going to “evaluate the situation” in Leon. Edmundo Jarquin, former MRS presidential candidate, said that the police had a dilemma “because they tried to protect the rights of the opposition group but were reluctant to suppress the aggressors because of their Sandinista links dating to their founding.”

The opposition march was organized by the Democratic Coalition of the West including the Movement for Nicaragua, which was created and funded by the US International Republican Institute of the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as the United Citizenry for Democracy, the Civil Coordinator, the United Movement for Leon, the Pro-Vote Movement and other opposition groups whose sources of funding are unknown.

Saenz said that he placed the blame for the burning of his car directly on the FSLN candidate for mayor of Leon, Manuel Calderon. He said, “Calderon, accompanied by a red and black mob, began to throw stones and later entered private property to burn my car and destroy the truck of Felix Noel Garcia.”

I used to follow Nicaraguan politics as best I could online, but I haven't been paying close attention the last couple years. I find this attack somewhat surprising in the sense that political violence in Nicaragua has not been all that common in recent years. But, it seems the polarizing effect of the election of Daniel Ortega to the presidency in 2006 is leading to some increasingly ugly conflicts. 

Nicaragua is holding municipal elections in November, which are sure to be another polarizing affair. The municipal elections in 2004 were incredibly important for the Sandinistas in demonstrating the party's political comeback after several disappointing elections throughout the 1990s and Ortega's consistently poor election results in the three presidential elections prior to 2006. The Sandinistas are looking to increase the number of municipalities they govern in these upcoming elections, although they already control a majority of municipalities, including nearly all the major population centers of Nicaragua. If the party does do well in these upcoming elections, we may see more political unrest.

If you are interested in reading a decent summary of what has been going politically in Nicaragua since 2006, click here. (Please read this with a grain of salt, the biases are pretty apparent, but there aren't many options when trying to find information on any Central American country).

Nicaragua

I am interested in this story of Daniel Ortega's Citizen Power Councils. The Nicaraguan opposition claims that he is creating a dictatorship through the CPCs, which are funded by Venezuela. There is really no accountability for the money and it's pretty clear that Ortega is building the Sandinista movement through this funding.

I'm less interested in the fear mongering over Ortega. On one level, I'm pretty uncomfortable with Ortega generally and the potential for corruption and for skirting the apparatus for government is obvious. It's clear that Nicaragua is still deeply affected by the Cold War civil wars. Both sides seem to operate through this framework.

What's more interesting to me though is the fact that Ortega is using this money to help the poor. And his opponents have never had any plan to help the poor and still apparently don't. Much of this money is going for microloans and food supplies. It is legitimate that the conservative opposition doesn't like Ortega's methods. Less acceptable is their clear indifference to helping the people. For all the criticisms leveled at Ortega and Hugo Chavez, I think the opposition must come up with a real plan to help the poor. If they don't like the CPCs, how are they going to pave roads? How are they going to provide food? How are they going to give and administer microloans? The conservatives had 15 years after the fall of the Sandinistas to fix some of their issues with poverty and they did virtually nothing. They didn't even really try to. So I have a hard time taking their opposition seriously, even if they aren't all wrong.

Historical Image of the Day

"Another American Aviation Achievement." Cartoon from the Louisville Courier-Journal, July 21, 1927.

The cartoon depicts the Battle of Ocotal, where US invading forces killed more than 300 Nicaraguans in what was the first example of an air attack directed from the ground.

$2.5 Million Case against Dole Fruit Thrown Out

Yesterday, a Superior Court Judge threw out a decision against Dole fruit company that gave 2.5 million dollars to former Dole employees in Nicaragua. The employees had originally sued Dole for using the pesticide DBCP in the 1970s, leaving the workers sterile and with other health problems. The effects of DBCP were already known in the 1970s, yet Dole continued using it on its bananas without warning its workers. In her decision, Judge Chaney ruled 'that punitive damages cannot be used to punish "a domestic corporation for injuries that occurred only in a foreign country.'"

This is obviously a setback on several fronts. Environmentally, is possibly sets precedent for companies not to have to pay such damages in cases involving pesticides that are bad for both the environment and for workers. Financially, it does nothing to stop companies like Dole from worrying about the consequences of their actions. And, at the most basic level, the ruling is absurd in terms of labor and business. Dole (and all the other fruit companies, past and present) is in no way, and never was, a "domestic" corporation. Are they based in the U.S.? Yes. Do they make all their tax claims and ownership claims in the U.S.? Sure.

