Obama, Lula, and Iran: Understanding the Complexities of International Relations

One of the refrains I've heard from some in Latin American and in the U.S. is that Obama is no different than Bush in terms of policies. These claims are clearly laughable at face value, and every value beyond that. Still, some still make those claims, based mostly on a "reasoning" that (and I paraphrase) "Obama hasn't stopped the wars, and Obama's a leader of an empire, just like Bush was." Again, stupid and simplistic arguments, but they exist.

In the face of such baseless and unrealistic accusations, this week offered yet another reminder of just how different the two administrations are:

President Obama sent a letter on Sunday to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil reiterating the American position on Iran’s nuclear program, a day before Iran’s president made his first state visit to Brazil, an aide to Mr. da Silva said Tuesday.

Mr. Obama did not explicitly criticize Mr. da Silva for hosting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, implying instead that he hoped Mr. da Silva would use the occasion to express support for the international effort to forge a compromise on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, according to two American officials.

In the three-page letter, Mr. Obama restated his support for a proposal by the International Atomic Energy Agency that would try to steer Iran into developing nuclear energy for peaceful, civilian purposes. The proposed accord calls for Iran to export most of its enriched uranium for additional processing into a form that could be used in a medical reactor in Tehran.

The differences between Bush and Obama should be fairly clear here. In Bush's black-and-white, with-me-or-against-me vision of foreign relations, I just don't see how he would have been nearly as nuanced in his letter-writing (if he even bothered to write a letter). Instead, we probably would have gotten some tired mashup of the "axis of evil" rhetoric, with no efforts to use Ahmadinejad's trip to Brazil to try to emphasize the policy we felt should be taken (which, to be fair, called for war against Iran during the Bush years - not exactly a policy to push at any time).

Under Obama, we get a cordial letter that clearly shows a far more nuanced understsanding of how international politics work not just between the U.S. and other countries, but between other countries and other countries. It's a far more multi-lateral position that understands and acknowledges the importance of other countries in the global arena without ever "conceding" the U.S.'s own role. Indeed, I think it's safe to say that Obama's move, while it may not be effective, was rather brilliant: he found a way to try to get the U.S.'s message to Ahmadinejad without ever having to talk directly to the Iranian president. Whether Obama's letter came up in conversation between Lula and Ahmadinejad (and what the nature or tone of that conversation was) may never be known, but moves like this should obliterate any declaration that Obama and Bush are "the same thing."

And as for Ahmadinejad's trip to Brazil, while it has sparked controversy, it hasn't been on the level of Chavez's alliance to Iran. Earlier this month, Lula met independently with Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas and with Israel's president, Shimon Peres, in an effort to try to increase negotiations for peace in the middle east. Lula has made little secret of his goal to use Brazil's newfound diplomatic presence in the global community to try to work towards peace in the region, and has even gone so far as to recommend the Brazilian national soccer team play a friendly game against an Israeli-Palestinian team. From Lula's point of view, Ahmadinejad's visit is a part of that broader effort. While the U.S. media has grossly misrepresented the Iranian president's trip to Brazil, declaring the trip, as Time magazine did, to be in "defiance" of the U.S., Time's own report indicated otherwise, and revealed Lula's motivation for hosting Ahmadinejad:

Lula enjoys considerable respect internationally, and the incorrigible talker believes problems can be resolved through dialogue. Before Ahmadinejad arrived, Lula pointedly declared, "It is important that someone sits down with Iran, talks with Iran and tries to establish a balance so we can get back to a kind of normality in the Middle East."

Exactly. Treating Iran's trip to Brazil as some isolated incident totally misses the point. Lula isn't meeting with Iran to thumb his nose at the U.S., or to show his support for "terrorism," or any such matter. The Iranian visit is part of a month-long effort to accelerate peace efforts in the Middle East, and Lula is well aware that Iran would be central to any such efforts. And it's not like it was some sycophantic, "best friends forever!" trip:

Of course, Lula has plenty of differences with his guest from Iran. He has made it clear he supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has made a point of repudiating all acts of intolerance or terrorism, and has subtly criticized Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust and of homosexuality in Iran.

Those are messages that Ahmadinejad needs to hear from friends, notes Anoush Ehteshami, a professor at the Centre for Iranian Studies at Durham University in England. Since Iran does not appear to be listening to the West, especially not the United States, on the issue, the emergence of interlocutors who could help bridge the gap between the two sides ought to be welcomed. "Hearing [these messages] from Lula will be a little bit better received than if it were coming from U.S. President or E.U. leaders," Ehteshami says.

Once again, that's exactly right. This latest trip is just another example of Lula's model of diplomacy throughout his career. Diplomacy depends on talking, on dialogue, and not on rejecting other leaders or countries simply because you disagree with them. And any effort towards peace, no matter who is leading it, is a valuable step. Sometimes, other countries may be in a better position for these kinds of talks than the U.S. is, and this is one of those instances. And anybody who insists Brazil is suddenly "palling around" with terrorists or directly contradicting the U.S. intentionally simply has no understanding of how diplomacy and foreign relations do and should work.

The Very Real Economic Effects of George LeMieux's Stupidity

Republican Senator George LeMieux's oh-so-brave, principled stand against Barack Obama's nominee for ambassador to Brazil, is having a negative effect on more than just our diplomatic relations:

Boeing Co. may lose a $7.5 billion jet fighter sale to Brazil unless the U.S. Senate lifts a four- month delay in confirming President Barack Obama’s nominee for ambassador to Latin America’s biggest country, a former top U.S. diplomat to the region said. [...]

“This will cost thousands of U.S. jobs,” said Aronson, who served as top envoy to the region from 1989 to 1993 for Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. “It’s an insult to Brazil to tell them they’re not important enough to have an ambassador like so-called advanced countries but that we want them to buy our planes over the French.”

Boeing is working to prevent Dassault from winning a contract that analysts estimate could be valued at as much as 5 billion euros ($7.5 billion). The Chicago-based company delivered its final offer for the F/A-18 Super Hornets in October, after French President Nicolas Sarkozy traveled to Brazil and won a promise from his counterpart, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, to open exclusive talks to buy Dassault’s Rafale jet.

That's right - because of LeMieux's pigheaded and completely unnecessary stubbornness, the U.S. may lose thousands of jobs when we desperately need some good news in the employment front. Not only that, we would lose those jobs to France, who just a few years back Republicans excoriated because France wouldn't support the Iraq war. Such moments as these often lead to hyperbole, but I'm not so certain that, at this point, calling LeMieux an economic traitor is too far off the mark.

Republicans Once Again Blocking Obama's Nominee for Ambassador to Brazil

A few weeks back, I wondered if the U.S. was about to finally get its ambassador for Brazil, as Jim DeMint had decided to stop his grandstanding and obstruction on one of the most increasingly important ambassador positions for the U.S. It seemed that things would finally get resolved.

Well, meet Senator George LeMieux, the new Jim Demint:

Shortly after Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC) agreed to drop his opposition to President Barack Obama’s nominee for Ambassador to Brazil, interim Sen. George LeMieux (R-FL) decided to pick up where DeMint left off. DeMint had been blocking Thomas Shannon’s nomination over the Obama’s policy on the coup in Honduras; LeMieux, on the other hand, is accusing the former Bush nominee of being soft on Cuba. According to an anonymous Republican aide, LeMieux is delaying Shannon’s confirmation over the role he played in initiating talks with Cuba on migration and direct mail service when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under the Obama administration.

DeMint's excuses were absolutely risible, but LeMieux's complaints about Shannon make DeMint look like a seasoned veteran of international affairs. Obstruction because of an individual's role in talks over direct mail service to Cuba? Clearly, Shannon is a massive communist threat who cannot take office!!!!!

As Erik has repeatedly said, this is the kind of thing Democrats absolutely need to be broadcasting loud and clear to the American public in order to show how childish, ridiculous, stupid, and hypocritical Republican politicians have become. And while that kind of tactic won't appear with the older generation of Democratic politicians, we can still hope younger and up-and-coming Democrats adopt them.

Seeing the Future of International Relations

Yglesias sees into the future, and to him it looks like this:

I don’t really think speculation about who will “dominate” this century is a great way to think about things. Almost certainly in 2079 the United States of America will have less relative power than it does today, and that will almost certainly be a good thing—it will be because people in China and India and Brazil and Indonesia are richer and because Europe continues on a path of peace and integration.

I'm really unsure about this. He's always a fairly optimistic fellow it seems, and I certainly am rarely accused of this. But for someone who writes about climate change not infrequently, Yglesias seems blind to connecting that discussion with his more general thoughts about foreign relations. That's a nice scenario he paints there, but it totally ignores the reality of drought, water shortages, food shortages, wars over resources, declines in oil, hafnium, and other key elements of economic and technological growth, deforestation, rising sea levels and the displacement that will cause, and a number of other environmental problems likely to get in the way of this rosy future he sees.

He may be right that the U.S. will hold less power in 70 years than it does now; in fact, he probably is. But I don't think that's because other nations will continue to rise in a peaceful manner. Rather, I think it's because the U.S. economy and U.S. mentality will struggle greatly with shortages in ways that other nations might now and that this will likely lead to long-term instability in the U.S. that other nations will be able to exploit, particularly either nations with long-term cooperative arrangements and generally progressive leadership (i.e., Europe) or totalitarian regimes with few qualms about doing what they have to do to stay in power and express that power on the international stage (China).

As for the developing world getting richer, given that Brazil, Indonesia, and any number of other countries rely on unsustainable resource exploitation to grow their economies, how is this going to continue when the wood and the minerals are gone?

Maybe I'm too pessimistic, but I think this scenario is a lot more realistic than what Yglesias offers, moreover I think we are already seeing it begin in Americans' struggle to deal with the financial collapse.

Some More Thoughts on Obama's Nobel Peace Prize

To follow up on what Sarah said regarding the announcement of Obama's Peace Prize, I think a lot of her points are valid. Like the rest of the world, I was initially surprised. In face, my confusion may have outdone most others - I woke up to NPR this morning hearing the following: "Today, the following announcement was made in Sweden [long pause, during which I'm thinking, within the first 30 seconds of waking up, "Please say Philip Roth has finally gotten the Nobel Prize in Literature"]," only to find that Obama has won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Like just about everybody both left and right, my initial reaction (now within the first 60 seconds of waking up) was, "Really?"

However, I apparently seem to think this makes more sense than a lot of people (both left and right). I understand the arguments against it from both sides (well, I don't understand the total vitriol that's already coming from the right, but I expect it): it's too early, it's just a "here's a prize for not being Bush," "what's left if he actually does accomplish something?," "He has two wars going on and is about to escalate Afghanistan - how is that peace?" All of this makes sense to me, and I'd share those feelings, if I thought this was really just about Barack Obama the man's accomplishments.

But I don't. Not exactly, anyways.

This really does seem to be an award for a particular diplomatic approach that embraces more than multi-lateral talks and openness (though it certainly offers that, as well). Maybe others have forgotten, or maybe I've overstated its importance, but Bush's "cowboy diplomacy" approach was so appalling from an international relations standpoint and in terms of all reason and respect to the world, that Obama really does mark a major shift. Sure, he has failed at some important domestic policies (thus far, though to all those saying "a peace prize after only 9 months?? But he's failed at health care and reforms!", I'd remind them, "well, yes - but as you yourself admit, it's only been 9 months"). We have focused on this a lot, and rightfully so. But I think in doing so, there's been a (again logical) focus on the domestic side, what between the health care and the economy and don't ask/don't tell.

But from the international standpoint, I really can't emphasize enough how much a shift Obama is. He hasn't caved to pushes for more aggression against Iran, and even his apparently-possible escalation in Afghanistan seems to be actually well-reasoned and considered; even if you don't agree with it, it's not like he's just diving in, consequences be damned. And let's not forget - America was closer than it likes to think to electing a guy who joked we should "bomb bomb bomb, bomb Iran."

And while you can and should argue that in many ways, Obama's policies reflect a return to Bill Clinton's, I don't think that holds in the case of international relations. Obama has proven himself much more open and reasoned in his policy making than even Clinton did. It's about more than just being willing to talk to Chavez face-to-face at a meeting of the OAS, or have Bill Clinton pull some tricky negotiations to release hostages in North Korea, or find a path that the entire international community is willing to follow in dealing with Iran. Indeed, one simply has to look at Honduras since June. Obama has taken an approach to Latin American coups that the U.S. has never seen before - an open, non-partisan condemnation of what was clearly an illegal removal of a president, combined with a refusal to get directly involved by sending troops in. The U.S. had done this any number of times before, and every time, it was wrong to do so. For once, Obama relied on diplomacy, and even while condemning the actions, has refused to directly interfere in Honduras. Sure, he's had the State department take measures to restrict the aid and cash flow to Honduras from the U.S., but that's within his prerogative as president, all the while respecting Honduran sovereignty.

That sounds simple, unimportant; but from a history where the U.S. basically took every opportunity to meddle in, interfere with, and even directly undo democratic processes in Latin America from 1846 to 2002, this is a major, major shift. And it's representative of Obama's policies thus far - respect, doing what's within his power without overstepping the sovereignty of others, all the while working to maintain global relations. Honduras isn't the reason; it's symptomatic of the broader, subtle, but major shifts in how the U.S. is forging a new path in its diplomatic history under Obama.