But it's not because Dole is some strong domestic company. The amount of land Dole (and other fruit companies) own in Latin America, from Honduras to Colombia, is absurd. They frequently buy up all land they can, pushing the poor off or forcing the poor to become what are virtually peon laborers, just to continue producing bananas. They do this because the pesticides and chemicals they use to grow and preserve bananas are so destructive that, after about 20 years, the lands that currently grow bananas become sterile. Instead of being environmentally responsible by spending a little more to use less damaging products, or instead of waiting for the land to regain its fertility, they just pick up and relocate everything to one of their massive landholdings that they have held fallow, waiting for just such a moment, at which point the production begins anew, with the currently-used land certain to be sterile in another 20 years or so.

And they do this all while having a ridiculous amount of say in the politics and economy of these Central American countries. Sure, it's not quite like it was when Minor Keith of United Fruit Company owned Costa Rica's "national" railroad, ports, and transportation lines, but it's not like Dole has no stakes in the Caribbean. It is absolutely dependent on the region for its land, its production, its labor, and its profits, and its connection to politicians, businessmen, and leaders in the region, while diminished in the last couple of decades, is far from lost. Dole is about as "domestic" as GM with its plants in Mexico and throughout the world.

Chaney's decision is extremely disappointing and even ridiculous. Dole is domestic only in the strictest, most narrow-minded sense of the word ("it's based in the U.S., so it's domestic!"), yet her decision has once again screwed over workers whose lives were already irreparably damaged by Dole's policies in the 1970s. A decision like this does nothing to discourage Dole or other companies in the future. It is extremely infuriating, and it is probably a major setback.

New England Patriots "World Champion 2008" Shirts in Nicaragua - Photographic Proof!!

I wrote about the "New England Patriots World Champions" t-shirts going to Nicaragua 2 weeks ago, and now, here is photo evidence for those interested. I particularly like the "19-0" below the "Champions". Oops.

The Very Real and Horrible Consequences of Nicaragua's 2006 Abortion Ban

This story reveals how the real effects of Nicaragua's no-exceptions abortion ban are playing out now, and the news is not good:

"Two weeks after Olga Reyes danced at her wedding, her bloated and disfigured body was laid to rest in an open coffin — the victim, her husband and some experts say, of Nicaragua's new no-exceptions ban on abortion.
Reyes, a 22-year-old law student, suffered an ectopic pregnancy. The fetus develops outside the uterus, cannot survive and causes bleeding that endangers the mother. But doctors seemed afraid to treat her because of the anti-abortion law, said husband Agustin Perez. By the time they took action, it was too late."

Let's get this clear: this wouldn't have been an "unwanted pregnancy" abortion. This wouldn't have been a case of abortion-as-birth-control. This wouldn't even have been a case where, had the pregnancy been brought to term, the fetus would survive. This was, simply put, a case where, because of the law in Nicaragua, a dead baby was going to kill its 22 year old mother. No doubt, doctors were probably afraid to treat Reyes out of fear they would be prosecuted. As the article points out, fewer than twelve (TWELVE!) legal abortions a year were recorded in Nicaragua prior to 2006, but the number of secret abortions was doubtlessly higher (though I see no reason to trust the Catholic Church's figure of 36,000, obviously given the nature of the source). Had this law not been put into effect, it isn't that Nicaraguan women everywhere would be running to get an abortion. But women like Reyes (and the other two, unnamed women who have already died because they couldn't get the treatment they had to have to survive) are instead forced to die because the medical profession (which, last time I checked, was kind of there to help us live) couldn't and wouldn't help her.

The fact that Reyes had a condition in which the fetus - no matter the outcome - was going to die, and yet she couldn't save her own life, and that doctors weren't willing to save her life, offers just one more reason why this abortion ban has to go. It isn't just denying what should be the fundamental rights of a woman - it's hiding behind the "defense of life" while actually killing more people.

Effects of the Total Abortion Ban in Nicaragua

With little surprise to me, Daniel Ortega's support of banning all forms of abortion in Nicaragua (all in the name of getting the conservative and religious vote in Nicaragua last year) has had disastrous results. A Human Rights Watch report puts the number of women dead at at least 80 since last year's ban, implemented in November, shortly after Ortega's election. The law, banning any form of abortion (even if the mother's life is in danger) has not only doubtlessly increased the number of deaths and injuries from illegal abortions; as the Human Rights Watch points out, it has also led to women becoming fearful of seeing doctors even in totally legal cases of women's health, for fear of prosecution. Likewise, doctors remain fearful of offering legal health services to women, again for fear of prosecution. Thus, pregnant women will continue to die in Nicaragua as long as this law remains in effect, not just through clandestine abortions, but through the failure to get the basic (legal) medical attention they need, due to women's and doctors' fears of prosecution, even if their needs and care are legal.

That Nicaragua passed such a law is incredible; that Ortega so heavily sponsored it is unforgiveable. For all those who insist that banning abortion anywhere will lead to positive results, Nicaragua is now tragically a damning indictment of how terrible such laws are.

(via The Latin Americanist)