In that regard, I think he's more deserving of the award than many. Is it too soon? I think that's a fair argument. Is it confusing? A bit (even after having awakened after a cup of coffee). Is there room for improvement? Of course - show me one person who's already perfect. That said, I think this is in part about Obama, and the (what I think is very real) change he brings to American foreign policy. But to focus on it just being about him is to miss the larger point, I think; it's also about embracing a major change in diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the world at large, a change that the U.S. initiated under the leadership of a particular man. And I'm fine with that.

Brazil and Spain Express Concern over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia

Brazil and Spain Express Concern Over Increase of U.S. Troops in Colombia
The recent agreement to put more U.S. troops in Colombia is raising concerns beyond just Venezuela:

Spain’s Miguel Angel Moratinos and Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim expressed their reservations about the effects the military program could have at a press conference within the framework of the Spanish official’s visit to Brazil.

The two ministers also called for dialogue between Venezuela and Colombia and agreed to work “to avoid a spiral of misunderstandings” between those two countries.

This is a good diplomatic move that gives greater weight to regional concerns than Chavez's opposition alone could ever achieve. However, I don't know how much it will actually accomplish.

To be clear, I think the U.S.'s decision is a bad one, for a number of reasons. The "war on drugs" is pretty ineffective in its focus on the supply side rather than the demand side, and basing more troops in Colombia isn't going to solve this problem. What is more, it is clear that this will add to regional suspicion and tension in South America. While Obama's diplomatic efforts in the hemisphere thus far have been admirable in comparison to past administrations (dating to about, oh, 1848), the presence of more U.S. troops on any country's soil is a legitimate cause for concern, regardless of who is president of the United States. For these reasons, I think it's important that Brazil and Spain, who are far from antagonistic towards the U.S., raise these concerns. Again, I'm not sure it will result in any real change in the decision to move troops to Colombia when the Ecuadoran bases close (rather than, you know, having the troops actually come back to the U.S. when the bases close). But Brazil's and Spain's questions and objections should at least make the U.S. stop and take notice, and give the opposition to such a move much greater legitimacy than Chavez's opposition alone could accomplish.

And, on a side note, can we please stop referring to Daniel Ortega as part of some "leftist" "alliance?" Firstly, as I've noted before, these notions in the American media of "leftist alliances" in Latin America are false and lazy. Just because countries are friendly with each other, or from relatively similar political ideologies, does not mean they are some new axis, and American journalists' inability to look at Latin America with a view that is more complex than "leftist" is just shameful. Secondly, and more directly related to Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega has hardly been "leftist." If you want to refer to the Sandinistas as leftist, fine - it's still probably a lazy categorization on the part of the media, but at least it's fairly accurate. But when the actual major "leftist" political group in a country disowns the president as not representing leftist goals, ideals, and missions, could we at least respect that country's political spectrum, and agree that just because a leader isn't as "conservative" as America would like does not mean he/she's some radical "leftist" political force?

Reporting the Honduras Coup, or, "How Some on the Left Are Reinforcing Ridiculous Perceptions of Obama"

Suffice to say, the coup in Honduras is a complex issue involving multiple power-struggles that cut to the core of how power is interpreted and assigned within the Honduran political system. Many people are trying to stay at the front of this story (including us), either through journalism or through analysis. However, as is typically the case in events like these, such quick rushes to judgement often look idiotic.

So it goes when one person has labeled this coup "Obama's First Coup d'Etat." Now, this could be interpreted in one of two ways: that it's the first coup that happened while Obama was president, or that it was the first coup he was involved with, directly or indirectly. I was willing to give the author the benefit of the doubt on the first interpretation, and it seemed that that may have been her viewpoint through the text. However, if it was, her updates leave her open to huge misinterpretation. Throughout the updates (which are frequent), Golinger repeatedly comments on Obama's failure to come out "fast enough" against the coup. I don't exactly know what she expects such a quick rush to judgement from the Obama administration will accomplish, but it's clear that she feels that, by not coming out "unequivocably" against the coup immediately, Obama is betraying some vague desire not to see Zelaya in power.

Fortunately, as Obama said in a recent press conference, the president of the U.S. doesn't work on a "24-hour news schedule." Instead (wonder of wonders), he waits to be informed of exactly what is going on, tries to let events play out some without directly jumping in and making matters worse, and then states his opinion. Indeed, yesterday Obama said that "the coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the president of Honduras." I already know what many would say: "It's too netural," "if Obama really weren't behind the coup, why not say it's 'illegal'," "why doesn't he say 'we fully support Zelaya/oppse the coup'," etc. My answer would be because Obama does have to consider broader-picture issues, and nobody knows how this is going to work out; to blindly pick one side or another before it becoming clear exactly how events will play out over the next hours or days can lead to a huge backfire. Just ask the Bush administration when they supported the failed coup of Chavez immediately in 2002.

Why does this matter? Sure, it's clearly in a partisan online publication that favors Venezuela and looks with very skeptical eyes at U.S. policy, but it's just one site. So what?

The problem is, I found this by getting it from friends in South America. This story is making the rounds among young people (and perhaps older people) who consider themselves "leftist" or "intellectuals" in Laitn America. They may not buy into it, but people generally don't foward stuff without comment if they think it's ridiculous. As a result, this image of the U.S. effectively doing in Honduras under Obama what Bush tried in Venezuela reinforces an image of Obama as just another imperialist bastard out of touch with the world.

This irritates me to no end for the same reasons that accusations in Brazil that Obama is "just like Bush" irritate me: because such positions couldn't be further from the truth. Look, I'm not going to pretend that Obama will be perfect, or that I (or the "left" more generally, whomever it may be at that moment) will always like his policies. We haven't already, and we won't. But to imply that he is no different from Bush simply because he's the head of the U.S. is beyond absurd, particularly given his penchant thus far to do things like, you know, be informed of a situation, listen to others' opinions, and welcome differing viewpoints before making decisions. Vague insinuations and charges from the left (within or outside of the U.S.) that this is "Obama's coup" and condemnations that his wording isn't "strong enough" are as absurd as charges from the right in the U.S. that Obama's response to Iran likewise wasn't "strong enough."

In some ways, this isn't Obama's or the bloggers'/journalists'/intellectuals' fault. As the Times points out today, the overthrow of Zelaya is "pitting Mr. Obama against the ghosts of past American foreign policy in Latin America." And there are a lot of ghosts, from the Mexican-American war and the takeover of 1/3 of Mexico's territory at the time, to the Spanish-American war and the turning of Cuba into a virtual American territory, to the involvement in Guatemala in 1954, to Chile in 1973, to Argentina during the Dirty War, to Guatemala and El Salvador, to the Contras in Nicaragua, to Noriega in Panama, to Chavez...and that only scratches the surface of horrible political moves the U.S. has made. This isn't to excuse Golinger's interpretation, but it's not like she doesn't have her reasons historically.

But there are constructive ways to use that past together with the current administration to try to effect change in U.S. policy. Calling the coup in Honduras "Obama's first coup," with the perjorative connotation that brings (reinforced through constant updates chiding Obama for not coming out with a "strong" statement against the coup), in no way helps anything, is in no way in touch with political realities in international politics, and ultimately makes the left look as ridiculous as those on the right who condemned Obama when it came to Iran.

OAS Readmits Cuba

Even small steps are important ones. And while Cuba may not automatically be in quite yet, this is more than a small step.

Two other quick things to note in passing: first, while the U.S. clearly isn't just welcoming Cuba in with open arms right away, I still can't express how exciting it is to see this country finally using sane, reasoned, rhetoric towards Cuba after more than 50 years. It may not be exactly the rhetoric some want to hear, but at least it's finally measured. Second, and more importantly, it's nice to see the OAS isn't a blatant bully-pulpit for the U.S. to demand smaller and "less powerful" states enforce U.S. policy throughout the region. This has been the case for way too long, and it's just amazing to finally be seeing the OAS functioning as a collection of nation-states, in which the U.S. is but one voice of many, some of whom are often at odds, working together to effect policy throughout the hemisphere based on broad interests rather than the sometimes-childish domination of one country.

China Turning to Brazil for Naval Training

Rob over at LG&M recently broke down the fascinating report that the Chinese are pushing forward their aircraft carrier program. As his IR/military policy posts always are, this one is outstanding, but this part in particular really grabbed my attention:

The PLAN has apparently arranged to begin training its carrier pilots on board the Sao Paulo, Brazil's full deck aircraft carrier.
[...]Sao Paulo, formerly the French Foch, operates A-4 Skyhawks. It appears from this interview that the PLAN has arranged with the Brazilian Navy to train some of its pilots and crews on board Sao Paulo. It's fair to say that this represents a substantial step forward for Chinese naval aviation. This agreement with Brazil will presumably allow the Chinese access to Brazilian naval aviation experts in addition to the carrier itself. This should accelerate the development of Chinese naval aviation
by quite a bit.

I either didn't know or had forgotten that Brazil had an aircraft carrier, and I was certainly surprised to know that it is ahead of China in this regard. Rob does an excellent job outlining why training is so difficult and important. He also does a fine job quickly explaining why China didn't go to the U.S., France, or Russia for training, but I think he misses something. He basically suggests that Brazil was the default trainer for the Chinese, given the reasons the U.S., French, and Russia have to not train China. While it's true in one sense that Brazil was the default ally for China, there was nothing dictating that Brazil had to agree to help China develop its naval power. This isn't a case where China bullied Brazil (and, though it's a gross simplification of complex issues, I like the idea of a country without aircraft carriers threatening a country with an aircraft carrier); through economic agreements, China needs Brazil as much (if not moreso) for its agricultural imports (especially soy), industry, and (down the road) oil as Brazil needs China's money and investment. I certainly don't believe this was a case of Brazil getting forced into an agreement it otherwise wouldn't have made. Yet Brazil signed on happily, with the Minister of Defense going to China later this year to further work out I think it's also evidence of the strengthening ties between China and Brazil, not just economically, but politically.

Of course, I don't envision some future "Sino-Brazilian" hegemon or anything. However, the agreement is mutually beneficial for both China and Brazil; China gets training, and Brazil strengthens its reputation and power as a global force. These efforts have been primarily economic up to this point, but this latest military agreement fits within a broader pattern of each trying to increase its role in international politics. The agreement on the carrier training was apparently part of the private meetings between China and Brazil during Lula's trip to Beijing last week, itself a noteworthy event as China and Brazil strengthened their trade relations in what they hope is a mutually beneficial agreement that would reduce both countries' dependency on the U.S. economy (and also agreed to jointly send 3 satellites into space by 2013). China will send military leaders to Brazil to train, and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim will be going to China in September, presumably when the details of the arrangement will be worked out.

Although Brazil has little it is materially gaining directly from China in this agreement, I think it could be the biggest "winner" here. That a country as powerful as China is turning to Brazil (and only partly out of necessity) is a real coup in Brazil's efforts to demonstrate its equality with the other major world powers. Nothing is assured down the road, but other countries are certainly taking notice of this. I doubt anybody outside of South America is worried about Brazil's military potential, and they shouldn't be; Brazil isn't gunning (no pun intended) for global military domination, and this is certainly not the first time that Brazil has demonstrated its growing power among the biggest international leaders, be it in economic, diplomatic, or military aspects. However, it does mark another major demonstration that Brazil isn't going away anytime soon, and it's a major feather in Brazil's cap in strengthening its position in the international community.

Some Thoughts in the Wake of the Summit of the Americas

The Summit of the Americas wrapped up yesterday, and I have just a few preliminary thoughts on it right now.

-The meeting seems like a huge success (in the best sense of the word) for U.S. foreign policy and for creating a new form of U.S.-Latin American relations that we haven't ever really seen in our diplomatic history. As of yet, there isn't much talk about policy issues that were accomplished, but in many regards, whatever policy was or wasn't formed is irrelevant. The fact that Obama was pretty much able to talk to everybody and establish excellent, cordial, intelligent, and respectful links with the other leaders is seemingly mundane but amazingly important. After 8 years of non-relations and alienation under Bush, it seems to me that the U.S. is in its best position for Latin America ever; from the Latin American standpoint, it seems that the U.S. under Obama finally gets that the region is to be treated respectfully and equally, and not as some inferior region that the U.S. can impose policy on at will. What is more, Obama seems respectful and understanding of differences between countries, knowing that only one way ("my way") is not the only solution. And Obama's openness to listen to all leaders, be it Alvaro Uribe or Raul Castro, now and down the line, marks a major shift in the U.S.'s vision of Latin America, in which we aren't dividing leaders by "ours" or "not ours," but rather acknowledging that each nation has its own leaders, and even if they disagree with us or we with them, their and our legitimacy as potential collaborators is not diminished. Again, this was all talk this weekend, and policy could derail a lot of things, but U.S.-Latin American relations are in the best position I think they've ever been in. And that alone renders the Summit an unqualified success.

-That said, there's not much to say about the policy. I haven't read the Statement yet, but if Boz's analysis is fair, it's a massive failure (albeit one that can't take too much away from the successes of the weekend).

-The one specific area I've read some about is environmental issues. In dealing with energy issues this year, reports are that Obama listened more than offered his own suggestions, taking in what the regions leaders had to say, whether it was Lula discussing biofuels, or Mexico's Calderon continuing to push for a regional "energy market."

-Republicans still just don't get it, having begun to come out already in condemning Obama for his brief-but-congenial encounter with Chavez and his efforts to thaw relations with Cuba. For over 50 years, from the Cold War to the "war on 'terror'," a "with us or against us" mentality has been destructive diplomatically, economically, socially, and politically, and has often led to the deaths of thousands or hundreds of thousands throug the U.S's positions. While both Democrats and Republicans were guilty in the past, given the previous 8 years, Republicans have absolutely no pot to piss in when it comes to telling Obama how he should be running foreign policy, in Latin America or elsewhere. Until Republicans can prove they can come up with constructive policies (foreign or domestic) that actually take a stance other than "if Obama does it, it's wrong," then they have absolutely no political, moral, or ideological ground to stand on. [Although I didn't see it until after I wrote my own post, it turns out that Randy and I are in virtually complete agreement here.]

-If/As the details of individual meetings and discussions between become more available, I may have more. That said, again, even if the actual declaration was a dud, the Summit was great for the region, and one of the brightest beacons of hope for U.S. foreign policy in some time.

Have We Seen the End of the Monroe Doctrine?

Foreign Policy In Focus has a fascinating brief editorial up by Philip Brenner and Saul Landau. In the article, the two men recommend Obama declare the official end of the Monroe Doctrine: "Obama could swiftly improve U.S. relations with Latin America by announcing the death of the Monroe Doctrine and then presiding over its funeral. Such a statement would cost him little domestically, and win him praise and appreciation throughout Latin America and much of the world."

This is a really interesting suggestion. Just off the top of my head, it strikes me that the "Monroe Doctrine," and, perhaps more importantly, the "Roosevelt Corollary," has not been less relevant to American Policy has not been this irrelevant and absent in American policy and rhetoric since at least the Great Depression - well before the atomic bombs, the Cold War, Castro, the collapse of the Soviet Union, etc. If Obama were to declare the end of the Monroe Doctrine, it very well may cost him little domestically. I suspect some Republican politicians and advisors would claim that Obama was "sacrificing security" in the "war on terror," but I just don't see how the American electorate could or even would care about this, even if Republicans shouted about how horrible it was until they are blue in the face. Joblessness is up, incomes are down, the economy is in the tank with no sign of improvement in the near future, health insurance is prohibitively expensive - I just can't see people putting this all aside to say, "No! Not the Monroe Doctrine!" And certainly, it would probably garner some goodwill within Latin America, though how much, I'm not sure - there's already a lot of goodwill right now directed towards the new administration, simply for being not-Bush.

I think towards the end, the brief article implies that, in many ways, the Monroe Doctrine is already in many ways dead. As I said above, since 9/11 and the "War on Terror," America's focus has shifted, and the Monroe Doctrine probably hasn't been as insignificant since the 1930s. And, as I've commented before, the Bush administration's focus on the Middle East and the Islamic World has been of great importance in helping Latin America establish its own political and economic autonomy without the U.S.'s interference.

I would go even further than Brenner's and Landau's explanation, though. It's not just that Lula, Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Nestor and Christina Kirchner, Fernando Lugo, Daniel Ortega, Rafael Correa, and others have overseen an unprecedented level of non-involvement from the U.S. politically. The development of Latin American economies independently of U.S. involvement has also effectively killed off the Monroe Doctrine. Many times in the past, we have used the Doctrine/Corollary not to defend simple political interests, but economic interests as well (such as the 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz to protect in no small part the controlling interests high-ranking members of the Eisenhower administration had in banana production there, or the defense of American industries in Cuba prior to the Cuban Revolution). As Bush sent the U.S. into trillions of dollars of debt with ridiculous tax cuts and obscene spending in futile military involvements, Latin American economies began booming with trade, not just within their own region, but with partners in Africa, Europe, and, probably most importantly, China. All of this helped Latin America as a region to move from its traditional role as an exporter of primary goods to more diversified exporters and importers, giving countries like Brazil and others a stronger and more equitable role in the global economy. In effect, the current economic role Latin America has assumed has played an even greater role in rendering the Monroe Doctrine a dead letter than the elections of this decade.

Just to clarify, I don't think the declaration or actual "death" of the Monroe Doctrine means the U.S. will never ever try to influence the political landscape of a Latin American country again. It takes a pretty naive view of international relations and an enormous ignorance of American history to presume that any powerful nation (which still includes the U.S.) will not try to work for the outcome that's most satisfactory to its interests, including direct or indirect pressure when possible. By that same token, though, it genuinely feels like the era of the U.S. support of any leader (including dictators) who kowtows to our geopolitical and economic visions is over, and I think the Bush administration, the rise of the so-called (and falsely-treated as unified) "left" in Latin America, and economic development in the region have played an enormous role in this shift. Declaring the end of the Monroe Doctrine publicly may be little more than a symbol at this point, but it would be an important symbol that could play an interesting, and perhaps even important, role in re-shaping our relations with Latin American countries. I don't see any evidence that Obama will do it, but it would be a great way to mark the changes that have already happened in U.S.-Latin American relations.

Bolivia and Brazil Joining Forces in Combatting Drug Trade

This is a few weeks old (I apologize for the light blogging - I currently have two grant proposals, a conference paper, a dissertation chapter, and a part-time job on my plate, and things have actually calmed a bit from the first 4 weeks of the year), but I wanted to point out that Bolivia and Brazil have joined forces in combatting the cocaine trade along their border in the wake of the expulsion of the DEA. It's a fascinating agreement that serves both wonderfully - Brazil is making an effort to implement some national drug policy efforts rather than letting police blaze their way into favelas, and Bolivia is making a strong effort to make clear that while coca leaf production is non-offensive and important to its economy, it has little tolerance for the cocaine trade. Additionally, Bolivia gets more infrastructural agreement as part of the deal, and Brazil strengthens its role as a regional leader in lending and development projects for its neighbors. Boz reminds us also that combatting the drug trade behooves more nations than the U.S., and that fighting it doesn't always have to involve the U.S.

But there is another major aspect worth mentioning here, too. Although the U.S. under Bush constantly chastized Morales for Bolivia's coca production (leading to occasionally humorous interactions between the two countries), Morales has always made it clear that the coca leaf itself is not a drug, and that he's against the proliferation of cocaine production. The distinction is important and relatively easy to understand, but one that the United States has never bothered to grasp. This request to Brazil just further evidence both of that fact, and of fact that U.S. really has gone about in the "war on drugs" in the Andes in the totally wrong way.

Relations between Brazil and Ecuador Normalize

Last month, I wrote about Ecuador defaulting on its loans to Brazil. At the time, I commented that the defaulting, combined with tensions between Brazil and Ecuador over dams Brazilian companies constructed in Ecuador, had created a lose-lose situation for both Brazil and Ecuador; the former was paying financially and had strained relations with one of its "leftist" allies on the continent, while the latter was isolating itself and creating a situation that would cause problems both presently and in the future both in terms of diplomacy and in terms of Ecuador's on infrastructural development.

Apparently, cooler heads have prevailed, though, as a couple of weeks ago (I haven't really had time to get around to this until now) Ecuador has paid back Brazil's BNDES for the funds to build the dams, and, in response, Brazil has sent its ambassador back to Ecuador, thereby reopening normalized relations between the two countries. While Brazil does gain a bit here diplomatically, it's really Ecuador that wins out in resolving this problem. Brazil was one of the few friends and willing foreign creditors able to help out Ecuador as the global economies deal with crisis; had Ecuador continued to alienate itself from Brazil, it would have faced real obstacles in infrastructural development, financial aid, and diplomatic relations in the region. I completely agree with Boz that Ecuador blinked first because it really couldn't afford not to, and this does help Brazil strengthen its position in the region even further. Overall, I think it's a satisfying end to what was a point of contention between the two countries that could have been increasingly damaging (particularly for Ecuador) had it been drawn out further.

Lula's Plan for Brazil's Military to Upgrade, Improve, Diversify

This has been in the works for awhile, but yesterday, Lula finally announced his restructuring plan for the Brazilian military. Among other things, the plan reorganizes the entire military into brigades for faster mobilization abilities; seeks to decrease Brazil's dependence on other nations for arms and weapons and increase its own military technology production (including satellites and nuclear-powered submarines); and, in what is perhaps the most novel part of the plan, to actually enforce mandatory conscription on people from all classes.


The technological and tactical parts of this plan are interesting, and could have a profound impact on Brazil's economy, it's role in the region and the world, and its military and international relations. I admit that, upon first learning of this, I was a bit uneasy - after all, Brazil's military was frequently involved in politics in the 20th century. (In addition to the 1964-1985 dictatorship, the military also intervened in politics in 1930, 1937, 1945, 1955, 1961, and finally, 1964; these interventions were not always direct, and could often take the form of "the military is providing vague threats if we politicians don't do X," as was the case in 1961; nor were these interventions always successful, as in 1955; still, one can easily identify at least those 6 cases of military involvement to one degree or another in Brazilian politics, and you can argue that there were other instances, too). Up until the announcement of the plan, there were just vague mentions of "increasing the military's power" in Brazil. Still, it seems that this is directed mostly at improving the ability of the military to mobilize, improve its standing in the region, protect Brazil's territory (no doubt, the discovery of a major oil field off Sao Paulo's coast providing some additional motivation for this latter issue), and other measures. Certainly, increased firepower and greater mobility could lead to a greater role of Brazil's military in politics down the road, and I'm still a bit uncertain about this, but it is at least not openly increasing the military's presence in the political sphere, which is a small victory I guess. And the fact that Brazilian progressive Roberto Mangabeira Unger (who, tangentially, was one of Obama's law professors at Harvard) is the author of this project is also encouraging if for no other reason than it wasn't drawn up by some conservative or a hawk.

However, I find Lula's efforts to actually enforce military conscription for everybody to be quite a fascinating aspect. Although the military is technically and legally supposed to conscript from all Brazilian sectors regardless of class, race, etc., the reality is Brazil's military ranks are composed overwhelmingly of the poor and marginalized who do not have recourse to get out of such service and who often accept it because they need the money. For decades and even generations (dating back to at least the Paraguayan War) there has been an unspoken understanding that elites and (more recently) the middle classes were "above" military service. So in one sense, any effort to break through this mold to prove that "mandatory conscription" applies to all Brazilian citizens, and not just those who don't have an economic/cultural/political way to avoide it.

While I like the idea of forcing the middle class and elite youths into the military, in practice I don't think is this automatically a great thing. Taking the most recent case, when Brazil's military led the coup in 1964, it did so with the support of the middle and upper classes. Many of the working class men who were actually in the military at the time were strong supporters of Joao Goulart, the deposed president, and the military really had to crack down on its own troops in order to "keep the ranks in line." Even today, a majority of the Brazilian middle class and elites are social and political conservatives with little tolerance for the poor or the racially marginalized (a marginalization made greater by the fact that Brazilians by and large culturally deny the existence of racism by claiming extreme miscegenation makes racism "impossible," which is, of course, bunk). Filling the ranks with conservatives who believe the poor are poor because they are "lazy" and "criminals" seems to make it more likely that, if the military were to launch another coup because somebody was too "progressive" in the future, the military would have much more support from the ranks than it did in 1964. What is more, it's not like conscription of all classes will lead to some amazing social levelling. It still seems highly likely that, even if the ranks were levelled out socially, the children of middle-class and elite families probably stand a much greater chance of promotion into the officer corps, due to factors such as better education as children, economic power, political connections, etc. Thus, while the face of the ranks might become more diverse, I really don't think the officer corps would, and given that it's the officers who are responsible for strategy, the power structure in the military would continue to be lopsided.

In spite of all this, though, I just don't see this enforcement of mandatory conscription for all happening anytime soon; rather, I think that part of the plan is simply the first step in trying to force the issue in Brazil. And I think that Lula's administration recognizes this, too - after all, Unger himself said this should start a "novel debate" on the issue of conscription and exactly what role sectors like the middle-class and the elties play in the Brazilian nation. Generally, if you're really trying to enforce a strong program, you don't comment that y our plan will spark an "novel" debate. Still, the fact that any presidential administration is even going so far to admit that there's definitely a social inequality when it comes to who has to serve in teh military and who does not is a decent step. I don't honestly know if this will go any further, and wouldn't be surprised if it doesn't (Lula has plenty on his plate between now and 2010, and there's no reason to believe his successor would strongly push this issue). But it is an interesting if subtle shift in the way the governments since 1985 have dealt with the issue of military service and nation. This fact, together with the significant changes in more technical and technological aspects of the plan, make it a fascinating and potentially game-changing plan not just in terms of military composition, but of Brazil's internatinoal relations, regional politics, and militarization throughout the continent in the near future.

Ecuador Defaults on Its Loans - What Does It Mean for South America?

Back in October, I began wondering if relations between Ecuador and Brazil were not starting to head south. Dissatisfied with the work that Odebrecht, one of the largest construction firms in Brazil, had performed on dams in Ecuador, Correa expelled the company and siezed control of the dams in question. This was a particularly inflammatory action because Lula's government, ever trusting on the power of negotiations, had made strong efforts to work out a settlement between Odebrecht and Ecuador, and Ecuador, which gave hints that it may be willing to settle, rather quickly reversed course. In response, Brazil suspended a trade mission to Ecuador, and the sale of 24 Super Tucano jets (from Brazil) was frozen. Relations on both sides were harmed, as Brazil and Ecuador both had financial and infrastructural benefits they could have co-benefited from before things got tense.

Well, if things were tense before, they will get ugly now, as Ecuador has defaulted on its loans. As Boz pointed out, when Ecuador was trying to get support in the region for its default, Brazil was less than welcome to working with Ecuador on the issue, in part because of Correa's somewhat abrasive attitude towards Brazil back in September and October. The default only worsens things, as Odebrecht was not the only matter at issue back in October; Brazil's development bank (the BNDES) had invested $243 million in aid to help Ecuador, and the expulsion of Odebrecht and the default put that money at risk for Brazil. Brazil has already announced that it will no longer lend money to Ecuador, given its history of defaulting (in addition to this year, Ecuador also defaulted on loans in 1999, as well as in the 1980s.

Nor is Brazil the only one at risk here. By defaulting, Venezuela, one of Correa's creditors, is now going to probably have to swallow at least $400 million in bonds, at a time when the economy in Venezuela is already threatened by the low price of oil right now.

Right now, it's still pretty difficult to really come down on one side or another in this issue. I certainly don't think Ecuador "defaults out of spite." The default on loans is something Correa has been threatening since he ran for president in 2006. What is more, he's not some economic idiot or an uninformed ideologue - he has a PhD in international economics. That said, I think his move has a very real chance of seriously harming Ecuador's relations with its neighbors. Defaulting on IMF and World Bank loans that impose neoliberal economics is one thing; defaulting to friendly nations like Brazil and Venezuela, who can relate to the experience of onerous debts and who are providing a far more friendly, regional alternative to the IMF and World Bank is a very different matter. And Ecuador certainly isn't defaulting due to a lack of funds - it apparently has $5.65 billion in cash reserves right now, so this isn't a case of "we simply can't afford it." It definitely seems, as Ishmael put it, that "this is an ideological dispute more than a strictly economic one (in as much as you can separate the two)." And I'm not totally unsympathetic to Correa's desire to wipe the slate clean from debts established by previous administrations, and try to lead economic reform from within.

At the same time, Brazil and Venezuela certainly aren't "predatory creditors." Those two countries have been at the forefront in helping South America as a whole become a stronger economic bloc, breaking some of its economic dependence on trade deals and loans with the U.S. and Europe and strengthening the region's own economic power in the global economy (as well as helping to improve infrastructure and social programs). However, as two growing regional and, in the case of Brazil, global economic powers, they are experiencing one of the downsides that comes with a global economic presence: not all investments pay off in the end. This may not be the first time Brazil has had a debtor default in loans to Brazil, but I certainly can't think of a previous instance, and certainly not one with this magnitude both economically and geopolitically.

I think overall, everybody is losing in this. Correa's choice may be right for his country financially, but his general abrasiveness is really alienating and is putting Ecuador more and more in a corner by itself. What is more, Ecuador simply does not have all of the capabilities to establish major infrastructural development and independence on its own right now, and relies on its neighbors for basic construction and military needs (as the Odebrecht case and its fallout demonstrated), so the temporary economic benefits it may gain from defaulting are still mixed. And Brazil and Venezuela certainly are losing out: after trying to help a neighbor with a similar political ideology (i.e., more "left" than "right"), they are left swallowing hundreds of millions of dollars in loans, just as the global economy gets weaker. They really have no incentive to help out Ecuador in the future, and I wouldn't blame them for refusing to do so. I wouldn't say that Ecuador's regional relations are irreparably damaged, but given this default and (in the case of Brazil) previous contentions with its neighbors, Ecuador is looking pretty isolated right now.

Bolivia's Situation Deteriorating, Threatening to Affect South America from the Caribbean to Tierra del Fuego

Events in Bolivia this week have gotten virtually no attention in the U.S. (due in no small part because people don't care, as well as the fact that the media has had the presidential campaigns, the non-Chilean 9/11 anniversary, and now Hurricane Ike to discuss). However, in the last few days, things have escalated to a point that Bolivia's internal crisis between Morales and the highlands vs. the four lowlands regions are threatening to blow up into a transnational diplomatic crisis.

In summary, despite Morales winning the referendum on his administration in early August, the situation has only worsened between his administration and the four eastern lowlands regions that have wanted virtual economic and political secession. As Erik accurately surmised, the situation has come to a standstill, with neither side gaining the upper hand as violence only escalates. Confrontations between rural workers (often of indigenous backgrounds) and the opposition (often of "whiter" and wealthier backgrounds) have escalated, with 8 deaths (seven of them campesinos who were surrounded and attacked) and 34 injuries yesterday alone. Morales also expelled the U.S. ambassador from Bolivia on Wednesday, claiming that the ambassador is supporting the four regions in an effort to undermine Morales's leadership. While the U.S. State Department called such claims "baseless," there is absolutely no more reason to trust the U.S. than there is Morales, particularly given our history of having the highest levels of the executive branch undermining leaders we didn't like in the past (Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973 [hat-tip to Randy], Argentina in 1976, Nicaragua in the 1980s, or Venezuela in 2002).

However, unlike previous times of conflict in Bolivia, this time, the threat of hemispheric involvement is greater. Already, as a sign of "solidarity," Hugo Chavez has expelled the U.S. ambassador from Venezuela. While this is the story that's getting the most press in the U.S., though, in many ways it's the least important for the rest of the South American continent. In addition to the violence, opponents of Morales blew up one of the major pipelines between Bolivia and Brazil. The attack on the pipeline had an immediate effect on Brazil, as Brazil gets 25% of its daily fuel from Bolivia through this pipeline.

Although the service was restored relatively quickly, Brazil and Bolivia's other neighbors are finding it more difficult not to get involved. Marco Aurelio Garcia, Brazil's special assessor for International Affairs for the President, said yesterday that Brazil "will not tolerate any rupture of institutional order in Bolivia," saying that Morales's overthrow would cause enormous problems for the entire continent. And Lula spoke with Argentine president Kristina Fernandez Kirchner, Chile's Michele Bachelet, Morales, and Chavez yesterday, in an effort to (as the article puts it) "mobilize the countries of the region - especially the Group of Friends of Bolivia, formed by Brazil, Colombia, and Argentina - so that they can serve as an intermediary channel between the government and the opposition in Bolivia."

These actions and statements are far from empty international bluster (even Chavez is probably not making empty threats when he promised to aide an armed resistance movement if the democratically-elected Morales were to be overthrown) that will not be backed up by action. It has been a very long time since the governments of so many South American countries were in such quick contact to try to aide another country (and the last time they were in contact, it was to root out and kill subversives in Operation Condor). The fact that Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are all clearly concerned and not afraid to enter into the equation to make sure Bolivia's institutions remain in tact reveals just how severe the situation has gotten. Certainly, I hope things will get better, but like Erik back in August, I just don't see how they can right now, given how much of a stalemate it's become between Bolivia and the lowlands regions.

Growing Tensions over Spain's Treatment of Brazilians

In early March, tensions between Brazil and Spain flared up over tourism. It began with Spain's sudden refusal to admit 452 Brazilians into the country at Madrid's airport in February. Brazil has a system of reciprocity in terms of visas and tourism; hence, if you live in the U.S., you pay $110 for a tourist visa to Brazil because the U.S. makes Brazilians pay the same to try to obtain a tourist visa to the U.S.* (and if you don't like that, call your local congressman/woman and senator to complain about the U.S.'s policy). Since Spain had begun turning away Brazilian tourists, in early March, Brazil turned away 8 Spaniards for "irregular papers" (which appears to have been the case - Brazil has been trying to crack down on European sex tourism for some time, and part of that crackdown has been an insistence on having your papers in order. (And that's not to say the 8 Spaniards expelled were sex tourists.)

*(Even so, the reciprocity is not complete, because Americans applying for a tourist visa to Brazil are almost guaranteed to get it, and do not have to go through an interview. Brazilians, on the other hand, have to be interviewed at one of the American consulates in Brazil, and if you are refused the visa, you don't even get your $110 back).

Last week, Foreign Policy Blogs had a post up contextualizing the situation a bit more. I think its generally right about Brazil's historical acceptance of immigrants, and Brazilian emigration has been on the rise in the last 40 years or so. I think the one weakness in the post's article, though, is the implicit presumption that the Brazilians who Spain turned away were part of this wave of illegal immigrants. Many of those turned away from Spain in February were middle- and upper-middle class tourists and professionals who were traveling to Spain either for professional duties like international congresses, or to sightsee and escape Brazil during Carnaval (not everybody loves Carnaval, after all).

I understand that Spain may be struggling with illegal immigration, but that in no way excuses Spain's terrible treatment of those who were detained, where Brazilians were "'treated like dogs,' and complained of being held for several days in crowded rooms, receiving insults and bad treatment, or being left for hours without any information about their status, and without food and water or access to their luggage." Compared to this treatment of Brazilians, and the fact that Brazil politely and expediently turned away 8 (and not 452) Spaniards seems more than fair. If Spain really is concerned about illegal immigration, from Brazilians or anybody else, that's within its rights, but there are better and more productive ways to deal with the issue than to just turn away people en masse from the airports, which solves nothing and just leads to diplomatic tensions and travel boycotts from Brazil (I actually knew 2 people who cancelled their trips to Spain to boycott the treatment of Brazilians).

As the post points out, it is essential that both Brazil and Spain work together on this. Spain needs to deal with people more professionally and humanely, be they illegal immigrants or legal tourists. And the possibility of brain-drain as Brazil's talented scientists and businesspeople leave is a threat, though not as great as it was years ago, given how well Brazil's economy is doing and how the government is giving incentive to public university graduates to stay in Brazil.
Still, it's good that both sides sat down last week to start discussing this, and hopefully things will improve, particularly for those Brazilians traveling to Spain legally.

Lula as a Broker between Cuba and the U.S.?

One of Brazil's better newspapers, Folha de São Paulo, has recently reported that, on his last trip to Cuba, Lula met with Raul Castro. Folha reported this past Wednesday that, during their meeting, among the other items Raul mentioned were the possibility of entering an agreement with Brazil that would send more sugar-based ethanol to Cuba, as well as the possibility of Lula brokering a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba that could potentially open relations between the two and end the embargo.

I've commented before on how important I think Lula's international relations approach has been. Instead of trying to kowtow to Europe and the United States in order to improve Brazil's economic standing, he has not been afraid to enter into any trade agreement that might help Brazil down the road, be it in Africa, Asia, Europe, South America, or North America. Cuba is no exception, and Lula has periodically visited there. Clearly, if this report is accurate, Cuba's efforts to switch to sugar-based fuel sources would be useful for Brazil from an economic standpoint, and would also help Cuba move away from oil dependency.

However, what really stands out to me here is Raul's suggestion that Lula broker an end to the embargo and an opening of relations between the United States and Cuba. This would be a great opportunity for Lula, and for Brazil, in several ways. Brazil, undeniably a growing power in the world, would be able to extend some of its influence into the Caribbean, providing a potential (but not antagonistic) second option to the U.S. for Caribbean countries. And lets play with what are simply hypotheticals, now. Let's say Obama should reach the White House next January, and he sticks to his promise to open relations with Cuba. Lula is called in to broker the talks, and after 48 years, the embargo falls, and the political landscape between the United States fundamentally changes (since anytime you start having diplomatic relations with a neighbor after shutting them off for 48 years constitutes quite a "change"). The entire world would probably be rather impressed by all members' participation in the talks, but Lula I think would particularly benefit, simply because it would give Brazil a political standing in the world it hasn't really achieved yet. Sure, it's greatly improving its economic participation and influence in the world, but Brazil hasn't really been considered a major diplomatic influence in the world. Brokering an agreement between the U.S. and Cuba would certainly help change that. And given his relations with Africa, China, the United States, and the European Union, Lula and, perhaps by extension, Brazil, would certainly have a strong claim on being a capable broker for international deals, economic and political.

Now of course, there is plenty of possibility that the above doesn't happen, or that it does, but Lula leaves office in 2010, and the new president doesn't continue Lula's efforts to increase Brazil's influence economically and diplomatically. I still think that the report (and again, this is if it's true) is still great news for Brazil - again, if nothing else holds, it's clear that Brazil is starting to have more influence in the Caribbean than it did. For all of the criticism Lula gets for being from the working class, for starting off as a metalworker, for being from the Northeast, etc. (none of which have any bearing on Lula's ability, but are totally revelatory of the classism and racism of parts of Brazil's middle class and the media here), no president in recent memory (including the presidents during the dictatorship) has done so much to increase Brazil's role in the international community as Lula has.

(via Boz).